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International commercial arbitration has unquestionably become one of the most 
commonly used alternative dispute resolutions owing to the high degree of reliable 
enforceability of arbitral awards, now enshrined in the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the ‘New York 
Convention’). According to the Convention, the enforcement of an arbitral award 
may be refused (other than for serious procedural violations) only when based upon 
the award’s incompatibility with the public interest of the enforcing state (further 
subdivided into the non-arbitrability of the subject matter of the dispute and an 
award’s violation of the enforcing state’s public policy), and such incompatibility is 
to be recognised in only rather exceptional circumstances.  
Although this enforcement-friendly pattern, which restricts significantly the 
application of a public interest defence, appears workable and generally successful in 
dealing with arbitral awards in private disputes, its reliability and clarity are 
inevitably challenged when international arbitration enters the public domain, 
especially that of competition law. On the one hand, as competition law has generally 
come to be recognised as an area of significant public policy interest and the NYC 
does not enumerate subject areas which are excluded from arbitrability, it remains to 
be seen whether competition law disputes are in fact amenable to resolution by 
arbitration, which has become a common form of private dispute resolution. At the 
same time the increasing tendency of ensuring compliance of an award with 
competition policy may well come to extend the restriction binding the enforcing 
court and encourage it more proactively to review an arbitral award in the area of 
competition law disputes. 
This thesis therefore sets out to analyse these challenges and explore a more balanced 
and uniform pattern of enforcing foreign awards which concern important public 
interests by focusing on EU competition law disputes. Moreover, since an arbitral 
award may be reviewed by a seat court before being brought before an enforcing 
court, the interrelationship between court of seat and court of enforcement is also 
considered and analysed. It is found that disputes concerning public interests being 
arbitrable tallies with the general trend. However, the current prevailing 
enforcement-friendly pattern may not strike the appropriate balance between 
enforceability and the developing tendency to ensure compliance of an arbitral award 









With the development and expansion of international business, international 
commercial arbitration has become one of the most commonly used methods to solve 
private transnational commercial disputes. Amongst the notable reasons for this is 
the readiness with which international arbitral awards are enforced by the national 
courts which give them effect (the ‘enforcing courts’). This reliable and effective 
enforceability is enshrined in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (the ‘New York Convention’, or ‘NYC’), to which 159 
states are party. According to the Convention, an enforcing court may refuse give 
effect to an award (other than for serious procedural violations) only if the subject 
matter of the dispute is not one suitable to be resolved by means of arbitration, or if 
the enforcement of the award would violate the enforcement state’s public policy. 
These two public interest defences are rarely – and this is in keeping with the spirit 
of the Convention - successfully invoked. So long as the arbitral tribunal has 
examined relevant issues and there is no clearly flagrant violation of public order 
which is immediately apparent, enforcement is executed. 
This enforcement-friendly pattern has been embraced worldwide, but is still 
challenged when disputes which concern not only private controversies but also 
public interests are brought before arbitral tribunals. A dispute involving competition 
law is a good measure of this. The NYC itself excludes no fields from the sphere of 
arbitration, so presumptively may apply. Yet there remains the more fundamental 
question of whether competition law disputes themselves are given to settlement by 
arbitration. And if so, whether it is within the proper province of the enforcing court 
to ensure compliance of the award with its own rules on and understanding of 
competition law as a function of its own public policy, and so perhaps here diminish 
the efficacy of arbitration as an appropriate means of dispute resolution. The thesis 
sets out to tackle the questions of whether a proper balance has been or can be struck 
between the desirable efficiency of arbitration and the necessity – if it be a necessity 
– of protecting a public order which recognises effective competition to be an 
essential component of it. If not, can a more balanced and more uniform standard be 
set out? As one of the most developed and complex systems of its kind in the world, 
attention will be upon the competition law of the European Union, whose many 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
I. Basic process of international commercial arbitration  
International commercial arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism with the 
involvement of multiple jurisdictions which could lead to both private and public 
legal consequences 1 . An international arbitration usually starts with a private 
contractual relationship involving parties with different nationalities or places of 
business agreeing to arbitrate their private disputes in a country, i.e. the arbitral seat2, 
which is generally not their own country, and consensually subjecting the procedural 
aspects of their arbitration to the law of the arbitral seat. Once the dispute between 
the parties is examined and an arbitral award is rendered accordingly, the private 
arbitration process would come to an end and the subsequence of the award will be 
clad in ‘public’ colours. First, although the parties merely intend to subject the 
procedural aspects of their arbitration to the law of the seat, it was stated that by 
choosing a particular country as the seat of arbitration, the choice ‘brings with it 
submission to the laws of that country, including any mandatory provisions of its law 
on arbitration’3 so that the seat court may be called to intervene to examine whether 
the arbitral award is on the one hand in line with its arbitration law (from the 
procedural aspect) whilst on the other hand complies with, for example, relevant 
mandatory rules or the fundamental public policy of the seat4 (from the substantive 
aspect). If any injustice is found, the seat court might set aside5 the award. Secondly, 
since the arbitral tribunal is merely a private panel with no coercive power to 
                                                          
1 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter 
on International Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 5th ed., 2009, at para. 1.84. 
2 Notably, arbitral seat is also called as ‘the seat of arbitration’, or simply ‘the seat’. 
3 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra 
note 1, at para. 3.61.  
4 Although mandatory rule and public policy may to certain extent coincide (e.g. a mandatory rule of a 
jurisdiction may simultaneously be regarded by the jurisdiction as its public policy), they may not 
always be identical. See, for example, F. Vischer, General Course on Private International Law, 232 
Hague Recueil (1992-I), at p. 165, as quoted in A. N. Zhilsov, Mandatory and Public Policy Rules in 
International Commercial Arbitration, Netherlands International Law Review, XLII 81-119, 1995, at 
104. Vischer opined that the notion of public policy and mandatory rules express the different concern 
of a state. The former ensured the protection of basic moral values and principles of justice whilst the 
latter guarantee the functioning of a jurisdiction’s administration and related activities, e.g. a state’s 
supervision of certain private activities in the field of insurance and banking, the safeguarding of the 
economic order and social welfare, etc.  
5 Setting aside an arbitral award may also be described as ‘annulling’ or ‘vacating’ an arbitral award. 
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facilitate the recognition or enforcement of the award6, the enforcing court(s)7, which 
is not necessarily the court of arbitral seat but that of where the losing party resides 
or has its place of business or assets,8 may be called to take the job if the losing party 
does not carry out the arbitral award voluntarily. Similarly, as the enforcement of an 
arbitral award would generally ask the national court of the enforcing state to dispose 
assets on its territory, the enforcing court is thus also understandably entitled to 
require that the enforcement of the arbitral award should also not violate its 
mandatory rules. Again, if any violation is perceived, it is likely that the enforcing 
court would refuse to enforce the award.  
II. Guiding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards: relevant 
provisions of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration  
In an international arbitration, one of the issues which is most concerned by the 
parties (including the losing party) and also what attracts the author most, is whether 
the arbitral award rendered by an arbitral tribunal would eventually be enforced. 
Although the basic framework of international commercial arbitration as introduced 
above is seemingly promising, it does not reveal much regarding the criterion of an 
enforcement court enforcing an arbitral award. Moreover, since in an international 
arbitration not only the enforcing court but also the seat court may be involved to 
review the arbitral award, one might also ask the question concerning that, first, 
whether seat court would always be involved in the review of arbitral awards; and 
secondly, whether the consequence of a seat court reviewing an arbitral award would 
make impact on an enforcing court’s examination and hence eventually influence the 
enforcement of the arbitral award. 
Guidance on these issues is hence needed. Luckily, the landmark Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter the ‘NYC’ or 
                                                          
6 One of the most representative examples would be that most of arbitral awards would contain 
pecuniary remedies, which could only be enforced by national courts to seize the assets. 
7 It is practically possible that the enforcing states will be more than just one since the losing party 
may have business or assets in multiple countries.  
8 The term ‘international arbitration’ as mentioned in this thesis is hence refer to an arbitration of 
which the arbitral seat and enforcing state are two different places.  
3 
 
simply the ‘Convention’) 9 as well as the highly instructive UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration10 (hereinafter the ‘Model Law’) to certain 
extent take the burden off, which essentially provide guidance on how a foreign 
arbitral award 11  should be reviewed at both setting-aside stage (i.e. before the 
national court of arbitral seat) and enforcement stage (i.e. before the national court of 
enforcement state). Key points could be concluded as follows: 
 It is not necessary for an arbitral award to safely go through the scrutiny of seat 
court before it could be ‘allowed’ to enter the enforcement stage, unless the 
losing party intends to set aside the arbitral award, which is widely understood as 
the exclusive function of the seat court.12 Notably, it was not the case before the 
NYC, as the mechanism of double exequatur, which was originally introduced in 
Article 1(d) of the 1927 Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (the predecessor of the NYC), required an arbitral award could only be 
enforced once it has become ‘final’ in the arbitral seat, i.e. a leave for 
enforcement should first be granted by the seat court so that the award could then 
be enforced by the enforcing court. This mechanism was subsequently abolished 
by Article V(1)(e) of the NYC which only requires an arbitral award to be 
‘binding’ before entering the enforcement stage.13  
 If an arbitral award is brought before a seat court for review, as exhaustively 
listed in Article 34(2) of the Model Law, the seat court could only examine the 
alleged procedural violations14  and look into whether the arbitral award runs 
                                                          
9 Which currently has 159 contracting states. 
10 The legislation based on the Model Law has been adopted in 80 States in a total of 111 jurisdictions. 
This data is provided in 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html 
(Retrieved: 2019-01-18) 
11 i.e. an arbitral award which is made in the territory of a State whilst being recognised or enforced in 
another State. See Article I(1) of the NYC.  
12 Jonathan Hill, The Significance of Foreign Judgments Relating to an Arbitral Award in the Context 
of an Application to Enforce the Award in England, Journal of Private International Law, Vol. 8, No. 
2, 2012, at 167.  
13 See, for example, Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, in E. 
Gaillard and D. Di Pietro eds., Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral 
Awards – The New York Convention Practice, Cameron May, 2008, at p. 17. (‘The word “final” was 
interpreted by many courts at the time as requiring a leave for enforcement (exequatur and the like) 
from the court in the country of origin … The drafters of the New York Convention, considering this 
system as too cumbersome, abolished it by providing the word “binding” instead of the word “final”. 
Accordingly, no leave for enforcement in the country of origin is required under the New York 
Convention. This principle is almost unanimously affirmed by the courts’). 
14 See Article 34(2)(a)(i) to (iv) of the Model Law.  
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counter to the arbitral seat’s fundamental public interest. The latter is further 
specified by the Model Law into two issues, namely whether the subject matter 
of the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration (or whether the subject 
matter is ‘arbitrable’), under the law of the seat15 and whether the arbitral award 
is in line with the seat’s public policy16. 
 When an arbitral award is brought before an enforcing court for enforcement, as 
exhaustively listed in Article V of the NYC (and also Article 36(1) of the Model 
Law17), the enforcing court could only examine the alleged procedural violations, 
and check whether the subject matter of dispute is capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of the enforcing state18 and whether the enforcement of 
the award would violate the enforcing state’s public policy19 (which are fairly 
similar as that of provided in the Model Law for setting aside an arbitral award20). 
 It is widely recognised that the grounds for setting aside or refusing the 
enforcement of arbitral awards as set in both the Model Law and the NYC should 
be construed narrowly,21 especially for the two grounds concerning the forum’s 
public interest: disputes arising from contractual or commercial relationships are 
almost always arbitrable22, and the public policy defence has been construed with 
extreme caution23. Moreover, a prima facie review is widely applied – no merits 
                                                          
15 See Article 34(2)(b)(i) of the Model Law.  
16 See Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. 
17 Article 36(1) of the Model Law mirrors the provisions of Article V of the NYC. 
18 See Article V(2)(a) of the NYC and Article 36(1)(b)(i) of the Model Law. 
19 See Article V(2)(b) of the NYC and Article 36(1)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. 
20 See Article V of the NYC and Article 34 of the Model Law. 
21 As for the grounds for setting aside arbitral awards, see Albert Jan van den Berg, Should the Setting 
Aside of the Arbitral Award be Abolished? ICSID Review, 2014, at 268, in which the author 
mentioned the restrictive application of setting aside grounds and pointed that ‘it is increasingly held 
that not every violation will lead to … setting aside. The violation must have substance and not be de 
minimis’. As for the grounds for refusing the enforcement of arbitral awards, see Gary Born, 
International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2014, at p. 3427. See also, for 
example, Sojuznefteecport (SNE) v.  Joc Oil Ltd., Court of Appeal of Bermuda, 7 July 1989, in Albert 
Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1990 - Volume XV, Kluwer Law 
International, at p. 397. (‘… not only are the defenders under the New York Convention exhaustive, 
but that they must be narrowly construed so as to favour the enforcement of the award.’); China 
Minmetals Materials Import and Export Co., Ltd. v. Chi Mei Corporation, 334 F.3d 274, at 283. 
(‘Consistently with the policy favoring enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, courts strictly have 
limited defenses to enforcement to the defenses set forth in Article V of the Convention, and generally 
have construed those exceptions narrowly.’) 
22  Margaret L. Moses, The Principles and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 
Cambridge University Press, 2017, 3rd ed., at p. 243. (‘In general, however, there are few cases in 
which awards have been denied on the ground of nonarbitrability’) 
23 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra 
note 1, at paras. 11.103 to 11.120.  
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of dispute should be re-examined 24  and an award or the enforcement of an 
arbitral award will be approved as long as there is no clearly flagrant violation of 
fundamental public policy which could be spotted by merely reading the award.25   
 As for the interrelationship between seat court and enforcing court, Article 
V(1)(e) of the NYC provides that the enforcing court may refuse to enforce an 
arbitral award once the award has been set aside by the seat court. Legal practice 
clearly shows that once an arbitral award has been annulled by the seat court 
based upon relevant procedural violation, the enforcing court would generally 
follow the seat court’s decision and refuse to enforce the award since the law 
governing the procedural issues of an international arbitration would normally be 
the law of arbitral seat.26 Notwithstanding, two exceptions could be observed:  
- The first concerns the scenario that the annulment decision was made 
based upon the subject matter of dispute being inarbitrable or the award 
violating the seat’s public policy. Since as mentioned above that both the 
seat and enforcing court may examine these two issues by applying their 
own laws, discrepancy may hence exist when a seat court and an 
enforcing court hold different viewpoints, and it is therefore unnecessary 
for the enforcing court to follow the seat court’s decision on these two 
issues. 27  
- The second concerns the scenario that an enforcing court follows the 
approach of delocalisation to diminish the importance of arbitral seat, i.e. 
                                                          
24 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, ‘Chapter 22 Court Review of Competition Law Awards in Setting 
Aside and Enforcements Proceedings’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust 
Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 22-021. See also, 
for example, Gordon Blanke, The ‘Minimalist’ and ‘Maximalist’ Approach to Reviewing Competition 
Law Awards: A Never Ending Saga, Stockholm International Arbitration Review, 2007, at 51-52; 
John Beechey, Arbitrability of Anti-trust/Competition Law Issues – Common Law, Arbitration 
International, Vol.12, Issue 2, 1996, at 186. (‘a form of merits review … would go well beyond any 
review called for under Article V of the New York Convention’). 
25 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011) op. cit., supra note 24, at paras. 22-032 and 22-059. 
26  See Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 63. (‘The law applicable to the 
arbitration procedural is usually … the arbitration law at the seat of arbitration’). This general 
compliance will be further discussed in infra Section IV(A) of Chapter III. 
27  See also, for example, Jonathan Hill (2012) op. cit., supra note 12, at 183-184. (‘Where, for 
example, a defence based on public policy is rejected by the courts of the seat, it does not follow that 
the defence of public policy under the NYC is bound to fail in other countries. This is because Article 
V.2.b NYC refers to the public policy of the country of enforcement (rather than of the seat) and the 
content of public policy differs from country to country’). This issue will be further discussed in infra 
Section IV(A) of Chapter III. 
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denying the connection between the law of arbitral seat and the procedure 
matters of an international arbitration.28  
III. Uncertainties and deficiencies of the existing enforcing standards – 
from the perspective of competition law 
Following the guidance of both the NYC and the Model Law, the pro-enforcement 
principle is steadily upheld 29 , which essentially form an enforcement-friendly 
environment for international arbitration. First, as provided by the Model Law, the 
grounds for setting aside an arbitral award is exhaustive and restrictively applied 
(especially for those concerning inarbitrability and violation of public policy as 
mentioned above), which largely limits the scope of an arbitral award being reviewed 
before a seat court. Therefore, an award being vacated would not be a routine, and 
would hence not commonly trigger the mechanism as provided by Article V(1)(e) of 
the NYC. 30  Secondly, since the NYC also provides exhaustive and restrictively 
applied grounds which are fairly similar to that of as provided in the Model Law for 
the refusal of enforcement, the review of arbitral award would also be conducted 
under a rather restrictive attitude and hence maintain the high enforceability of 
arbitral award. It is hence observable that international commercial arbitration has 
been greatly increasingly used in the resolution of private commercial dispute31 since 
the enforcement of arbitral award, which is also the matter most concerned by the 
parties, could normally be expected.32  
Notwithstanding, the enforceability of foreign arbitral award is shrouded with 
uncertainty when international commercial arbitration starts to take tentative steps 
                                                          
28 This issue will be further discussed in infra Section IV(A)(3)(c) and Section IV(B) of Chapter III  
29 See, for example, Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial 
Arbitration, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, at p. 457 (‘… in most countries the “pro-enforcement bias” of 
the New York Convention has been faithfully observed’); Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides 
with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at para. 11.105; Fifi Junita, ‘Pro 
Enforcement Bias’ under Article V of the New York Convention in International Commercial 
Arbitration: Comparative Overview, Indonesia Law Review, Vol. 2, 2015; Vesselina Shaleva, The 
‘Public Policy’ Exception to the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the Theory and 
Jurisprudence of the Central and East European States and Russia, Arbitration International, Vol. 19, 
No. 1, 2003, at 67.   
30 This, however, does not imply that any award which has been vacated will not be enforced at 
enforcement stage. See infra Section IV(A)(3) of Chapter III for more detailed discussion. 
31 See, for example, the Foreword of Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29. 
32  See Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 244. (‘Overall, the New York 
Convention has been one of the most successful international treaties … Parties are willing to engage 
in international arbitration because they have confidence that if they obtain the award, it will be 
readily enforceable in almost any country in the world where the award debtor’s assets can be found.’) 
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into the intersection of both private and public domains. Dispute concerning 
competition law issues is one of the most representative examples: on the one hand, 
one of the contracting parties may be harmed owing to the anticompetitive conducts 
of the counterparty; whilst on the other hand, such anticompetitive conducts may not 
only influence the harmed party but also the third parties, e.g. downstream customers 
and other competitors, and the general competition legal order of the market.33 With 
competition law disputes increasingly being raised in international arbitration, the 
pro-enforcement principle as established and consecrated by the NYC and the Model 
Law seems no longer provide sufficient and persuasive guidance on the enforcement 
of arbitral awards concerning competition law disputes. More specifically, the 
uncertainties and potential deficiencies would mainly focus on the interpretation and 
application of the grounds concerning public interests, i.e. inarbitrability and 
violation of public policy: 
 First of all, although the NYC and the Model Law provide that an enforcing 
court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award on the ground that the subject 
matter of the dispute is non-arbitrable, they fail to specify what subject matter 
of dispute is non-arbitrable, and it hence remains to be seen whether subject 
matters concerning public interests, such as competition law, by being 
different from traditional arbitrable disputes which would not make 
noticeable impact on public interest but merely between the contracting 
parties, would be suitable for being resolved by international arbitration.  
 Secondly, and similarly, since both the NYC and the Model Law remain 
silent to the precise definition of public policy, it is hence undetermined 
whether the violations of competition law could be deemed as the violation of 
public policy and hence lead to the refusal of enforcement. 
 Thirdly, the importance as attached to certain laws which concern strong 
public interest, such as competition law, and the strong motivation of 
ensuring the compliance of arbitral awards to relevant public legal order may 
require the reviewing courts to focus more on the legality of an arbitral award 
                                                          
33 For example, see American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F. 2d 821, 1968, at 
para. 19. (‘A claim under the antitrust law is not merely a private matter … Antitrust violations can 
affect hundreds of thousands – perhaps millions – of people and inflict staggering economic damage’). 
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concerning relevant disputes and may therefore break the well-set rule that 
the reviewing courts shall not re-examine the merits of dispute.  
 Fourthly, different jurisdictions may interpret and apply laws concerning 
strong public interests, such as competition law, differently, and different 
jurisdictions may also have public interest at different levels when 
encountering a specific arbitral award. Since as aforesaid that an enforcing 
court is not obliged to follow a seat court’s annulment decision which was 
made based upon public policy concern, such difference may possibly lead to 
the uncertainty regarding how an enforcing court should perform when a seat 
court has already ruled on relevant public policy issues. The NYC itself does 
not provide a comprehensive answer for the application of this discretion as 
held by an enforcing court. 
IV. Aim and focus of the research 
By noticing these uncertainties and potential deficiencies of the existing pattern of 
enforcing arbitral awards concerning certain public interest, this thesis hence intends 
to delve into these issues and propose a more balanced and comprehensive standard 
of enforcing arbitral awards concerning strong public interests by focusing on foreign 
awards concerning competition law disputes. More specifically, out of the 
consideration of feasibility of this research, the thesis will focus on EU competition 
law, which is unquestionably one of the most well-developed competition law 
systems in the world and is therefore the ideal focus for conducting this research. 
Pursuant to this choice, the discussion in the following chapters will focus on the 
scenario under which the place of the performance of parties’ contract is within the 
EU and the arbitral award would mainly influence EU competition legal order.  
Speaking of EU competition law, two of the key provisions are Article 101 and 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the ‘TFEU’)34. 
As for Article 101, Section (1) of this Article explicitly provides the prohibition of 
                                                          
34 It should be noted that, along with the development of the European Union, the name of the EU 
itself as well as the provision numbers of these two landmark Articles have undergone some changes. 
Article 101 and 102 were originally Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community (‘TEEC’) from 1957 to 1993 and Article 85 and 86 of the (re-named) Treaty 
establishing the European Community (‘TEC’). The numbering was subsequently changed to Article 
81 and 82 of the TEC from 1999 to 2009, and eventually Article 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) from 2009 to present.  
9 
 
anticompetitive agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which: 
‘[M]ay affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the 
internal market’ 
Within all prohibited practices, there are five types of practices which are 
emphasised in this Article: 
‘[A]nd in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading 
conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’ 
Also, as stated in Article 101(2), ‘any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to 
this Article shall be automatically void (nuls de plein droit)’. Therefore, assuming 
that two parties enter into a contract which, or certain provisions of the contract 
which, concerns the practice or practices which fall within the scope of Article 101(1) 
or even directly concern those five typical scenarios, the contract or the certain 
provisions of the contract would be highly likely deemed as void (N.B., not 
voidable)35 automatically. 
Besides anticompetitive agreements or practices, another typical breach of EU 
competition law is abusing dominant position within the internal market, which is 
provided in Article 102 TFEU: 
                                                          
35 Notably, not only would these five types of anticompetitive practices but also other practices which, 
although unspecified, fall within the scope of Article 101 would be deemed as void automatically.  
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‘Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between 
Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other 
unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other 
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other 
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to 
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.’ 
It should, notwithstanding, be noted that EU competition law, if being interpreted 
broadly, would also cover other relevant provisions in the TFEU (e.g. Article 103 – 
109 TFEU), EU regulations, directives, etc., which relate to the ‘achievement of the 
direct aims of safeguarding economic efficiency and promoting the integration of the 
EU’36. However, the term ‘EU competition law’ as used in this thesis will mainly 
focus on the aforementioned two key provisions, since as stated that EU competition 
law issues raised in international arbitration concern typically breaches of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU.37 
V. Structure of the thesis 
Based upon this focus of research, the thesis will be composed under the following 
structure. In Chapter II, the connection between international commercial arbitration 
and EU competition law disputes will be established, including the introduction of 
                                                          
36  Phillip Landolt, Modernised EC Competition Law in International Arbitration, Kluwer Law 
International, 2006, at p. 11. 
37 Rolf Trittmann & Boris Kasolowsky, ‘Chapter 6 EU Competition Law Arguments in International 
Arbitration: Practical Steps and Strategic Considerations’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU 
and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 
6-004. See also Gordon Blanke & Renato Nazzini, Arbitration and ADR of Global Competition 
Disputes: Taking Stock (Part I), Global Competition Litigation Review, No.1, 2008, 46, at 48. 
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international arbitration as a way of the private enforcement of EU competition law 
and the basic modalities of arbitrating EU competition law disputes in legal practice. 
Following this connection, Chapter III of the thesis will then progress to reveal the 
potential obstacles which may be encountered when enforcing a foreign arbitral 
award concerning EU competition law under Article V of the NYC, namely the 
procedural violations as listed in Article V(1)(a) to V(1)(b), the annulment decision 
made by a seat court as considered in Article V(1)(e) and non-arbitrability/public 
policy concerns as provided in Article V(2), coupled with the general remarks on 
each obstacle, e.g. the analysis of the governing law of arbitrability and public policy 
as well as the general attitude of applying them in refusal of enforcement, and the 
introduction of remaining issues of the application of each grounds. The research will 
then focus on the latter three obstacles as they are the core parts which distinguish 
competition law arbitration from other types of arbitration. In Chapter IV, the 
evolution of the attitude towards the arbitrability of competition law issues will be 
examined to shed certain light regarding the development of the arbitrability of other 
subject matters of dispute which also concern certain public interests. After the 
research on the arbitrability issue, the focus of Chapter V will then be switched to 
public policy defence as listed in Article V(2)(b). The discussion will further divide 
the term ‘enforcing courts’ to the courts of EU Member States and non-EU 
jurisdictions and start by figuring out whether EU competition law would be 
categorised as the public policy of both EU and non-EU states. The discussion will 
then carry on listing three major types of potential breaches of EU competition law in 
international commercial arbitration and examine whether these breaches would 
always trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC, followed 
by examining how an enforcing court, which could be either an EU or non-EU state’s 
national court, should perform when encountering these potential breaches. By 
examining on the pattern of an enforcing court reviewing arbitral awards concerning 
EU competition law issues under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC, a reflection will be 
made to see how this research would set an example for reviewing arbitral awards 
concerning other subject matters which also concern certain public interests. 
Following these discussion and analysis, this research will then progress to Chapter 
VI and examine the interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing courts. More 
specifically, since in an international arbitration the arbitral seat may commonly 
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differ from the enforcement state, it is possible that the seat and the enforcing state 
may share different viewpoints regarding relevant public policy concerns of 
competition law. This potential difference will be considered and the influence of a 
seat court’s decision on an enforcing court’s judgment will hence be examined, 
followed by proposing a comprehensive behavioural pattern of an enforcing court 
reviewing an arbitral award concerning EU competition law issues of which the 
public policy concern has been examined by the seat court. Again, it is expected that 
this research could also to certain extent shed light on the allocation of competence 
between a seat court and an enforcing court when a strong public policy concern is 
involved. After the discussion and analysis conducted in the previous chapters, 
Chapter VII will make up the last piece of the research by addressing the 
interrelationship between procedural autonomy, which is a potential influence factor 
of the applicability of the previously proposed behavioural patterns, and the 
protection of public interests, followed by the key points and main contributions of 













Chapter II – Connecting EU competition law with international 
commercial arbitration 
This research starts with establishing the connection between EU competition law 
and international commercial arbitration to lay the foundation for the discussion and 
analysis in the following chapters. 
I. International commercial arbitration as a private way of enforcing 
EU competition law 
The relationship between EU competition law and international commercial 
arbitration begins with the recognition of the possibility of enforcing EU competition 
law in a private way. Different from the public enforcement of EU competition law 
of which the main enforcers are the European Commission (hereinafter the 
‘Commission’) and national competition authorities38 (hereinafter the ‘NCAs’) who 
investigate potential unlawful anti-competitive activities based not only upon 
complaints or reports but also by their own initiative, private enforcement would 
mainly be conducted by judicial authorities, such as Member States’ national courts 
or arbitral tribunals, who would only examine alleged violation of EU competition 
law pursuant to parties’ claims and issue remedies which would generally apply only 
inter partes.  
Notably, the private enforcement of EU competition law could only be possibly 
conducted based upon two crucial prerequisites, namely that EU competition law 
needs to be, first, directly effective so that parties in disputes could invoke EU 
competition law to claim their rights as set in EU competition law before judicial 
authorities. As correctly stated, unless individuals are given rights by the Treaty 
which they may protect notwithstanding contrary or absent provisions of national law, 
the question of private enforcement of EU competition rules does not arise. 39 
Secondly, EU competition law also needs to be applicable, no matter directly or not, 
before judicial authorities so that these authorities are able to apply relevant EU 
                                                          
38  National competition authorities are designated by each EU Member State and, with the 
commission, responsible for the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU. See Article 35 of the 
Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 
of the Treaty, OJ 2003 L1/1. (hereinafter the ‘Regulation 1/2003’). 
39 Clifford A. Jones, Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA, Oxford University 
Press, 1999, at p. 47.  
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competition law provisions to resolve disputes. Therefore, before actually connecting 
EU competition law with international commercial arbitration, both the direct effect 
and direct applicability of EU competition law should be confirmed first. 
A. Direct effect of EU competition law 
As for the direct effect of EU law, it has long been affirmed by the European Court 
of Justice (hereinafter the ‘ECJ’), starting from its decision in Van Gend en Loos, a 
case concerning the direct effect of Article 12 TEEC40: 
‘[T]his treaty [i.e. the TEEC] is more than an agreement which merely creates 
mutual obligations between the contracting States … Community law has an 
authority which can be invoked by their nationals before those courts and 
tribunals. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that the Community 
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the 
States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the 
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. 
Independently of the legislation of Member States, Community law therefore 
not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer 
upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.’41 
Following this affirmation, the ECJ further specified the conditions of EU law being 
directly effective. First, 
‘These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, 
but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly 
defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon 
the institutions of the Community.42 
Moreover, 
                                                          
40 This Article reads ‘Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new 
customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from increasing 
those which they already apply in their trade with each other’. In this case, the ECJ was asked for a 
preliminary ruling in the face of a unilateral increase in Dutch tariff rates and so the question of 
whether Article 12 TEEC has direct application within the territory of a Member State; in other words, 
whether nationals of such a State can, on the basis of Article 12 TEEC, lay claim to individual rights 
which the courts of Member States must protect. 
41 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastigen [1963] ECR 1, at 12. 
Emphasis added. 
42 Ibid, at 12. Emphasis added. 
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‘The wording of Article 12 contains a clear and unconditional prohibition 
which is not a positive but a negative obligation. This obligation, moreover, is 
not qualified by any reservation on the part of states which would make its 
implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure enacted 
under national law. The very nature of this prohibition makes it ideally 
adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member 
States and their subjects.’43 
Last but not least, it was opined by Advocate General Mayras opined in Reyners v. 
Belgian State that there remained a third condition,  
‘[The application of a directly effective Community law] must not depend on 
measures being subsequently taken by Community Institutions or Member 
States with discretionary power in the matter.’44 
Hence, pursuant to this ‘groundbreaking and by now legendary’ 45  judgment, a 
provision of EU law should be directly effective as long as it contains a precise and 
unconditional legal content which do not call for additional legislative measures.  
Clearly, these conditions are also applicable when examining the direct effect of EU 
competition law. As for EU competition law, its compliance with the first condition 
is undoubted46 -- the clarity of EU competition law could be easily seen in both 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU, which contains, first, clear legal requirements concerning 
the prohibition of incompatible anti-competitive and abusive behaviours; secondly, 
clear definition of the object of prohibition; and thirdly, an explicit enumeration of 
typical anti-competitive or abusive behaviours.  
Moreover, as regards its compliance with the second condition, the unconditional 
nature of EU competition law could also be extracted not only from the wording 
Article 101 and 102 apply, which reads (in the English drafting style) that anti-
competitive and abusive behaviours as caught by both provisions shall be prohibited 
                                                          
43 Ibid, at 13. Emphasis added. 
44 The Opinion of Advocate General Mayras in Case 2-74 Jean Reyners v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 
631, at 661. Emphasis added.  
45 Gordon Blanke, ‘Chapter 10 The Supranational Dimension of Arbitrating Competition Law Issues 
within the EU’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust Arbitration, Kluwer Law 
International, 2011, at para. 10-041. 
46 Clifford A. Jones (1999) op. cit., supra note 39, at p. 50. 
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and any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be 
automatically void; but also from the fact that such prohibition and automatic 
nullification are not subject to any other EU legislation or the reservation which EU 
Member States could make to evade these obligations. Notably, although Article 103 
TFEU provides that the European Council shall lay down appropriate regulations or 
directives to give effect to the principles set out in Article 101 and 102 and it hence 
seems that the application of Article 101 and 102 is conditional subject to the 
Council’s legislation, it should be seen that Article 104 TFEU authorises NCAs and 
Member States’ national courts to enforce Article 101 and 102 immediately.47 As 
affirmed in its previous judgment in De Geus v. Bosch, the ECJ clearly opined that: 
‘The judgment of the Court of Appeal of The Hague raises the question 
whether Article 85 [now 101 TFEU] has been applicable from the time of 
entry into force of the Treaty. The answer to this question must in principle 
be in the affirmative. Article 88 and 89 [now 104 and 105 TFEU] of the 
Treaty, which confer powers on the national authorities and on the 
Commission respectively for the application of Article 85, presuppose its 
applicability from the time of entry into force of the Treaty.’48 
Notwithstanding, although the first two conditions are satisfied undoubtedly, it may 
not be the case for the third condition, namely the application of Article 101 and 102 
should not depend on ‘further discretionary action by a Community [now Union] 
institution or Member State’49. It could be seen that throughout the development of 
EU competition law the compliance to this criterion was not consistently affirmed. 
Article 101(3) TFEU provided that anti-competitive agreement, decision or practice 
may be allowed if they contribute to improving the production or distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress whilst allowing consumers a 
fair share of the resulting benefit. This exemptive power was once possessed 
exclusively by the Commission. According to Article 4(1) of Regulation No. 17: 
First Regulation Implementing Article 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
                                                          
47 Ibid.  
48 Case 13/61, De Geus v. Bosch [1962] ECR 45, at 51. 
49 Clifford A. Jones (1999) op. cit., supra note 39, at p. 51. 
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‘Agreements, decisions and concerted practices of the kind described in 
Article 85 (1) of the Treaty which come into existence after the entry into 
force of this Regulation and in respect of which the parties seek application of 
Article 85 (3) must be notified to the Commission. Until they have been 
notified, no decision in application of Article 85 (3) may be taken.’50 
Moreover, Article 9(1) of the Regulation further centralised the power of the 
Commission by providing that, 
‘Subject to review of its decision by the Court of Justice, the Commission 
shall have sole power to declare Article 85(1) inapplicable pursuant to Article 
85(3) of the Treaty.’51  
These two provisions thus inevitably placed the applicability of applying Article 85(3) 
TEEC in the exclusive territory of the Commission. Notwithstanding, this centralised 
situation has been greatly changed since year 2003. After being ‘beleaguered in 
holding back a flood of notifications’52 of which the majority ‘present[s] no hint of 
Community interest or threat to competition’ 53 , the Commission determined to 
refocus on ‘particularly threats to competition’ 54  and hence spread around of 
responsibility for enforcing EC competition law to NCAs and the Member States’ 
national courts.55 According to Regulation 1/2003, national courts and NCAs are 
now under no obligation of notification and also qualified to consider and render 
exemptions of anti-competitive activities as provided in Article 101(3) TFEU: 
‘Agreements, decisions and concerted practices caught by Article 81(1) of the 
Treaty which satisfy the conditions of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall not be 
prohibited, no prior decision to that effect being required.’56 
Therefore: 
‘The competition authorities of the Member States shall have the power to 
apply Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty in individual cases.’57 
                                                          
50 Emphasis added. 
51 Emphasis added. 
52 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 39. 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid, at p. 38.  
55 Ibid.  




‘National courts shall have the power to apply Article 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty.’58 
Hence, since the introduction of the Regulation 1/2003, the applicability of applying 
Article 81(3) TEC (now Article 101(3) TFEU) has been dragged from the exclusive 
territory of the Commission, and there should be no further doubt that the application 
of Article 101 and 102 does not call for any additional measures, at either national or 
EU level.  
It hence follows the foregoing considerations that, since the set criteria are fully 
satisfied, it is therefore fully tenable to conclude that Article 101 and 102 TFEU are 
directly effective.  
B. Direct applicability of EU competition law 
Once the direct effect of EU competition law is affirmed, it would be naturally 
expected that, based upon its clear and unconditional nature, EU competition law 
could also be directly applied by judicial authorities to examine disputes concerning 
EU competition law. Indeed, as for the direct applicability of Article 101(1) and 102, 
as the ECJ positively viewed in BRT: 
‘The competence of those courts [i.e. Member States’ national courts] to 
apply the provisions of Community law, particularly in the case of such 
disputes [i.e. EU competition law disputes], derives from the direct effect of 
those provisions. 
As the prohibition of Articles 85(1) and 86 tend by their very nature to 
produce direct effects in relations between individuals, these articles create 
direct rights in respect of the individuals concerned which the national courts 
must safeguard.’59  
                                                                                                                                                                    
57 Article 5 of Regulation 1/2003. 
58 Article 6 of Regulation 1/2003.  
59 Case 127/73, Belgische Radio en Televisie v. Société Belge des Auteurs Compositeurs et Editeurs 
de Musique [1974] ECR 51, at paras. 15 to 16. Emphasis added. See also, for example, Case C-234/89, 
Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935, at para. 43; Case C-292/95 P, Guérin Automobiles v. 
Commission [1997] I-1531, at para. 39; Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, 
at para. 23. 
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Moreover, since as aforementioned that the Regulation 1/2003 has removed the 
limitation of NCAs and national courts in applying Article 101(3) TFEU, both 
Article 101 and 102 have also been fully applicable before Member States’ national 
courts.60 
Nevertheless, confirming the direct applicability of EU competition law before 
national courts may not necessarily lead to the conclusion that EU competition law is 
also applicable before arbitral tribunal -- it should be noted that Regulation 1/2003 
remains silent on whether EU competition law, especially Article 101(3), is directly 
applicable before arbitral tribunals. However, such silence should not be interpreted 
as excluding the applicability of (now) EU competition law before arbitral tribunals. 
It is rather clear that ‘The Modernisation project very much relies on the private 
enforcement of EC competition law to ensure the adequate overall enforcement of 
EC competition law’61. Since international arbitration is undoubtedly an important 
private dispute resolution mechanism and the prevalence of international arbitration 
in international commerce would clearly lead to that ‘arbitral tribunal will often find 
themselves adjudicating matters of EC competition law’62, proposing that arbitral 
tribunal could not apply (now) EU competition law merely based upon the silence of 
Regulation 1/2003 would be simply unconvincing.  
Still, a more plausible reason to exclude arbitral tribunals from applying EU 
competition law might be the consideration of EU competition law issues being 
inarbitrable, i.e. not suitable for settlement by arbitration, based upon the 
considerations of, for example, the ‘inability of arbitrators to get involved’63 in EU 
competition law issues. This concern will be addressed in more detail in Chapter IV, 
but it is worth noting at this point that this reason is a rather practical one which has 
no correlation to the inherent inapplicability of EU competition law before arbitral 
tribunal. In other words, besides this pragmatic consideration, one could see no 
theoretical reason to uphold such exclusion. 
                                                          
60 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at pp. 36-39. 
61 Ibid, at p. 39. 
62 Ibid.  
63 Assimakis P. Komninos, ‘Chapter 12 Arbitration and EU Competition Law in the Post-
Modernization Era’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A 
Handbook for Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 12-122. 
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II. Modalities of raising competition law issues in international 
arbitration  
According to the discussion above, it is hence tenable to conclude at this point that, 
from a theoretical perspective, international commercial arbitration is clearly capable 
of being a private way of enforcing EU competition law pursuant to the well 
affirmed direct effective and applicability of EU competition law.64 More specifically, 
the involvement of EU competition law in international commercial arbitration may 
be potentially observed in two main scenarios. 
A. Raising competition law issues defensively 
The first one concerns raising competition law issues defensively. The typical 
scenario is that two individuals entered a contract which contains an arbitration 
agreement and one of the parties subsequently claims that the counterparty breaches 
the contract by, say, failing to fulfil the obligation. In order to counter-argue this 
claim, the defendant then raises competition law issues as a ‘shield’65 by stating that 
the contract is in violation of EU competition law and should be void, and his 
obligation under the contract could therefore be evaded. 
B. Raising EU competition law issues proactively 
In contradistinction to raising EU competition law as a defence, the second way 
concerns raising competition law issues as a ‘sword’66. This could happen in a case 
concerning a damage claim of a co-contractor of an anti-competitive agreement 
based upon the harm incurred through his counterparty’s behaviour under the 
agreement.67  
Notwithstanding, a doubtful point of this scenario may be raised concerning the 
principle ex dolo malo non oritur causa, i.e. no right of action can have its origin in 
                                                          
64 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra 
note 1, at para. 2.112 (‘In principle, any dispute should be just as capable of being resolved by a 
private arbitral tribunal as by the judge of a national court.’) 
65 Tim Ward & Kassie Smith, Competition Litigation in the UK, Sweet & Maxwell, 2005, at para. 10-
021. 




fraud68 – since the party claiming for damages is himself a co-contractor of the 
illegal anti-competitive agreement, his recourse should automatically fail, and 
competition law issues could not be raised offensively.  
This issue was raised in Courage v. Crehan 69 , although which did not directly 
concern raising EU competition law issues in international arbitration. In this case, 
Mr. Crehan signed a contract with Courage Ltd, a brewery. In accordance with the 
contract, Mr. Crehan rented a Courage pub for twenty years whereby he had to buy a 
fixed minimum quantity of beer exclusively from Courage.  Mr. Crehan later fell into 
financial arrears, basically blaming this on Courage’s supply of beer at lower prices 
to other non-tied pubs whilst in the same year, Courage brought an action for the 
recovery of Mr. Crehan’s unpaid deliveries of beer. Mr. Crehan then alleged the 
incompatibility with Article 81(1) EC of the clause based upon the requirement of 
purchasing a fixed minimum quantity of beer from Courage and counterclaimed for 
damages for his financial arrears.  
The case was first brought before the High Court of England and Wales and 
subsequently before the Court of Appeal. The latter then referred this case to the ECJ 
for preliminary ruling on the question that whether a party of a prohibited anti-
competitive agreement retains his right to claim for damage. The ECJ opined that 
there should not be an absolute bar to the action of claiming damage being brought 
by a party to a contract which would be held to violate the competition rules70 since:  
‘The full effectiveness of Article 85 of the Treaty and, in particular, the 
practical effect of the prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) would be put at 
risk if it were not open to any individual to claim damages for loss caused to 
him by a contract or by conduct liable to restrict or distort competition. 
Indeed, the existence of such a right strengthens the working of the 
Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, 
which are frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort competition. 
From that point of view, actions for damages before the national courts can 
                                                          
68 This translation was given in Assimakis P. Komninos (2011) op. cit., supra note 63, footnote 52, at 
para. 12-035. 
69 Courage Ltd. v. Crehan (No. 1) [1999] E.C.C. 455 (CA).  
70 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, at para. 28. 
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make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective competition in 
the Community.’71 
Therefore, instead of simply refusing the right to damages on the basis that Mr 
Crehan was a party of the illegal agreement, which would bar the claim in English 
law,72 the national court should take into account matters including the economic and 
legal context in which the parties find themselves and the respective bargaining 
power and conducts of the two parties to the contract: 
‘In particular, it is for the national court to ascertain whether the party who 
claims to have suffered loss through concluding a contract that is liable to 
restrict or distort competition found himself in a markedly weaker position 
than the other party, such as seriously to compromise or even eliminate his 
freedom to negotiate the terms of the contract and his capacity to avoid the 
loss or reduce its extent, in particular by availing himself in good time of all 
the legal remedies available to him.’73 
This ruling opened a new path for reconciling the potential conflict between the well-
set principle nemo auditur turpitudinem propriam (suam) allegans74 or estoppel and 
the right to claim damages: the latter should not be merely deemed as parties seeking 
for redress but also a motivation of revealing illegal anti-competitive agreements. As 
inspiringly pointed out, 
‘Private antitrust actions, apart from their compensatory function, further the 
overall deterrent effect of the law. Thus, economic agents themselves become 
instrumental in implementing the regulatory policy on competition and the 
general level of compliance with the law is raised.’75 
Moreover, since from the perspective of the private enforcement of EU competition 
law there is no fundamental difference between court litigation and arbitration, the 
aforementioned rationale should also be applicable to the scenario of arbitrating EU 
competition law: a contracting party claiming damages in an international arbitration 
                                                          
71 Ibid, at paras. 26 to 27. Emphasis added. 
72 See Gibbs Mew PLC v. Graham Gemmell [1998] EuLR 588 (CA). 
73 Case C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, at para. 32. 
74 i.e. no one is heard when alleging one’s own wrong. This translation was given in Assimakis P. 
Komninos (2011) op. cit., supra note 63, footnote 50, at para. 12-035. 
75 Assimakis P. Komninos (2011) op. cit., supra note 63, footnote 62, at para. 12-038.  
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for counterparty’s violation of an agreement which could be liable to restrict or 





















Chapter III – The mechanism of reviewing foreign arbitral awards 
at enforcement stage under the NYC: basic understanding and 
remaining questions 
It thus follows from the discussion in Chapter II that, from a theoretical perspective, 
there is no obstacle hindering EU competition law issues from being raised in 
international arbitration. Once an EU competition law issue was raised as either a 
‘sword’ 76  or as a ‘shield’ 77  in an international arbitration and the tribunal has 
examined and rendered its award, the award will then enter the reviewing stage: it 
might go through the examination conducted by the court of arbitral seat, and will 
eventually have its destiny be decided before the court of enforcement.  
The mechanism of reviewing international awards at enforcement stage, including 
those concerning EU competition law disputes, is laid down in the landmark 
provision Article V of the NYC, which consists of four main grounds for potentially 
refusing the enforcement of foreign arbitral award. First of all, Article V(1)(a) – (d) 
sets forth four intrinsic78 procedural violations, namely the incapacity of parties or 
the invalidity of arbitration agreement79, lack of proper notice or parties being unable 
to present their case80, arbitrators acting ultra vires81, and the non-compliance of the 
composition of the tribunal or the arbitral procedure with parties’ agreement or the 
law of the arbitral seat82. Secondly, Article V(2)(a) allows the potential refusal of 
enforcement if the subject matter of parties’ dispute is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of the enforcing state. Thirdly, Article V(2)(b) provides that 
the violation of enforcing state’s public policy may lead to non-enforcement. 
Fourthly, Article V(1)(e) brings the court of arbitral seat into consideration and states 
that if an arbitral award has been set aside by the seat court, the enforcing court may 
refuse to enforce the award. Notably, since the procedural violations which may exist 
in arbitrating EU competition law disputes would not be distinguishably different 
                                                          
76 Assimakis P. Komninos (2011) op. cit., supra note 63, at para. 12-093. See also Tim Ward & 
Kassie Smith (2005) op. cit., supra note 65, at para. 10-022. 
77 Tim Ward & Kassie Smith (2005) op. cit., supra note 65, at para. 10-021. 
78 Georgios C. Petrochilos, Enforcing Awards Annulled in their State of Origin under the New York 
Convention, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.48, 1999, at 862.  
79 Article V(1)(a) of the NYC. 
80 Article V(1)(b) of the NYC. 
81 Article V(1)(c) of the NYC. 
82 Article V(1)(d) of the NYC. 
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from that of during the process of arbitrating disputes concerning other subject 
matters, they will not be particularly considered, and the focus of the research is 
hence placed upon the remaining three.  
Although the application of the rest of three grounds in enforcing arbitral awards 
concerning EU competition law disputes will be delved into in the following Chapter 
IV to VI, it would be worth making a general remark on each of them at this point to 
establish a basic understanding as well as reveal relevant remaining questions of their 
application in legal practice, and hence lay the foundation for the analysis in the 
following chapters. Notably, since inarbitrability and violation of public policy are 
also two legitimate grounds for setting aside an arbitral award83 and might hence be 
well invoked under both the annulment and enforcement stages, a comprehensive 
examination of Article V(2)(a) and V(2)(b) would inevitably touch upon the 
interrelationship between a seat court and an enforcing court. However, for the 
purpose of clarity, the following Section II and III of this Chapter will only focus on 
relevant public policy and arbitrability issues under the scenario that an arbitral 
award is directly brought before an enforcing court after it being rendered84, whilst 
leaving the questions concerning the interrelationship between a seat court and an 
enforcing court’s viewpoints of relevant inarbitrability and violation of public policy 
to Section IV of this Chapter, in which relevant issues of Article V(1)(e) will be 
examined.  
I. The permissive wording as applied in Article V of the NYC and the 
discretionary power of enforcing courts 
Before examining each of the three grounds, a distinct feature shared by all of them 
should be addressed first. It could be clearly observed through a brief peruse of the 
text of Article V that, instead of laying down compulsory grounds for refusing the 
enforcement of arbitral ward, it applies a permissive tone, which reads that: 
                                                          
83 See, for example, Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law. 
84 Therefore, Chapter VI and V of this thesis which examine the uncertainties as raised by Section II 
and III of this Chapter will also focus on the scenario that an arbitral award is directly brought before 
an enforcing court after it being rendered. 
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‘1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused … only if that 
party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought, proof that: 
… 
(e) The award … has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of 
the country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made. 
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country; or 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country.’85 
A. ‘May’ or actually ‘Shall’? 
The term ‘may’ as applied in the text is clearly an attention catcher. It might well 
‘lure’ a reader to reach the seemingly obvious conclusion that Article V ‘establishes 
a discretion that is general and equally applicable to each of the grounds for non-
enforcement’86. However, this rather plausible interpretation was questioned by those 
who noticed the ‘linguistic discrepancy’87 between the French and English versions, 
which are both authentic versions of the Convention88. Different from the English 
version, the French version reads that ‘La reconnaissance et l’exécution de la 
sentence ne seront refuses … que si …’89, which, as opined, may suggest that the 
                                                          
85 Emphasis added.  
86 Jonathan Hill, The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Relation to Applications to Enforce Arbitral 
Awards under the New York Convention 1958, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 2016, 
at 305.  
87 Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 858. 
88 See Article XVI of the NYC, which states that Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
versions of the Convention are all equally authentic.  
89 i.e. ‘recognition and enforcement of the award shall not be refused … unless …’ This translation 
was given in Jan Paulsson, May or Must Under the New York Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and 
Linguistics, Arbitration International, Vol. 14, No. 2, 1998, at 228.  
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authors of the French text might imply that under the grounds as listed, the 
enforcement of an arbitral award shall be refused.90 
However, this interpretation is simply based upon a suggested implication, of which 
the reliability is far from being persuasive. First of all, this interpretation would place 
the French version on a rather opposite situation to its four siblings. Besides the 
English version, it could be interestingly found that not only do the Chinese and 
Russian versions correspond fully to the English version91, but also the Spanish 
version, which is linguistic proximal to the French version, is somehow surprising 
congruent with the English one.92 One would hence have to ask that whether this is 
actually the case that this ‘singular nuance in the French text’93 should be understood 
in this way.94  
Secondly, following the semantic discussion, it should also be noted that (in keeping 
with standard English drafting) the mandatory ‘shall’ is used in other provisions of 
the NYC, e.g. in Article II(1) and IV(1). With the presumption that the drafters of the 
Convention would be rather cautious of the wording they applied in the text standing 
plausible, such clearly observable distinction of wording applied would hence 
suggest ‘inclusio unius est exclusio alterius’95, namely that the inclusion of a term 
will be the exclusion of another term as used in legal text.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, when tracing back to the historic development of the 
Convention, the inclusion of the term ‘may’ seem to be ‘intentional and formed part 
of a wider drafting compromise’96. The predecessor of the NYC, the 1927 Geneva 
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter the ‘Geneva 
Convention’), provided grounds under which the recognition and enforcement of an 
arbitral award shall be refused, and such mandatory refusal was subsequently also 
                                                          
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid, at 229. See also Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 858. 
92 Jan Paulsson (1998) op. cit., supra note 89, at 229. The Spanish version reads ‘Sólo se podrá 
denegar el reconocimiento y la ejecución de la sentencia … si esta parte …’. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Another example which could support this doubt is that in other provisions which the Convention 
provides for some discretion, there seems to be no such discrepancy between the English and French 
versions. One of the most representative examples is that Article VI reads in English version as ‘may’ 
whilst in French version reads ‘peut’, which means ‘can’ in English. See Georgios C. Petrochilos 
(1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 860. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid, at 859. 
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upheld in the Preliminary Convention drafted by the International Chamber of 
Commerce,97 although the intention of which was to loosen the strict requirements as 
set in the previous Geneva Convention.98 However, this mandatory term has been 
abandoned since the ICC initiative of amending the original Geneva Convention was 
taken over by the United Nations Economics and Social Council (hereinafter the 
‘ECOSOC’), which subsequently recommended a new version of the draft 
Convention in which the term ‘shall’ was replaced by ‘may’ to further protect the 
finality of arbitral awards. Although there was no further discussion regarding this 
amendment but merely the replacement as reflected in the travaux préparatoires of 
the NYC, it is clear that such amendment should be interpreted as an intentional 
behaviour by the drafters, especially by considering the trend of marching towards a 
more enforcement-friendly environment.99 As being correctly opined, 
‘That the convention’s drafters specifically chose to use the word ‘may’ 
rather than ‘shall’ shows their intention to preserve the discretion of every 
legal system to decide for itself, and, based on its own standards, whether or 
not an arbitral award meets the conditions of recognition and enforcement.’100 
It hence follows the foregoing analysis that, the discretionary nature of Article V has 
been plausibly established. As stated, 
‘The discretionary nature of Art V is now well accepted internationally. 
There is no longer any argument, or any sustainable argument, that would 
suggest that the word ‘may’ in Art V should mean anything other than a 
discretionary ‘may’ as opposed to a mandatory ‘shall’.’101 
                                                          
97 See Article IV of the ICC draft Convention.  
98 See, for example, Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards -- Report and Preliminary Draft 
Convention adopted by the Committee on International Commercial Arbitration at its meeting of 13 
March 1953, at 2. 
99 This now unquestionable principle could be extracted from, for example, the ICC draft Convention 
in which it abandoned the requirement of arbitral award being final before being enforced. See also 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards -- Report and Preliminary Draft Convention adopted by 
the Committee on International Commercial Arbitration at its meeting of 13 March 1953, at para. 14. 
(‘… going further than the Geneva Convention in facilitating the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards’) 
100 Emmanuel Gaillard, The Representations of International Arbitration, New York Law Journal, Vol. 
238, No. 67, 2007, at 1-2.   
101 Teresa Cheng, ‘Celebrating the Fiftieth Anniversary of the New York Convention’, in Albert Jan 
van den Berg, 50 Years of the New York Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, 
Kluwer Law International, 2009, 679, at 680. See also, for example, Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., 
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B. Review the general application of the discretion in legal practice 
Notwithstanding, notably, although the discretionary power of enforcing courts is 
persuasively affirmed, the NYC failed to make a step forward and touch upon the 
next key issue, i.e. how exactly this discretionary power should be exercised in legal 
practice. The silence of the Convention on this issue hence leaves, at least in theory, 
a huge space for the Contracting States of the Convention to interpret and establish 
their own specific mechanisms concerning how these provisions would actually be 
applied in practice, which would therefore lead to potential uncertainties.  
Fortunately, the relevant legal practice shows the convergence upon the strict attitude 
towards the application of discretion based upon the so-called ‘pro-enforcement bias’ 
of the NYC, which was opined to be ‘designed for the purpose of facilitating the 
effective recognition and enforcement of foreign and nondomestic awards’102 and 
essentially puts enforcing courts at an auxiliary position of which the duty is to assist, 
but not freely intervene in, the enforcement of arbitral awards. The rationale is rather 
straightforward: if an enforcing court could unconditionally dismiss the decision 
made by an arbitral tribunal, what is the point of allowing the dispute to be examined 
by the tribunal at the first place? Therefore, as pointed out: 
‘Developed international arbitration regimes adopt an avowedly “pro-
enforcement” approach to the recognition [and enforcement] of international 
arbitral awards. Assuming that the existence of an award, satisfying 
applicable jurisdictional requirements, has been proven by the award-creditor, 
these regimes impose a presumptive obligation on national courts to 
recognize [or enforce] the award.’103 
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
supra note 22, at p. 238; Reyadh Seyadi, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Annulled by the Court of 
the Seat, Arbitration, Vol. 84, No. 2, 2018, at 131-132.  
102 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3411. See Article III of the Convention, which reads: 
‘Each Contracting State Shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance 
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid 
down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or 
higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention 
applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards’.  
103 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3410. Emphasis added.  
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This understanding of the purpose of the NYC was reported to be uniformly 
recognized, 104  and is reflected more specifically in legal practice in three main 
aspects. The first concerns the narrow interpretation on the grounds as listed in 
Article V.105  For example, the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals in 
Gould, by firmly recognising the general pro-enforcement bias of the Convention, 
adopted a narrow interpretation of defence based upon arbitrator exceeding authority, 
which is provided in Article V(1)(c) of the Convention.106 Similarly, when dealing 
with Article V(1)(b) of the NYC, it was reported that the key elements of this Article, 
such as the connotation of ‘proper notice’ and ‘unable to present his case’, are also 
interpreted narrowly.107 
The second concerns the threshold of the severity of relevant violations. It was 
opined that Article V should not lead to refusal if the violation of one of the grounds 
of Article V is only marginally present and if its absence would still have led to the 
same award.108  A representative example is that although Article V(1)(d) of the 
Convention provides that the discordance between arbitral procedure or arbitral 
                                                          
104 Ibid, at 3412. See also, for example, Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at pp. 231-
232; Italy No. 104, Holzindustrie Schweighofer GmBH v. Industria Legnami Trentina – ILET srl, 
Corte di Appello [Court of Appeal] of Florence, Not Indicated, 3 June 1988, in Albert Jan van den 
berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1990 - Volume XV, Kluwer Law International, at p. 499 
(‘The New York Convention clearly aimed at making the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
easier’); Aloe Vera of Am. Inc. v. Asianic Food (S) Pte Ltd., Singapore High Court [2006] 3 S.L.R 174, 
at para. 40 (‘there is the principle of international comity enshrined in the Convention that strongly 
inclines the courts to give effect to foreign arbitration awards’); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Man 
GHH, 141 F.3d 1434 (11 Cir. 1998), at 1440. (‘The purpose of the New York Convention … is 
to “encourage the recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards,” Bergesen v. 
Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983), to “relieve congestion in the courts and 
to provide parties with an alternative method for dispute resolution that [is] speedier and 
less costly than litigation.” Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11 Cir. 
1981).’); Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe General De L’Industrie Du Papier, 508 
F.2d 969, 1974, at 973; Dardana Ltd. v. Yukos Oil Co. [2002] E.W.C.A. Civ 543, at para. 10; Gater 
Assets Ltd v. Nak Naftogaz Ukrainy [2007] E.W.H.C. 697, at para 29; China Nanhai Oil Joint Serv. 
Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., [1994] H.K.C.F.I. 215; Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. 
General Electric Company, Supreme Court of India [1994] AIR 860, at para. 22-23, 33, and 41. 
105 UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 2016 Edition, at p. 125. (‘courts in the Contracting States have 
generally construed the grounds for refusal under the Convention narrowly’) 
106 Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Gould, INC, 969 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1992), at 
770. 
107 See UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 2016 Edition, at p. 157 and 166. 
108 Marike R. P. Paulsson, The 1958 New York Convention in Action, Kluwer Law International, 2016, 
at p. 174. (‘[I]f a violation of due process was minor and did not affect the outcome of the arbitration, 




authority and the agreement of the parties might lead to the refusal of enforcement, 
such discordance shall be obvious and may possibly lead to a different award. As 
could be found in the Travaux Preparatoires of the Convention: 
‘It was pointed out that [Article V(1)(d)] could cause the frustration of 
awards if any differences, however small and insignificant, are found to occur 
in the arbitration procedure agreed upon between the parties and the laws 
prevailing in the territory where the arbitrators actually met.’109 
Another example is the severity threshold of the application of Article V(1)(b). As 
stated, ‘it is not uncommon for courts to require parties opposing enforcement under 
Article V(1)(b) to prove not only a breach of due process, but also that the outcome 
of the case would have been different had the alleged breach not occurred’110 . 
Following this requirement, the Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt once ruled that 
violation of due process would be able to trigger the refusal of enforcement only 
when it would plausibly lead to a substantive change of the award.111 
Last but not least, the enforcement court, when examining whether there is a serious 
violation as listed in Article V of the Convention, may not review on the merits of 
the disputes. Since the role played by an enforcing court in an international 
arbitration is essentially an auxiliary court which is merely authorised to decide 
whether to enforce an award instead of hearing and judging on the merits of dispute, 
                                                          
109 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Awards, Travaux Preparatoires – 
Comments on Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
Note by the Secretary-General, at 6. U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/2 (6 March, 1958), at p. 6. See also, for 
example, Creditor under the award v. Debitor under the award, Oberlandesgericht [OLG] Karlsruhe, 
Germany, 14 September 2007, 9 Sch 02/07, in which the German court rejected the argument for the 
refusal of enforcement that the arbitral tribunal had been appointed by the wrong authority since the 
party could not convincingly prove that a different appointment procedure would have led to a 
different ruling.  
110 UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 2016 Edition, at p. 168-169. 
111 Germany No. 104, Buyer v. Seller, Corte di Appello [Court of Appeal], Frankfurt, 26 SchH 03/09, 
12 October 2009, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2010 - Volume 
XXXV, Kluwer Law International, at p. 380. (‘Due process, reasoned the court, is guaranteed when 
each party may express its opinion as to the factual and legal aspects of the case and the arbitral 
tribunal discusses and considers all relevant arguments of the parties. The latter condition does not 
mean, however, that the arbitrators must deal with all details of the arguments of the parties in the 
written reasons for their award, or that silence in respect of one argument necessarily means that it has 
been ignored, unless that argument is essential for rendering the award.’) 
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the enforcement procedure should therefore not be a ‘de facto appeal’ 112 . For 
example, the House of Lords clearly stated in Lesotho Highlands, that Article V must 
be construed narrowly and should never lead to a re-examination of the merits of the 
award113. By the same token, the Cour Superieure de Justice once held that, 
‘The New York Convention does not provide for any control on the manner 
in which the arbitrators decide on the merits … Even if blatant, a mistake of 
fact or law, if made by the arbitral tribunal, is not a ground for refusal of 
enforcement of the tribunal’s award.’114 
It could therefore be clearly seen that the discretion possessed by an enforcing court 
under the NYC is actually considerably restricted. Notwithstanding, it should also be 
noted that the review on the application of an enforcing court’s discretion under 
Article V as conducted above is a rather general one, and its specific connotation 
under Article V(2)(a) 115 , V(2)(b) 116  and V(1)(e) 117  should be further examined 
under each Articles. This would be particularly true for Article V(1)(e), since these 
three widely accepted golden rules do not directly concern the interrelationship 
between a seat court and an enforcing court.  
II. Public policy and Article V(2)(b) of the NYC 
The first ground to be examined is the public policy defence as provided in Article 
V(2)(b) of the NYC 118 , which draws the attention to the following preliminary 
questions. 
                                                          
112 Marike R. P. Paulsson (2016) op. cit., supra note 108, at p. 168. (‘The Court also must remain 
mindful of the principle that judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely limited and that this Court 
does not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator in the same manner that an appeals 
court would review the decision of a lower court … If the enforcing authorities were to proceed in 
each case with a full re-examination of such awards, the purpose of the Convention would be 
defeated’) 
113 Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v. Impregilo SpA and others [2005] U.K.H.L. 43, at 
para. 30. 
114 Luxembourg No. 1, Kersa Holding Company Luxembourg v. Infancourtage, Famajuk Investment 
and Isny, Cour Superieure de Justice [Court of Appeal], Not Indicated, 24 November 1993, in Albert 
Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1996 - Volume XXI, Kluwer Law 
International, at p. 624. 
115 See infra Section III(D) of this Chapter. 
116 See infra Section II(C) of this Chapter. 
117 See infra Section IV(A) of this Chapter. 
118 Although according to the order of the provisions of the NYC that Article V(2)(a) should come 
first and arbitrability issue is actually the most fundamental question since it concerns whether a 
subject matter could be arbitrated at the first place, as will be seen in Section III of this Chapter, 
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A. The definition of public policy under Article V(2)(b) 
The first and also the most fundamental issues concerning the public policy defence 
is to understand what public policy is. Different from the provisions in Article V(1) 
which apply a relatively clear expression of each procedural violation, Article V(2)(b) 
fails to maintain such level of clarity -- although it explicitly provides that the 
violation of public policy could be potentially resorted to refuse the enforcement of 
arbitral awards, it fails to make a step forward to demonstrate what exactly public 
policy is.  
1. Public policy as defined in national legislation 
Since seeking the definition of public policy from the text of the Convention has 
stuck in an impasse, one hence needs to resort to other resources for a more detailed 
definition. One of the most authoritative resources is relevant national legislation. 
However, quite surprisingly, according to the Report on the Public Policy Exception 
in the New York Convention which covers more than forty jurisdictions, only three 
of them, i.e. the United Arab Emirates (hereinafter the ‘UAE’), Australia and 
Sweden,119 have statutorily defined the term ‘public policy’. 
As for the UAE, Article 3 of the Civil Transactions Law states in general (which 
does not limit to arbitration) that: 
‘[public order] include[s] matters relating to personal status such as marriage, 
inheritance, and lineage, and matters relating to system of government, 
freedom of trade, the circulation of wealth, rules of individual ownership and 
the other rules and foundations upon which society is based, in such a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
arbitrability issue is essentially examined based upon the public policy concern of a jurisdiction. 
Therefore, based upon the consideration of logic inherence, the preliminary questions of public policy 
will be examined first. After examining the preliminary questions of both public policy and 
arbitrability and laying the foundation for the following chapters, the order of the provisions of the 
NYC will then be re-followed and relevant arbitrability issues will then be examined first when the 
consideration of these two grounds being further concretised under the scenario of enforcing foreign 
arbitral awards concerning EU competition law.  
119 IBA Subcommittee on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards – Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, October 2015, at 2. 
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manner as not to conflict with the definitive provisions and fundamental 
principles of the Islamic Sharia.’120 
Moreover, with regards to Australia, Section 8(7A) of the 1974 International 
Arbitration Act reads that ‘the enforcement of a foreign award would be contrary to 
public policy if (a) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or 
corruption; or (b) a breach of the rules of natural justice occurred in connection with 
the making of the award.’121 
Last but not least, as for Sweden, Section 55(2) of the Swedish Arbitration Act, 
instead of using the term ‘public policy’, provides that: 
‘Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award shall also be refused 
where a court finds: 
… 
2. that it would be manifestly incompatible with the fundamental principles of 
Swedish law to recognise and enforce the arbitral award.’122 
The definitions given by these three jurisdictions do assist to form the outline of 
public policy: it should be the rules and principles upon which the legal system of the 
individual jurisdiction is based. Nevertheless, such definition is still too vague to be 
satisfactory -- wording such as ‘fundamental principles’, ‘the rules of natural justice’ 
and ‘rules and foundations’ are too broad to convey a precise understanding of public 
policy. 
2. Public policy as defined in case law 
Although the research on national legislations does not reveal much, there is still 
another option on the table: one who attempts to figure out what exactly public 
policy is could still shift his attention to analyse the court’s definitions of public 
policy. 
                                                          
120 This translated version was provided in Hassan Arab & Laila El Shentenawi, The UAE Country 
Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 3. Emphasis added. 
121 Emphasis added. 
122 This translated version was provided in Pontus Ewerlöf, Sweden Country Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 2. Emphasis added. 
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Notwithstanding, again, the result is fairly discouraging. Although different 
jurisdictions may apply different wording, the essence of their definitions is the same. 
As reported, in the vast majority of jurisdictions, public policy is commonly defined 
as a vague term close to fundamental or basic principles or values by national 
courts. 123  For example, the German Bundesgerichtshof commonly defines public 
policy as ‘fundamentals of public and economic life’124; the Swiss Tribunal fédéral 
stated in one of its decision that public policy was the ‘fundamental values of the 
Swiss legal order’ 125 , and public policy is generally construed as ‘fundamental 
principles and values that reflect public interest’126 in Finland. It could be clearly 
found that, domestic courts seem, in general, have difficulty in ‘precisely defining 
the meaning and scope of the notion’.127 
3. Defining public policy precisely: feasible or impractical? 
It hence follows from the research above that the difficulty of precisely defining 
public policy still remains even after examining both national legislation and case 
law of different jurisdictions. A query hence arises: can public policy be defined with 
any precision at all? 
For answering this question, the decision of the Indian Supreme Court in Brojo Nath 
Ganguly is worthy quoting here: 
‘From the very nature of things, the expressions ‘public policy’, ‘opposed to 
public policy’, or ‘contrary to public policy’ are incapable of precise 
definition. Public policy, however, is not the policy of a particular 
Government. It connotes some matter which concerns the public good and the 
public interest. The concept of what is for the public good or in the public 
interest or what would be injurious or harmful to the public good or the 
                                                          
123 IBA Subcommittee on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards – Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, October 2015, at 6.  
124 BGH NJW 1986, 3027, 3028, as quoted in Maxi Scherer, German Country Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 2. 
125 Decision of the Swiss Tribunal fédéral dated September 25, 2014, ref. 5A_165/2014, cons. 5. This 
translated version was quoted in Dominique Brown-Berset, Switzerland Country Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 2. 
126 Marko Hentunen & Thomas Kolster, Finland Country Report on the Public Policy Exception in the 
New York Convention, at 1. 
127 IBA Subcommittee on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards – Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, October 2015, at 6. 
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public interest has varied from time to time…Practice which were considered 
perfectly normal at one time have today become obnoxious and oppressive to 
public conscience’128 
This quoted paragraph conveys an important message: public policy is incapable of 
precise definition because the content of public policy is floating – it would change 
through the passage of time.129 Furthermore, such message would also trigger the 
thought that, since public policy may float through its vertical development, it may 
well diversify through its horizontal development: the public policy of one state 
might not be indubitably embraced by other states. For example, different from many 
other jurisdictions, disputes arising from exclusive distributorship agreements 
performed in Belgium are still deemed as inarbitrable.130 Another example would be 
the arbitrability of disputes concerning securities law, which, although being 
affirmed in most jurisdictions,131 does not seem to be entirely settled in Germany.132 
These two aforesaid reasons would make precisely defining public policy a daunting 
task, if not a totally impossible mission. They may also explain why the 
aforementioned Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention 
stated that the notion of public policy could even be intentionally not defined in the 
Convention133 since it is practically out of the question. As once stated by the House 
of Lords, that ‘Considerations of public policy can never be exhaustively defined’134. 
Hence, the best effort one could give when defining public policy is describing it as 
the fundamental and basic principles or values.135  
                                                          
128 Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and others v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and others, 
Supreme Court of India [1986] AIR 1571. Emphasis added. 
129 Some scholars describe this vertical development of public policy as the ‘evolving character’ of 
public policy. See E. Gaillard & J. Savage (ed), Fouchard, Gaillard, Goldman on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 1999, at para. 1650. 
130  See Alexis Mourre, ‘Chapter 1 Arbitrability of Antitrust Law from the European and US 
Perspectives’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for 
Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 1-026. 
131 Ibid, footnote 41, at para. 1-020.  
132 Ibid, footnote 42, at para. 1-020. 
133 IBA Subcommittee on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards – Report on the Public 
Policy Exception in the New York Convention, October 2015, at 1. 
134 Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co., Shell 
International Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1988] 3 W.L.R 230 (CA), at 316. 
135  See Pierre Lalive, ‘Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International 
Arbitration’, in Pieter Sanders (ed), Comparative Arbitration Practice and Public Policy In 
Arbitration, ICCA Congress Series, Kluwer Law International, Vol. 3, 1987, at para. 17, in which the 
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Expectedly, such fundamental and basic principles or values would convey a two-
layer meaning: on the one hand, it is unquestionably that a state’s public policy 
would cover its own fundamental political, social and economic public interest, 
which hence has a clearly domestic nature. On the other hand, a state’s public policy 
would also cover those general value pertaining to morality, justice and 
internationally recognised public value, which hence also has a transnational nature. 
Nevertheless, its detailed connotation would still need to be materialised when 
specific limiting conditions are provided, e.g. which jurisdiction is involved, when 
the question of public policy is posed, etc. 
B. The law applicable to public policy defence at enforcement stage 
1. The lex fori 
One of the most important determinants which should then be brought into 
consideration when examining the public policy defence at enforcement stage 
concerns which law should be applied to examine the issue. The answer to this 
question would be fairly straightforward, that the lex fori, i.e. the law of enforcing 
state under this scenario, should be the law applicable to public policy defence. This 
choice of law is explicitly provided in Article V(2)(b) which reads that:  
‘2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that: 
… 
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the 
public policy of that country’136 
Undoubtedly, the term ‘that country’ refers to the enforcing state, and therefore the 
law of enforcing state will govern the public policy defence. Theoretically speaking, 
this approach is in line with the traditional conception of public policy which is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
author described public policy as ‘a kind of ‘hard core’ of legal or moral values’; see also, for example, 
Sir Jack Beatson FBA, International arbitration, public policy considerations, and conflicts of law: the 
perspectives of reviewing and enforcing courts, Arbitration International, Vol. 33, Issue 2, 2017, at 
176.  
136 Emphasis added. 
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essentially established upon the doctrine of territoriality137. It is fairly straightforward 
that the courts of a jurisdiction would prioritise the public policy of the jurisdiction, 
which could be clearly extracted from the well-established principle of the conflict of 
laws that ‘[n]o nation can be justly required to yield up its own fundamental policy 
and institutions, in favor of those of another nation’ 138 . Following this sense, 
therefore, as correctly pointed out, that ‘when a matter gets into the courts of a given 
jurisdiction there is a temptation to value that jurisdiction’s own policy over that of 
the policy of one of the other sources/systems.’139 
Article V(2)(b) of the Convention thus ‘establishes an exceptional escape device 
from Article V’s generally-uniform rules’140 which essentially allows a jurisdiction, 
by applying its own public policy concern, to refuse enforcement of arbitral award. 
Practically speaking, this approach was also reported to be ‘internationally-settled’141. 
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales once clearly stated that ‘it may be that 
the plaintiff can enforce it in some place outside England and Wales. But 
enforcement here is governed by the public policy of the lex fori’142.  Similarly, the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales opined that ‘the very point of provisions such as 
s(8)(7A) (which is the counterpart of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC) is to preserve to 
the court in which enforcement is sought, the right to apply its own standards of 
public policy in respect of the award’143. Other jurisdictions which hold the same 
attitude includes the U.S.144, India145, Portugal146, etc. 
                                                          
137  Thomas Schultz & Niccolò Ridi, Comity and International Courts and Tribunals, Cornell 
International Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 3, 2017, at 582. 
138 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, foreign and domestic: in regard to contracts, 
rights, and remedies, and especially in regard to marriages, divorces, wills, secessions, and 
judgments, Hillard, Gray and Company, 1834, at p. 26. See also Authur K. Kuhn, Comparative 
Commentaries on Private International Law, The Macmillan Company, 1937, at p. 33. 
139 Sir Jack Beatson FBA (2017) op. cit., supra note 135, at 185.  
140 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3642. According to the author, the two grounds 
listed in Article V(2), which allows local considerations to come into play, are different from those 
grounds listed in Article V(1) which provides ‘internationally-applicable standards of procedural 
fairness’.  
141  Maxi Scherer, England Country Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York 
Convention, at 21. 
142 Soleimany v. Soleimany [1998] Q.B. 785 (CA), at 800. 
143 Corvetina Technology Ltd v. Clough Engineering Ltd., Supreme Court of New South Wales [2004] 
183 FLR 317, at para. 18. 
144 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe General De L’Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 
969, 1974, at 971 (‘Article V(2)(b) of the Convention allows the court in which enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award is sought to refuse enforcement, on the defendant’s motion or sua sponte, if 
‘enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [the forum] country.’’) 
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2. Interpreting public policy as ‘international public policy’ 
Although being rather irrebuttable, certain doubts may be raised under the 
circumstance that certain jurisdictions interpret the term public policy under Article 
V(2)(b) of the NYC as ‘international public policy’, which focuses on the general 
principles or values recognised and embraced worldwide rather than those 
concerning merely domestic interest which may not be recognised elsewhere. For 
example, Article 1520, 5° of the French Code de procédure civile, which governs the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award, reads that: ‘An appeal against the decision, 
which grants recognition or enforcement, will be available only in the following 
cases: … 5° if the recognition or enforcement is contrary to the international public 
order’147. It is hence distinguished from Article 1492, 5° of the Code, which governs 
the enforcement of domestic arbitral award and applies domestic public policy in the 
consideration.148 149 
                                                                                                                                                                    
145 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Company, Supreme Court of India [1994] AIR 860, 
at para. 89. (‘While construing the provisions of Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Award Act [which 
is the counterpart of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC], we have held that under the said provisions the 
enforcement of a foreign award can be objected to only on the ground of such enforcement being 
contrary to public policy of India and that public policy of other countries e.g. country of the law of 
contract of the courts of the place of arbitration cannot be taken into consideration.’)  
146 A v. B & Cia Ltda. & others, Supremo Tribunal de Justiça, Portugal, 9 October 2003. In this case 
the Supremo Tribunal de Justiça affirmed that under the New York Convention, the recognition and 
enforcement of an arbitral award rendered in the territory of one Contracting State may only be denied 
in the territory of another Contracting State when Article V NYC so provides, and, specifically in 
what concerns this case, when the award is contrary to the public policy of the state where recognition 
is sought. 
147 The original text is ‘Le recours en annulation n'est ouvert que si: … 5° La reconnaissance ou 
l'exécution de la sentence est contraire à l'ordre public international’. Emphasis added. 
148 Instead of ‘ordre public international’, this Article applies ‘order public’. See also Charles Nairac, 
France Country Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 3. By quoting 
CA Paris, 14 June 2001, SA Compagnie commerciale André v. SA Tradigrain France, the author 
stated that ’The Code of Civil Procedure thus draws a distinction between (domestic) public policy 
and international public policy.’ 
149 Other jurisdictions which interprets their public policy as international public policy include but are 
not limited to, England, see Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. ST-CMS Electric Company Private Ltd. 
[2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 93 (HC), at para. 42. (‘…in the context of an international treaty, ‘public policy’ 
means international public policy and differs from public policy in a domestic context.’); see also L. 
Collins et al. (eds), Dicey, Morris & Collins: The Conflict of Laws, Sweet & Maxwell, 14th ed, 2006, 
at para. 16-146; India, see Renusager Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., Supreme Court of India, 
[1994] AIR 860, at para. 66. (‘Since the Foreign Awards Act is concerned with recognition and 
enforcement of foreign awards which are governed by the principles of private international law, the 
expression “public policy” in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards Act [the counterpart of Article 
V(2)(b) of the NYC] must necessarily be construed in the sense the doctrine of public policy is 
applied in the field of private international law.’); Italy, see Massimo Benedettelli & Michele Sabatini, 
Italy Country Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 10. 
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Defining a jurisdiction’s public policy as an international one may, to certain extent, 
suggests that it is in some way a supranational principle 150  which ‘entails the 
identification of fundamental principles that are recognised by different legal 
systems’151. Following this thought, the term ‘international public policy’ may hence 
be understood as a transnational, or as named by some scholars, a ‘truly international 
public policy’152 which is not rooted in any specific legal forum. Therefore, Article 
V(2)(b) may not be understood as it reads literally that enforcing court may refuse 
enforcement if such enforcement violates its own public policy, and the conclusion 
that the law of enforcing state being the law applicable to public policy issues at 
enforcement stage would hence be challenged.  
Nevertheless, first, this understanding of the term ‘international public policy’ would 
not be fully convincing. First of all, one should be aware that public policy at such a 
high level of general legal norms and abstract principles may be a mere legal 
aspiration 153 , of which the achievement would require the sacrifice of domestic 
public interest. This would be hardly conceivable since a certain part of the function 
of public policy is to resist the ‘intrusion’ of foreign arbitral awards which are 
deemed to run contrary to an enforcement jurisdiction’s own public policy. As stated,  
‘It is … clear that Article V, paragraph 2(b) refers to the host country’s 
conception of international public policy, and not to a ‘genuinely 
international public policy’ rooted in the law of the community of nations … 
The logic of Article V, paragraph 2(b) of the New York Convention is … to 
enable the country where recognition or enforcement is sought to refuse to 
                                                          
150 World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 2006, at para. 138. 
151  Julian D. M. Lew, Transnational Public Policy: Its Application and Effect by International 
Arbitration Tribunals, De la edición, Fundación Universitaria San Pablo CEU, 2018, at 25-26. See 
also, for example, International Law Association, Report on the Sixty-Ninth Conference, London, 
2000, at pp. 345-346, in which transnational public policy was defined as ‘fundamental rules of 
natural law, principles of universal justice, jus cogens in public international law, and the general 
principles of morality accepted by what are referred to as “civilised nations”’.  
152 Pierre Lalive (1987) op. cit., supra note 135. 
153 Stavros Brekoulakis, Public Policy Rules in English and International Arbitration Law, Arbitration, 
Vol. 84, Issue 3, 2018, at 219. See also, for example, Jan Kleinheisterkamp, Overriding Mandatory 
Laws in International Arbitration, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 67, Issue 4, 2018, 
at 912, in which such ‘truly international’ public policy was questioned and the author opined that 




accept into its legal order an award which contravenes its fundamental 
convictions.’154 
Therefore, by bearing this part of function of public policy in mind, eliminating 
domestic colour of public policy would not be tenable, and ‘domestic value 
preferences’ are still relevant.155 Following this thought, it could be seen that the 
term ‘international public policy’ was once defined by the International Law 
Association in its Resolution on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of 
International Arbitral Awards as not only the ‘fundamental principles, pertaining to 
justice or morality, that the State wishes to protect even when it is not directly 
concerned’ 156  but also ‘rules designed to serve the essential political, social or 
economic interests of the State’157.  
Secondly, even by interpreting international public policy as the fundamental 
principles which apply when a state is not directly concerned, such compliance 
would still be based upon the state’s understanding and wish. As pointed out, the 
very fluid concept of international public policy is to be determined on the basis of a 
‘comparative law approach and on the existence of international instruments adopted 
with respect to specific matters and which reflect a broad consensus among the 
community of states’158. But such a ‘broad consensus’ on international legal norms 
could be achieved only based upon the consideration of each involved jurisdiction 
but not in abstract159, and the answer regarding how this general norm is ‘distilled in 
precise legal rules’160 may still vary in different national legal systems.161 
                                                          
154 E. Gaillard & J. Savage (1999) op. cit., supra note 129, at para. 1712. Emphasis added. See also, 
for example, Dicey, Morris & Collins (2006) op. cit., supra note 149, at para. 32-230. (‘The courts of 
all countries insist on applying … those principles of their own law which, in their own view, express 
basic ideas of public policy.’) 
155 William E. Holder, Public Policy and National Preferences: The Exclusion of Foreign Law In 
English Private International Law, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 17, 1968, at 
951.  
156 Resolution of the ILA on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 
Arbitration International, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2003, at 214. 
157 Ibid.   
158 Emmanuel Gaillard, Legal Theory of International Arbitration, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010, 
at p. 130. 
159 William E. Holder (1968) op. cit., supra note 155, at 951. 
160 Stavros Brekoulakis (2018) op. cit., supra note 153, at p. 219. 
161  See Julian D. M. Lew (2018) op. cit., supra note 151, at 64. (‘…just as there are no fixed 
transnational public policy rules, so too there is no standard and burden of proof to show its existence, 
relevance and effect.’) 
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Hence, it would be sounder to conclude that interpreting public policy as an 
international one does not take away the ‘domestic’ nature of it. In other words, even 
where a jurisdiction chooses to apply ‘international’ public policy when examining 
relevant public policy concerns at enforcement stage, the connotation of this term is 
still based upon its own understanding of what its fundamental public interests are, 
and hence pursuant to its own law. The term ‘international public policy’ should not 
leave the impression that it is a purely transnational rule but an enforcing state’s 
bottom line in reviewing international arbitral awards: those ‘international’ public 
policies, no matter whether they are actually transnational or national, are what an 
enforcing court would neither concede nor neglect when reviewing a foreign arbitral 
award at enforcement stage.162 The intention of stating a state’s public policy as an 
international one is hence to emphasis the high threshold of invoking public policy 
defence at enforcement stage but not to limit the connotation of public policy to 
merely cover those concerning internationally recognised public values. From this 
sense, a state’s public policy under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC which is interpreted 
as an international one would not, in essence, be different from another state’s public 
policy under the same provision which is simply interpreted without adding the 
qualifier ‘international’163, and a specific public policy could be ‘international’ whilst 
                                                          
162 See Pierre Lalive (1987) op. cit., supra note 135, at para. 59 (‘the function of international public 
policy may also be to enable the State of the forum to impose its views and requirements as to the 
proper and specific regulation needed by international situations’). See also, World Duty Free Co. Ltd. 
v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/7, 2006, at para. 138 (‘The concept of public policy 
(“ordre public”) is rooted in most, if not all, legal systems … This narrow concept is often referred to 
as “international public policy” (“ordre public international”). Although this name suggests that it is in 
some way a supranational principle, it is in fact no more than domestic public policy applied to 
foreign awards and its content and application remains subjective to each State.’) 
163  See infra Section II(A)(3), in which the general term ‘public policy’ is also interpreted as 
containing not only a state’s own fundamental public interest but also general values which are 
internationally recognised. Notably, one might plausibly argue that jurisdictions which interpret their 
public policy as international public policy may apply a stricter attitude towards their application in 
enforcing a foreign arbitral award, it may not be the case in legal practice. See IBA Subcommittee on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards – Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New 
York Convention, October 2015, at 5. (‘[I]n other jurisdictions, courts do not distinguish between 
domestic or national public policy with international public policy. This absence of distinction does 
not, however, always mean that courts adopt a broader interpretation of public policy than in the 
jurisdictions where the distinction exists.’). As reported, jurisdictions where courts restrictively 
interpret public policy, without distinguishing between domestic and international public policy 
includes but are not limited to: Canada (see Craig Chiasson & Kalie McCrystal, Canada Country 
Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York Convention, at 3.); Poland (see Beata Gessel-
Kalinowska vel Kalisz, Poland Country Report on the Public Policy Exception in the New York 
Convention, at para. 4.); and Austria (see Maxi Scherer, Austria Country Report on the Public Policy 
Exception in the New York Convention, at 3.) It was also opined that, no matter whether the term 
public policy is interpreted as international public policy or merely national public policy, its 
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refer to the public value of a specific jurisdiction simultaneously. It would therefore 
not be paradoxical to find that, on the one hand, the Court of Appeal of England and 
Wales once stated in Soleimany that enforcement sought before an English court is 
governed by the public policy of English law164, whilst on the other hand, the High 
Court opined in Tamil Nadu that, ‘in the context of an international treaty, ‘public 
policy’ means international public policy and differs from public policy in a 
domestic context’165. By the same token, it would also not be confusing to see that, in 
the context of international commercial arbitration, Italian public policy was defined 
as ‘domestic international public policy’166. 
3. The public policy of foreign states 
The discussion on the law applicable to public policy issues at enforcement stage 
does not, however, end here. The rationale of the law applicable to public policy 
issues being the law of forum as revealed above essentially lies in the argument that 
public policy is the fundamental public value of a jurisdiction and the court of the 
jurisdiction would hence naturally prioritise the public policy of its own when 
encountering relevant public policy issues. Notwithstanding, such rationale could 
only logically lead to the conclusion that the law of forum is the law applicable to 
public policy issues, but not the conclusion that the law of forum is the only law 
applicable to public policy issues. Issues may arise when an enforcing court, having 
applied its own law, does not opine that the enforcement of the award would violate 
either its fundamental domestic public interests or the generally recognised public 
policy, and the party still argue that the enforcement would, notwithstanding, violate 
the fundamental domestic public interests of another jurisdiction and seek the refusal 
of enforcement.167 Under this scenario, the aforementioned rationale could only lead 
                                                                                                                                                                    
restrictive interpretation is recognised worldwide. See Dicey, Morris & Collins (2006) op. cit., supra 
note 149, footnote 69, at para. 16-145. 
164 Soleimany v. Soleimany [1998] Q.B. 785 (CA), at 800. 
165 Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. ST-CMS Electric Company Private Ltd. [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 93 
(HC), at para. 42. See also, for example, Robert Merkin & Louis Flannery, Arbitration Act 1996, 5th 
ed., Informa Law from Routledge, 2014, at p. 408.  
166 Massimo Benedettelli & Michele Sabatini, Italy Country Report on the Public Policy Exception in 
the New York Convention, at 10. Emphasis added. 
167 Notably, the party may also argue that the enforcement would violate the generally recognised 
public value under the law of another jurisdiction. This is theoretically possible since as discussed in 
supra Section II(B)(2) that the scope of the so-called generally recognised public value is still subject 
to each jurisdiction’s own understanding. However, the law of another jurisdiction would not have a 
say in this situation as the enforcing court would apply its own law in determining this issue. 
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to the conclusion that the enforcing court should apply its own law to examine 
relevant public policy issues (which the court has already done), but not the 
conclusion that the enforcing court should only apply its own law to examine 
relevant public policy issues. Following this thought, a question hence emerges: does 
Article V(2)(b), which allows an enforcing court to apply its own public policy 
concern to refuse enforcement, also allow an enforcing court to apply foreign public 
policy to refuse the enforcement of arbitral awards when its own public policy is not 
violated?  
International comity may arguably come into play under this scenario. Although it is 
self-evident that comity cannot require an enforcing court to yield up its own public 
interest to enforce an arbitral award which merely successfully passed the public 
interests examination of other jurisdiction,168 it may plausibly drive an enforcing 
court, after confirming that its own public interests would not be violated, to refuse 
to enforce an arbitral award if it is convinced that the enforcement would violate 
foreign public policy. 
Notwithstanding, the author reckons that it would not be the case here based upon the 
consideration of the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention. Following the pro-
enforcement bias, it has been widely recognised that the grounds as listed in Article 
V are exclusive and exhaustive169 and they should be ‘strictly applied’170 to ensure 
the general enforceability of arbitral awards. Allowing an enforcing court to refuse 
enforcement based upon the alleged violation of foreign public policy would thus fail 
to fulfil these rules and undermine the pro-enforcement spirit of the Convention as 
such behaviour would potentially reduce the possibility of an arbitral award being 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Therefore, since the enforcing court has ruled that the involved subject matter or the enforcing of the 
award would not violate the generally recognised public policy, such argument would not be upheld.  
168  For example, international comity should not be used in supporting the argument that the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, although violating the public interests of the enforcement forum, 
should be approved since it would not violate the public interests of a foreign jurisdiction. See 
William W. Park, Arbitration of International Business Disputes – Studies in Law and Practice, 
Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2012, at p. 366. (‘Comity … should not require violation of an 
enforcement forum’s own public policy.’) 
169 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at pp. 3426-3427. 
170 Ibid, at p. 3421. See also, for example, Blackwater Security Consulting LLC v. Nordan, E.D.N.C., 
No. 2:06-CV-49-F, 2011, at 18. (‘The grounds for refusal to confirm are set forth in Article V of the 
Convention, which is strictly applied ... to effectuate the policy favouring enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards.’); Ario v. The Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for the 1998 Year of 
Account, 618 F.3d 277, 2010, at 290-291. (‘Article V of the Convention sets forth the grounds for 
refusal, and courts have strictly applied the Article V defences …’). 
45 
 
enforced by requiring an arbitral award to be in line with not only the enforcing 
state’s (which is provided in Article V(2)(b)) but also foreign jurisdictions’ public 
policy (which is not provided in Article V(2)(b)). From the author’s viewpoint, 
Article V(2)(b) of the Convention should be understood as merely providing a 
defensive mechanism for enforcing courts to protect their own fundamental public 
interests but not an excessively generous provision allowing enforcing courts to also 
bring foreign public policy into consideration when its own public policy is not 
violated to further obstruct the enforcement of arbitral awards – respecting and 
applying foreign public policy is simply not the role an enforcing court should play 
under the Convention. From this sense, the consideration of maintaining the general 
enforceability would outweigh the consideration of showing international comity. It 
hence follows the analysis above that the discretion of enforcing courts applying 
foreign public policy to refuse enforcement would be largely restrained by the 
Convention, and the law applicable to public policy issues at enforcement stage 
would hence remain to be the law of the forum.  
The analysis conducted above, notwithstanding, would not utterly eliminate the 
possibility of an enforcing court considering the public policy of another jurisdiction. 
A remaining possibility is that an enforcing state may deem respecting other 
jurisdiction’s public policy as its own public policy, which would be another form of 
showing international comity.171 Under this scenario, when foreign public policy is 
potentially violated, the enforcing state’s own public policy concern may also be 
triggered and the involved foreign public policy would hence be considered and 
applied. For example, it was stated that, ‘if it is apparent on the face of the award that 
the contract was made with the intention of violating the law of a foreign friendly 
State, then the enforcement of an award rendered on the basis of such a contract may 
be contrary to English public policy’172, which could be naturally extended to the 
                                                          
171 See, for example, § 4-18 of Restatement (Third) U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012) stated that: ‘By way of exception … a U.S. court might plausibly regard 
recognition or enforcement of an award to be so deeply detrimental to a foreign State’s paramount 
interests that it offends international comity and is, to that extent, repugnant to U.S. public policy.’ 
172 Dicey, Morris & Collins (2006) op. cit., supra note 149, footnote 69, at para. 16-146. See also, for 
example, Venture Global Eng’g LLC v. Satyam Computer Ltd., 233 F. App’x 517, 2007, at 523. 
(‘well-settled that in the interest of international comity, this Court should not enforce an award in a 
country that would result in the violation of the law of that country’); Regazzoni v. Sethia [1958] A.C. 
301 (HL), at 319. (‘Just as public policy avoids contracts which offend against our own law, so it will 
46 
 
viewpoint that if a contract violates the public policy of a foreign friendly state then 
the enforcement of an award rendered based upon this contract would be contrary to 
English public policy.173 
It should, however, be emphasised that even under this scenario that foreign public 
policy may come into play to obstruct the enforcement of arbitral awards, 174 
following such international comity to respect foreign states’ public policy should by 
no means be understood as kicking an enforcing state’s own public policy out of 
consideration. Rather, it would still be necessary to build the link between foreign 
states’ public policy and the enforcing state’s public policy since the latter is what 
the enforcing court is actually interested in. Just as the statement quoted above, that 
if a contract was made with the purpose of violating the law of a foreign friendly 
State, the enforcement of the award concerning the dispute arising out of the contract 
may be contrary to English public policy -- here one could clearly see that the reason 
of an English court deciding to examine the law of other jurisdiction essentially lies 
in that such clear violation of the law of other jurisdictions would also be deemed as 
a violation of English public policy.175  Showing respect to another jurisdiction’s 
public policy would thus not rewrite the conclusion that no enforcing court should be 
held obliged to uphold other jurisdiction’s public policy, especially when other 
jurisdiction’s public policy would not trigger the public policy concern of the 
enforcing state. It would hence be persuasive to conclude that, even when the public 
policy concern of a foreign jurisdiction comes into play, the law applicable to public 
policy issues would still be the lex fori. 
C. The permissive wording and its application under Article V(2)(b) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
avoid at least some contracts which violate the laws of foreign State, and it will do so because public 
policy demands that deference to international comity’) 
173 See also, for example, Soleimany v. Soleimany, [1999] Q.B. 785 (CA), in which the Court stated 
that where a foreign arbitration award was made based on a contract which was illegal under the law 
of a friendly foreign state where the law governed the contract or the contract was to be performed in 
that state, the English court would not enforce that award as such enforcement would also violate 
English public policy.  
174 It was opined (and the author also agreed) that this application of foreign public policy to prevent 
enforcement was consistent with Article V(2)(b). See Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 
3667. 
175 Similarly, in the example made in supra note 156, one could clearly see that foreign public policy 
would need to be connected to U.S. public policy to trigger the  public policy defence under Article 
V(2)(b) of the Convention. 
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The analysis above further concretised the understanding of public policy under the 
NYC by specifying its applicable law, i.e. the law of enforcing state,176 but it is still 
insufficient to present the full picture of the term. Another key issue which is yet to 
be examined concerns how an enforcing state would exercise its discretion as 
mandated by the permissive wording ‘may’ as applied in Article V(2).  
Three widely accepted golden rules on the application of an enforcing courts’ 
discretion under Article V in general have been gone through above,177 and it could 
be clearly seen that their application meets no difficulty when dealing with Article 
V(2)(b).  
The first rule is that provisions in Article V should be narrowly interpreted. This is 
strictly followed when interpreting the key element of Article V(2)(b), i.e. the term 
‘public policy’. It has been recognised worldwide that, following the ‘strong public 
policies favouring honouring agreements and finality’ 178 , or the so-called pro-
enforcement bias of the NYC, the term public policy ‘must be given a narrow 
meaning’179. Therefore, it could be clearly seen that, as shown above, public policy 
                                                          
176 Subject to the rather rare scenario that an enforcing court regards respecting other jurisdictions’ 
public policy as its own public policy and the violation of other jurisdictions’ public policy could be 
clearly established by the parties. See supra Section II(B)(3) of this Chapter.  
177 See supra Section I(B) of this Chapter.  
178 Sir Jack Beatson FBA (2017) op. cit., supra note 135, at 185. 
179 Ibid. See also, for example, Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at pp. 3648-3649; Marike R. 
P. Paulsson (2016) op. cit., supra note 108, at p. 225; Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan 
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 2004, at 306 (‘The general pro-
enforcement bias informing the convention … points to a narrow reading of the public policy 
defense’); Switzerland No. 10, Chrome Resources S.A. v. Léopold Lazarus Ltd., Tribunal Fédéral 
[Supreme Court], Not Indicated, 8 February 1978, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 1986 - Volume XI, Kluwer Law International, at pp. 538-542, in which the 
Court held that public policy was, in general, of an eminently subsidiary character; Spain No. 9, Odin 
Shipping Co. (Pte) Ltd. v. Aguas Industriales de Tarragona, Tribunal Supremo [Supreme Court], Not 
Indicated, 4 October 1983, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1986 - 
Volume XI, Kluwer Law International, at pp. 528-530, in which the Court referred to the ‘principles 
of universality of justice and of solidarity amongst civilised peoples’ when refusing to apply Article 
V(2)(b) and hence essentially interpreted this Article narrowly; Korea No. 3, Adviso N.V. v. Korea 
Overseas Construction Corp., Supreme Court, 93Da53054, 14 February 1995, in Albert Jan van den 
berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1996 - Volume XXI, Kluwer Law International, at pp. 
612-616. (‘The basic tenet of [Article V(2)(b)] is to protect the fundamental moral beliefs and social 
order of the country where recognition and enforcement of the award is sought from being harmed by 
such recognition and enforcement. As due regard should be paid to the stability of international 
commercial order, as well as domestic concerns, this provision should be interpreted narrowly.’); 
IPCO Nigeria Ltd. v. Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. [2005] E.W.H.C. 726, at para. 13. 
(‘considerations of public policy, if relied upon to resist enforcement of an award, should be 
approached with extreme caution … [the public policy exception] was not intended to furnish an 
open-ended escape route for refusing enforcement of New York Convention awards.’) 
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touches only upon the fundamental principles or values of a jurisdiction. 180  As 
reported, this narrow interpretation was exactly the intent of the drafters of the NYC, 
namely to give the term ‘public policy’ ‘the narrowest interpretation’181.  
Being in line with this rationale, in the landmark case Parsons & Whittemore 
Overseas, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit unsurprisingly held that: 
‘The general pro-enforcement bias informing the Convention and explaining 
its suppression of the Geneva Convention points toward a narrow reading of 
the public policy defense. An expansive construction of this defense would 
vitiate the Convention’s basic effort to remove preexisting obstacles to 
enforcement. 
… 
We conclude, therefore, that the Convention’s public policy defense should 
be construed narrowly. Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied 
on this basis only where enforcement would violate the forum state’s most 
basic notions of morality and justice.’182 
Notably, this requirement on the narrow interpretation of the term ‘public policy’ 
may also derive from the consideration of reciprocity. A jurisdiction widening the 
connotation of public policy and frequently applying public policy defence to refuse 
enforcement would likely encourage other jurisdictions to follow this behavioural 
pattern – this would clearly undermine the cooperation and harmony of international 
commerce. As stated: 
‘Considerations of reciprocity – considerations given express recognition in 
the Convention itself – counsel courts to invoke the public policy defense 
                                                          
180 See supra Section II(A) of this Chapter. As reported, in general, the public policies that have been 
invoked under Article V(2)(b) fall into a limited number of categories, including but not limited to 
mandatory criminal law, corruption and bribery, illegal contracts, etc. See Gary Born (2014) op. cit., 
supra note 21, at pp. 3672-3683. 
181 Marike R. P. Paulsson (2016) op. cit., supra note 108, at pp. 223-224. See also, for example, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards- Travaux. Summary Record of the 
Fourteenth Meeting, at 3 and 9, U.N. Doc E/Conf.26, SR.14, 12 September 1958, in which Indian 
delegate Mr. Adamiyat and Japanese delegate Mr. Urabe both greatly supported the narrow 
interpretation of the term ‘public policy’. 
182 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe General De L’Industrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 
969, 1974, at 971. Emphasis added. 
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with caution lest foreign courts frequently accept it as a defense to 
enforcement of arbitral awards rendered in the United States.’183 
Secondly, the prevailing application of Article V of the Convention requires that a 
violation of the grounds as listed in Article V, if being able to lead to the refusal of 
enforcement, should not be marginal and its absence should plausibly lead to a 
different award. Following this principle, under Article V(2)(b), if a violation of 
public policy could lead to the refusal of enforcement, such violation should be 
serious enough to trigger the public policy defence. The statement made by Sir John 
Donaldson M.R. in Deutsche Schachtbau was representative: 
‘[When considering public policy issues] It has to be shown that there is some 
element of illegality or that the enforcement of the award would be clearly 
injurious to the public good or, possibly, the enforcement would be wholly 
offensive to the ordinary reasonable and fully informed member of the public 
on whose behalf the powers of the state are exercised’184. 
Similarly, as once stated by the French Cour de Cassation in SNF, that only a 
‘flagrant, effective and concrete’185  violation of international public policy could 
trigger the public policy defence.186 
The third rule is that the merits of dispute should not be re-examined, and obviously 
this rule is widely followed when an enforcing court reviewing on relevant public 
policy issues of an arbitral award.187 The message is clear: an enforcement court shall 
                                                          
183 Ibid.  
184 Deutsche Schachtbau- und Tiefbohrgesellschaft mbH v. Ras Al Khaimah National Oil Co., Shell 
International Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1988] 3 W.L.R 230 (CA), at 316. Emphasis added.  
185 French Cour de Cassation (1re Ch. civile), Société SNF v. Société Cytec Industries BV, 4 juin 2008. 
The original text is ‘flagrante, effective et concrète’. The translation is provided in Luca G. Radicati di 
Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-044. 
186 See also, for example, Fitzroy Eng’g Ltd. v. Flame Eng’g Ltd., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17781, at 
*11, in which the Court clearly held that to prevail on a public policy defence, an award-debtor ‘must 
convincingly show that a clear, direct conflict existed that could have affected the outcome of the 
proceeding.’ 
187 Alexis Mourre & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Towards Finality of Arbitral Awards: Two Steps 
Forward and One Step Back, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 2006, at 172, in 
which the author opines that the restriction on touching upon merits is prevailing in legal practice. See 
also, for example, Switzerland No. 28, Inter Maritime Management SA v. Russin & Vecchi, Tribunal 
Fédéral [Supreme Court], Not Indicated, 9 January 1995, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook 
Commercial Arbitration 1997 - Volume XXII, Kluwer Law International, at p. 797 (‘the enforcement 
court does not decide on the arbitral award as an appellate instance; the merits of the award cannot be 
reviewed under the cover of public policy’); Greece No. 9, Not indicated v. Not indicated, Court of 
Appeal of Athens, 6886, 1984, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
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not dig into the merits of disputes188 but merely conduct a prima facie review to 
examine whether there is a violation of public policy.  
More specifically, this rule covers two potential scenarios. The first is that when 
relevant public policy issues have already been examined, the enforcing court should 
be satisfied automatically that relevant public policy issues have been properly 
examined by the tribunal and not review the reasoning of the award. As pointed out: 
‘The review should not entail a review of the merits, that is, a rejudgment of 
the dispute. The proceedings for the setting aside or the enforcement of the 
award should not be an opportunity for the losing party in the arbitration, so 
to speak, to have a second bite at the cherry.’189 
Bearing the fact that enforcement is not an appeal of the arbitration decision190 in 
mind, it would therefore 
‘make no sense to interpret Article V(2)(b) as allowing a Contracting State 
to … review the merits of all arbitral awards for substantive correctness … 
[which] would essentially annul a Contracting State’s ratification of the 
Convention and cannot have been intended by the Convention’s drafters or 
the States that have ratified the Convention.’191  
Instead,  
‘[w]hat must be understood is that in this respect the courts’ role is not to 
revise arbitrators’ reasoning, or to nullify the award on account of their 
                                                                                                                                                                    
1989 - Volume XIV, Kluwer Law International, at p. 637. (‘Under the New York Convention, the 
enforcement court cannot examine whether the award was validly rendered under the law applicable 
to the merits, or whether the proper law was applied to the merits’); Korea No. 5, Majestic Woodchips 
Inc. v. Hun-Geun Yu, as the receiver of the reorganized Donghae Pulp Co., Ltd. et al., Supreme Court, 
28 May 2009 and 29 April 2010, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 
2012 - Volume XXXVII, Kluwer Law International, at p. 263 (‘the competent court in the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought is not allowed to substantially and fully re-examine the 
right and wrong of the ruling on merits, such as facts admitted or rules applied by the arbitrators’). 
188 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-021. See also Gordon 
Blanke (2007), op. cit., supra note 24, at 51-52; John Beechey (1996), op. cit., supra note 24, at 186.  
189 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-066. 
190 ICCA’s Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges, 
published by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration, ISBN 978-90-817251-1-8, 
footnote 5, at p. 15.  
191 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3662.  
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pronouncements, but to prevent enforcement if the practical result thereof 
would be intolerable as a matter of fundamental social values’192 
The second concerns that relevant public policy issues were not examined by the 
arbitral tribunal. Under this circumstance, the enforcing court, instead of digging into 
the merits of the dispute, should only draw the conclusion on whether there is a 
serious violation of public policy by merely analysing the information as shown in 
the award. This approach is largely based upon the view that serious violation of 
public policy could be revealed without comprehensive in-depth review on the merits 
of dispute. As opined: 
‘Where the violation is not prima facie apparent from a perusal of the 
award … it is unlikely that the award can be so seriously flawed as to entail 
an actual violation of public policy.’193 
Therefore, as could be seen from the analysis above, although owing to the principle 
of territoriality (i.e. that no jurisdiction could be justly required to yield up its own 
fundamental public interests) 194  a jurisdiction could/should legitimately refuse to 
enforce an arbitral award when such enforcement would violate its own public 
policy,195 this public policy defence is interpreted and applied in a rather narrow 
fashion.  
Notably, a stricter attitude may suggest that an enforcing court, even when finding 
that the enforcement of an arbitral award violates its public policy, should first remit 
the award back to the arbitral tribunal and give the tribunal the second chance to 
render an enforceable award. The author does not consider this approach feasible as 
the enforcement stage of an international arbitration is essentially the final stage of 
resolving the dispute between the parties. With all the possibilities that relevant 
public policy issues could have been examined or even remitted to the tribunal at 
                                                          
192 Jan Paulsson, The Ideal of Arbitration, Oxford University Press, 2013, at p. 136. Emphasis added. 
193 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-032. 
194 Joseph Story (1834) op. cit., supra note 138, at p. 26. 
195 See Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3694. (‘As the ex officio character of Article 
V(2)(b)’s public policy exception suggests, however, it would be unusual for a court to recognize [or 
enforce] an award notwithstanding the fact that it violated an applicable public policy.’) See also, for 
example, § 4-18, comment c of Restatement (Third) U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2012): ‘although non-recognition [and non-enforcement] under 
Article V is not mandatory, it “seems virtually axiomatic … that a court would not choose to confirm, 
recognize, or enforce an award if doing so would be repugnant to a fundamental public policy”’. 
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annulment stage,196 the onus of an enforcing court is simply to determine whether to 
enforce the award. Therefore, out of the consideration of legal certainty of 
international arbitration, allowing an enforcing court to remit the award to the arbitral 
tribunal for reconsideration would unpleasantly prolong the process of international 
arbitration and run counter to the parties’ expectation of a speedy and definitive 
dispute resolution. Therefore, as shown in legal practice, there is no observed case in 
which an enforcing court remit the award to the arbitral tribunal for reconsideration, 
and it is the author’s viewpoint that an enforcing court should not be allowed to do so.  
D. Remaining questions concerning public policy issues 
The examination of the definition of public policy, the law applicable to public 
policy issues as well as the general attitude of the application of public policy 
defence as conducted above, although intending to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of this term, may not be able to eliminate but even invite uncertainties.  
As discussed above, there are three golden rules governing the behavioural pattern of 
an enforcing court reviewing foreign arbitral awards. The first two are 
straightforward and unquestionable. Since the NYC was designed to facilitate the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, it is therefore naturally inferred that any potential 
grounds for refusal, including the protection of public interests of enforcing states, 
should be applied only when necessary. As for the application of Article V(2)(b), 
such necessity hence requires an enforcing court first to interpret the term ‘public 
policy’ narrowly and secondly only refuse to enforce an award when the enforcement 
would violate relevant public policy in a substantive way.  
Notwithstanding, the third may not be as indubitable as the first two. As discussed 
above, the rationale of restraining enforcing courts from conducting in-depth review 
is two-folded. The first is that when relevant public policy issues have been dealt 
with by the tribunal, the auxiliary role played by the enforcing court determines that 
                                                          
196 See Section 69(7) of Arbitration Act 1996: ‘On an appeal under this section the court [as 
the court of seat] may order -- … (c) remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for 
reconsideration in the light of the court’s determination’. See also, for example, Article 34(4) 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law: ‘The court, when asked to set aside an award, may, where 
appropriate and so requested by a party, suspend the setting aside proceedings for a period 
of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the 
arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will 
eliminate the grounds for setting aside.’  
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it is not at the appropriate position to review what the tribunal has ruled, therefore no 
in-depth review is required. The second is that even the tribunal did not examine and 
rule upon relevant public policy issues, a serious violation of public policy would be 
revealed without in-depth review on the merits of disputes, hence no in-depth review 
is needed. However, the author finds these two rationales not fully indubitable. As 
for the first rationale, it has been discussed above that Article V(2)(b) is essentially 
an escape mechanism allowing an enforcing court proactively to bring its own public 
policy concern in deciding whether to enforce an arbitral award. In this sense, 
relevant public policy issues which were revealed, examined and ruled in an 
international arbitration may also trigger the public interests of the enforcing state. If 
this is the case, the enforcing court’s role played in the international arbitration 
would not be a merely auxiliary one but a more proactive one, depending upon what 
the enforcing court should do under its own public policy concern. This might be 
particularly true when international arbitration steps into the intersection of both 
private and public domains, where the growing concern of public interest may 
plausibly sway the balance between the protection of public policy and obligation of 
general enforcement as struck traditionally – the enforcing court may bear a heavier 
obligation to ensure the protection of relevant strong public interests, according to 
which it might then need to do more than merely following the arbitral tribunal’s 
decision on relevant public policy issues, e.g. to review the reasoning of the award. 
As for the second rationale, from the author’s viewpoint, it is more of an experiential 
judgment but not a settled conclusion. It still remains to be seen whether a serious 
violation of any public policy could always be revealed without touching upon the 
merits of dispute when the arbitral tribunal remained silent on relevant issues. If this 
is not the case, it would then be more legitimate to argue for an approach which 
would allow the enforcing court to dig deeper and touch more upon the merits of 
dispute.  
The query on the legitimacy of these two rationales as well as a new behavioural 
pattern of an enforcing court reviewing awards concerning EU competition law will 
then be further examined and proposed under the scenario of enforcing arbitral 
awards concerning EU competition law in Chapter V below. 
III. Arbitrability and Article V(2)(a) of the NYC 
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The second ground to be looked at concerns the arbitrability197 of a dispute, i.e. 
whether a dispute is ‘amenable to settlement by arbitration’ 198  or ‘belongs 
exclusively to the domain of the courts’199, which further leads to three preliminary 
questions, namely that, first, why certain subject matter is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration; secondly, what the law applicable to arbitrability issues is; and thirdly, 
what the general attitude towards the application of arbitrability defence is.  
A. The rationale of inarbitrability 
One of the most fundamental issues to understand arbitrability defence is to figure 
out the rationale of inarbitrability.  
The prevailing view of this issue is that inarbitrability is founded based upon public 
policy concerns,200 namely a State may put great value on certain public interests and 
take the viewpoint that arbitration is not an appropriate dispute resolution mechanism 
for effectively resolving relevant disputes and hence sufficiently protecting the 
involved public policy.201 Arbitration would thus be excluded from application, and 
                                                          
197 Notably, the term ‘arbitrability’ is also given another meaning in the U.S., which concerns whether 
a dispute is within the scope of arbitration agreement and should hence be submitted to arbitration. 
See, for example, Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 98; Laurence Shore, 
Defining ‘Arbitrability’ – The United States vs. The Rest of the World, New York Law Journal, June 
15, 2009, at 1. For the purpose of this research, this interpretation of arbitrability will not be 
particularly considered. 
198  Ilias Bantekas, The Foundations of Arbitrability in International Commercial Arbitration, 
Australian Year Book of International Law, Vol.27, Issue 1, 2008, at p. 193. 
199 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., 
supra note 1, at para. 2.111. 
200 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Chapter 2 – On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New Areas of 
Concern’, in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and 
Comparative Perspectives, Kluwer Arbitration International, 2009, at para. 2-6. See also, for example, 
Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra 
note 1, at para. 2.116 (‘Whether or not a particular type of dispute is ‘arbitrable’ under a given law is 
in essence a matter of public policy for that law to determine’); J. Lew, L. Mistelis & S. Kröll, 
Comparative International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2003, at para. 9-2.; 
Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson, Comparative Law of International Arbitration, Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2007, at p. 292.  
201  Notably, the arbitrability of a specific subject matter may also be subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction as provided in national provisions. For example, Article 97 of the Swiss Loi fédérale sur 
le droit international privé provides that ‘The courts at the place where real property is located in 
Switzerland have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain actions relating to real property rights’. (The 
original text is in French: ‘Les tribunaux du lieu de situation des immeubles en Suisse sont 
exclusivement compétents pour connaître des actions réelles immobilières.’). However, it was opined 
that such exclusive jurisdiction should not necessarily be construed as excluding the arbitrability of 
the dispute with respect to the subject matter of that exclusive jurisdiction. The key lies in the real 
purpose of setting such exclusive jurisdiction – it may be set merely due to the allocation of powers 
within the jurisdictional system and hence is irrelevant to arbitration or based upon certain public 
policy concern. Only the latter should be construed as setting a rule of non-arbitrability. (see Alexis 
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the enforcement of arbitral awards concerning these disputes may not be approved by 
the state since from its own understanding, these issues should not be arbitrated.  
But why would a state hold such understanding and restrict the arbitrability of 
disputes based upon public interest? Usually, the incapability of a specific dispute 
resolution mechanism in resolving certain types of dispute would lie in two aspects: 
it is either because of the inappropriateness caused by its inherent mechanism or a 
result of the unfitness based upon other extrinsic reasons. Indubitably, the 
inappropriateness caused by inherent mechanism, if there is any, would be more 
fundamental and thus more decisive than that of caused by other extrinsic reasons.  
In the context of international arbitration, the most notable potential incompatibility 
between its inherent mechanism and disputes concerning public interest lies in the 
essence that international arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism of 
‘contractual origins’202. On the one hand, it is always conducted based upon the 
contracting parties’ consensual agreement to arbitrate their dispute. 203  Therefore, 
those who are not contracting parties of an arbitration agreement would generally not 
be able to join the arbitration as they did not show their consensus of being bound by 
the arbitration agreement when it was made between the contracting parties.204 On 
the other hand, the fact that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal originates from the 
parties’ arbitration agreement determines that the award rendered by the tribunal 
would only apply inter partes. As stated that by being constrained by the privity 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at paras. 1-028 and 1-029; see also, for example, Jean-
François Poudret and Sébastien Besson (2007) op. cit., supra note 200, at pp. 293-295.) 
202 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-42. 
203 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., 
supra note 1, at para. 2.01. (‘The agreement to arbitrate is the foundation stone of international 
arbitration. It records … a consent which is indispensable to any process of dispute resolution outside 
national courts. Such processes depend for their very existence upon the agreement of the parties.’) 
204 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-52. See also Nigel Blackaby & 
Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at para. 2.52. 
(‘Unlike litigation in State courts, where third parties can often be joined to proceedings, the 
jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to allow for the joinder or intervention of third parties to an 
arbitration is limited. The tribunal’s jurisdiction derives from the will of the parties to the arbitration 
agreement and therefore joinder or intervention is generally only possible with the consent of all 
parties concerned.’); J. Lew, L. Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 16-74. 
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inherent in the source of his jurisdiction, an arbitrator has authority to dictate legal 
effects inter partes and not vis-à-vis third parties.205 
These features then breed the possibility of the inherent inappropriateness of 
international arbitration being used in resolving disputes concerning public interests. 
First, although an arbitral tribunal is merely obliged to resolve the dispute between 
parties, it would be certainly possible that the award rendered by the tribunal would 
exert influence on third parties since the dispute does have certain public components. 
This may in effect run counter to the private nature of arbitration. As stated:  
‘To the extent it would dictate effects with respect to third parties, the 
arbitrability of mixed/public rights would simply conflict with the contractual 
nature of arbitration’206 
Secondly, the facts that the principle goal of international arbitration is to effectively 
resolve commercial disputes but not protect public interest207 and that non-signatory 
third parties, although being de facto interested, may not be the joinders to arbitration 
would also plausibly raise the doubt that international arbitration may not, from the 
perspective of the public, provide adequate redress to the involved violation of public 
policy. Such nonsatisfaction may be aggravated by bringing the general 
confidentiality of international arbitration into consideration, which would possibly 
cause information asymmetry to other injured parties or affected public and hence 
block the way of other potential lawsuits or other types of dispute resolution.  
Besides these inherent limitations, the unsuitability of international arbitration 
resolving disputes concerning public interests may also, although less decisively, be 
announced based upon some extrinsic reasons.208 One of the most representative 
examples would be the viewpoint that arbitrators may not be as qualified as court 
judges in dealing with disputes concerning public interest. As the opinion given by 
                                                          
205 Karim Abou Youssef, ‘Chapter 3. The Death of Arbitrability’, in Loukas A. Mistelis and Starvros 
L. Brekoulakis, Arbitrability: International & Comparative Perspectives, Kluwer Law International, 
2009, at para. 3-10.  
206 Ibid.  
207 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-47. 
208  It is even opined by some scholars that those extrinsic reasons were actually largely 
‘unsubstantiated’. See, for example, Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at paras. 2-5 
to 2-39.  
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the U.S. First Circuit in Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 
Inc. stated: 
‘issues of war and peace are too important to be vested in the generals … 
decisions as to antitrust regulation of business are too important to be lodged 
in arbitrators chosen from the business community – particularly those from a 
foreign community that has had no experience with or exposure to our law 
and values.’209 
Apart from this allegation, international arbitration may also be queried from, for 
instance, the perspective of due process 210 , such as the alleged generally less 
intensive fact-finding process and less rigorous evidential proceedings when 
compared to national courts211 and the limited or lack of reasoning of awards212. 
Moreover, distrust may also be placed upon arbitration pursuant to the viewpoint that 
‘arbitrators, as private judges, are by nature in alliance with the interests of private 
corporations’213 and would hence not protect the wider public interest.214 
B. Arbitrability and public policy: is Article V(2)(a) tautological? 
Before continuing the analysis on the rest of preliminary questions of arbitrability, a 
point concerning the relationship between arbitrability and public policy should be 
raised here to further clarify the rationale of arbitrability. According to the analysis 
above, the close relationship between arbitrability and public policy has been firmly 
established, as the latter forms the base of the former. Such intersection may, 
however, invite certain doubt that, since arbitrability is in essence a public policy 
                                                          
209 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 1983, at 162. 
210 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-10. 
211 See Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 1974, at 57-58. (‘Moreover, the fact finding 
process in arbitration usually is not equivalent to judicial fact finding. The record of the arbitration 
proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures 
common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony 
under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.’) See also, for example, Bernhardt v. 
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 1956, at 203; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 1953, at 435-438.  
212 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 1974, at 533. (‘An arbitral award can be made without 
explication of reasons and without development of a record, so that the arbitrator’s conception of out 
statutory requirement may be absolutely incorrect yet functionally unreviewable, even when the 
arbitrator seeks to apply our law.’) 
213 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-20. 
214  See, for example, Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 1981, at 729. 
(‘Because the arbitrator is required to effectuate the intent of the parties, rather than to enforce the 
statute, he may issue a ruling that is inimical to the public policies underlying the [U.S. Fair Labour 
Standards Act], thus depriving an employee of protected statutory rights.’) 
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concern, is Article V(2)(a) a tautological provision to Article V(2)(b) and should 
hence be eliminated?  
Some scholars did favour such interpretation of the relationship between arbitrability 
and public policy. As once suggested by Jan Paulsson, a leading scholar in 
international commercial arbitration, that: 
‘Subparagraph V(2)(a) shall not prevent recognition and enforcement unless 
the non-arbitrability of the subject matter is a matter of such fundamental 
importance that recognition and enforcement would also violate subparagraph 
V(2)(b).’215 
Therefore, since the concept of arbitrability has been ‘absorbed or covered’216 by the 
concept of public policy, the independent relevance of Article V(2)(a) should be 
denied.217 
Nevertheless, this understanding of the relationship between arbitrability and public 
policy could not stand unquestionable. These two concepts’ relationship should not 
be understood as one is absorbed or covered by another. On the one hand, as 
analysed above in Section A of this Chapter, it could be found that although 
inarbitrability is triggered by public policy concern, the core of it lies in the reason 
that a specific jurisdiction reckons that international arbitration is not suitable for 
resolving disputes concerning relevant public interest so that they should be 
exclusively resolved by national courts. In other words, arbitrability is more relevant 
to ‘the jurisdiction of a State authority, and constitutes an absolute procedural bar to 
the recognition of an arbitral award’218. Therefore, the consequence of inarbitrability, 
namely the refusal of enforcing the arbitral award, would be unrelated to the 
substance of the award, but merely based upon a jurisdictional reason.  
                                                          
215 Jan Paulsson, Arbitrability, Still Through a Glass Darkly, in Arbitration the Next Decade, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bullet, Special Supplement, ICC Publication No. 612E, 1999, at p. 
98. 
216 Gerold Herrmann, Does the World Need Additional Uniform Legislation on Arbitration? The 1998 
Freshfields Lecture, Arbitration International, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1999, at 220.  
217 Ibid. See also, for example, UN DOC E/CONF.26/SR.11, the Summary Record of the 11th Meeting 
of United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, New York, 27 May 1958, at 7, 
in which the French deletate, Mr. Holleaux, argued that ‘the exception of incompatibility with public 
policy was quite sufficient to cover the rare cases of inarbitrability.’ 
218 Homayoon Arfazadeh, Arbitrability under the New York Convention: the Lex Fori Revisited, 
Arbitration International, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2001, at 86. Emphasis added. 
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On the other hand, public policy plays a different game. It essentially concerns 
whether the substance of an award would violate a state’s understanding of its public 
policy, which ‘sets standard to be respected by arbitrators and their awards’219. 
It hence follows the analysis above that, although these two concepts are indeed 
closely related, arbitrability should not be confused with public policy. The 
relationship between the concepts of arbitrability and public policy would be better 
interpreted as the former is based upon the concern of the latter, but essentially has a 
different focus.   
C. The law applicable to inarbitrability defence at enforcement stage 
The aforesaid inherent conflict between arbitration and disputes concerning public 
interest and those extrinsic reasons may hence lead to the viewpoint that international 
arbitration is inappropriate to be used in resolving public interests-involved disputes. 
Indeed, as will be seen in Chapter IV, these reasons also formed the base of the 
initial distrust on international arbitration in resolving disputes concerning EU 
competition law.  
With this plausible connection being established, the next question which should be 
answered is what the law applicable to arbitrability is. As shown above, different 
jurisdictions may interpret their public policy differently.220 Each jurisdiction hence 
possesses the discretion to shape their own standard of arbitrability. As such standard 
may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction221, it thus crucial to determine which law 
should be applied when considering the arbitrability question at enforcement stage.  
1. The lex fori 
The prevailing viewpoint regarding this issue is that lex fori, i.e. the law of forum, 
should be applied when determining whether a subject matter is arbitrable at 
enforcement stage, 222 which could be legitimised by the point of view that, since 
                                                          
219 Ibid. 
220 See supra Section II(A)(3) of this Chapter. 
221 See Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-049; Nigel Blackaby & Constantine 
Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at paras. 2.116 and 
11.100. 
222 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Chapter 6 – Law Applicable to Arbitrability: Revisiting the Revisited Lex 
Fori’, in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and 
Comparative Perspectives, Kluwer Arbitration International, 2009, at para. 6-3. See also, for example, 
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arbitrability is related to a state’s public policy concern, applying the lex fori to 
govern it is hence based upon a ‘sound territorial consideration’223. This rationale is 
also seemingly endorsed in Article V(2)(a) of the NYC, which reads that: 
‘2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is 
sought finds that: 
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by 
arbitration under the law of that country…’ 
It is irrebuttable that ‘the law of that country’ points to the law of the enforcing 
state,224 and therefore, as opined, 
‘[T]he express mandate of the New York Convention Article V(2)(a) leaves 
very little space, if any at all, for a different view.’225 
2. A second-look on the rationale of applying the lex fori: towards a 
restrictive application of the law of forum 
Although being prevailing and seemingly impeccable, this choice of law may suffer 
from an ‘illogic leap’. There is a logic lacuna between ‘considering certain subject 
matters inarbitrable based upon a state’s own public policy concern’ and ‘applying 
its own law in examining arbitrability issues at enforcement stage’, namely that the 
arbitral award brought before the state’s national court should actually have influence 
on the state’s public policy. For example, in a hypothetic case, a party of State X and 
a party of State Y entered a contract which provides an arbitration agreement and the 
contract was performed in State Y. Later, the collaboration relationship collapsed and 
one of the party refer the dispute to arbitration. After an arbitral award was rendered, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Piero Bernardini, ‘The Problem of Arbitrability in General’, in E. Gaillard & D. Di Pietro (eds), 
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and International Arbitral Awards: The New York Convention 
in Practice, Cameron May, 2008, at p. 516; Hosna Sheikhattar and Alexander Odle, Conflict of Laws 
in the Arbitration of IP Disputes, European International Arbitration Review, Vol. 7, Issue. 1, 2018, at 
75; Jean-François Poudret and Sébastien Besson (2007) op. cit., supra note 200, at p. 285. 
223 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 222, at para. 6-1. See also the discussion of the law 
applicable to public policy in supra Section II(B) of this Chapter.  
224 See for example, Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter 
(2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at para. 11.100. (‘The issue of ‘arbitrability’ under [Article V(2)(a)] of 
the New York Convention is, of course, an issue for the law of the enforcement State’); Stavros 
Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 222, at para. 6-30.  
225 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 222, at para. 6-3.  
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the winning party brought the award to the national court of a neutral enforcing state 
which has no connection with the contract, say State Z, and sought for enforcement. 
The arbitrability of the subject matter of the dispute between the parties is arbitrable 
under the law of State Y but inarbitrable under the law of State Z. Under this 
scenario, should the national court of State Z refuse to enforce the arbitral award 
based upon the inarbitrability of the subject matter under its own law?226  
The answer should be in the negative. As discussed above 227 , arbitrability is 
essentially a ‘jurisdictional requirement’ 228  which concerns a specific state’s 
understanding of the unsuitability of arbitrating disputes with certain subject matters 
of public interests which the state intends to protect. It should thus be noted that a 
key premise of the applicability of a state’s arbitrability rule is that the national court 
of this state should have the jurisdiction to hear the dispute if there were no such 
arbitration agreement. Following this rationale, in this hypothetical case, State Z is a 
purely neutral state which would have no jurisdiction on hearing the dispute even if 
there were no such arbitration agreement. In other words, the exclusive jurisdictional 
rule of State Z will by no means be harmed in this case. Therefore, the arbitrability 
rule of State Z in this case will not be applicable. This understanding hence adds a 
premise to the application of a specific jurisdiction’s arbitrability rule: if a dispute 
will under no circumstance fall within the jurisdiction of an enforcing state’s national 
courts, it will not call for the application of the arbitrability rule of the enforcing 
state.229  
                                                          
226 Notably, as discussed in supra Section II(A)(3) of this Chapter, a specific state’s public policy may 
consist of two parts, namely the public policy concerning the state’s own social or economic interests 
or the generally recognised values which do not particularly concern the state. The place of the 
performance of contract being different from the enforcing state would hence not necessarily lead to 
that an arbitral award would not influence the public interest of the enforcing state, since the award 
may reflect certain generally recognised values. However, for the purpose of the research, this 
situation is not considered in this hypothetic case at this point, but will be further examined in infra 
Section I(A)(2) of Chapter V under the scenario of enforcing foreign arbitral awards concerning EU 
competition law. 
227 See supra Section III(B) of this Chapter.  
228 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-63.  
229 However, it should be noted that the generally recognised values which do not particularly concern 
the state, although may be recognised as its public policy, could not trigger the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the enforcing state’s national court, since such exclusive jurisdiction is essentially established based 
upon the territoriality principle, i.e. ‘jurisdiction obtains over acts that have been committed within the 
territory’. See Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2008, at p. 
42. See also, for example, Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-073. 
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This understanding of arbitrability would then lead to another question: if under such 
scenario the national court of State Z should not apply its own law, then which law 
would govern the arbitrability issue at the enforcement stage? A plausible answer 
would be that if the national court of State Z has considered that the law of State Z is 
inapplicable, it should then leave the issue alone and enforce the award -- since the 
court of State Z would only have the obligation to ensure that the enforcement of the 
arbitral award would not contravene the rule of exclusive jurisdiction of State Z’s 
national courts. Once this obligation is fulfilled, no more action would be needed.   
Following this answer, notwithstanding, it may still be argued that the plausibility of 
this answer is still partially based upon the fact that under the law of state Y, which is 
the substantively interested jurisdiction,230 the subject matter is arbitrable. Therefore, 
even State Z leaves the issue alone there would not be any substantial influence. This 
answer may however be questioned when the fact of the hypothetic case is slightly 
changed: different from the original fact, the subject matter of the dispute between 
the parties is now also inarbitrable under the law of State Y. Should the national 
court of State Z, although still reckoning that its own law is inapplicable, refuse to 
enforce the arbitral award by applying the law of State Y, of which the public policy 
would actually be influenced, and the national courts’ exclusive jurisdiction would 
actually be contravened?  
Similar to the conclusion drawn above concerning the application of foreign public 
policy in refusing the enforcement of arbitral awards, the author opines that applying 
foreign exclusive jurisdiction rule to refuse enforcement would cross the boundary 
set by the Convention since Article V(2)(a), which should also be ‘strictly applied’231. 
It only allows an enforcing court to refuse enforcement if the subject matter of the 
involved dispute is not arbitrable under the law of the forum, but not under the law of 
other jurisdictions. Article V(2)(a), just as Article V(2)(b), should also be interpreted 
as merely providing a defensive mechanism for an enforcing court to protect its own 
                                                          
230 The term ‘substantively interested jurisdiction’ in this research refers to a jurisdiction 
which will actually have the jurisdiction to hear the dispute if there were no arbitration 
agreement. 
231 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3421. 
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fundamental public interest,232 but not to excessively amplify the effect of public 
interests concern so that an enforcing court could apply a foreign arbitrability rule to 
hinder the enforcement of arbitral awards even when its own arbitrability rule would 
not get involved.  
Notably, international comity may still come into play when considering the 
application of foreign arbitrability rules. A potential scenario would be that an 
enforcing court deems the need to respect exclusive jurisdiction rules of other 
jurisdictions to be a matter of its own public policy, and therefore decides to respect 
such rule and refuse to enforce an arbitral award. However, it should be noted that if 
it is actually the case the enforcing court would in fact apply Article V(2)(b), rather 
than Article V(2)(a), to refuse the award. This would thus not alter the conclusion 
that the law applicable to arbitrability issues under Article V(2)(b) is the lex fori.233 
Following the analysis above, the author hence reckons that the law applicable to 
arbitrability issues is the law of forum, but an enforcing court should apply its own 
arbitrability rule only if the involved dispute actually triggers its jurisdiction on it. If 
this is not the case, the question of arbitrability should be left out and the award 
should be enforced, subject to other public policy concerns the enforcing court may 
have.  
3. The law governing arbitration agreement or the law of arbitral seat 
It follows from the discussion above that the lex fori should be the law applicable to 
arbitrability, although it should be applied with certain restriction. However, the 
discussion on this issue does not end here as besides the lex fori, the law governing 
arbitration agreement and the law of arbitral seat may also require certain attention 
when examining the law applicable to arbitrability issues. 
These two potential applicable laws come into play under Article V(1)(a) of the NYC, 
which reads that: 
                                                          
232 Ibid, at p. 3699. (‘… nonarbitrability under … V(2)(a) has the character of an exceptional escape 
mechanism, comparable to the public policy exception, where the local forum is permitted to deviate 
from the Convention’s otherwise applicable international standards and to apply local mandatory 
rules.’) 
233 It should also be reiterated here that even the enforcing court by applying Article V(2)(b) to apply 
foreign arbitrability rule to refuse enforcement, the applicable law would still be the law of forum as 




 ‘1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request 
of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the 
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof 
that 
(a) … the said agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have 
subjected it, or failing any indication thereon, under the law of the country 
where the award was made’234 
Therefore, by interpreting inarbitrability as a component of the invalidity of 
arbitration agreement, the law applicable to arbitrability would then be diversified as 
multiple choices, including the law governing arbitration agreement and the law of 
the seat235, would then emerge and should arguably be considered at the enforcement 
stage.  
Although such connection between the inarbitrability and invalidity of an arbitration 
agreement is, to certain extent, recognised236, the author opines that it is by no means 
a dominant view237 and should be questioned from the following perspectives. First, 
and most importantly, it should be noted that there is an essential difference between 
the validity of arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of dispute. The validity of 
arbitration agreement concerns the inherent effectiveness of the arbitration agreement 
itself, rather than the agreement’s extrinsic connection with the public policy concern 
of a state. As correctly stated, 
‘Despite its procedural effects, the arbitration agreement is primarily a 
substantive contract by which the parties agree to refer their disputes to 
arbitration instead of the state courts. This implies that for the agreement to 
come into existence the requirements for the conclusion of a contract must be 
fulfilled. The parties must have agreed the extent of the referral to arbitration 
                                                          
234 Emphasis added. 
235 i.e. the law of the country where the award was made. 
236 See Bernard Hanotiau, What Law Governs the Issue of Arbitrability? Arbitration International, 
Vol. 12, No. 4, 1996, at 391. (‘Arbitrability is indeed a condition of validity of the arbitration 
agreement and consequently, of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction’). See also, for example, J. Lew, L. 
Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 9-18. (‘… arbitrability is often considered 
to be a requirement for the validity of the arbitration agreement …’). 
237 Although this approach was once described as a prevailing view in Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. 
cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-58. 
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and there should be no factors present which may vitiate their consent under 
general contract law. Furthermore, the parties must have had capacity to enter 
into an arbitration agreement. In this respect the arbitration agreement is a 
contract like any other contract.’238 
Notably, besides the parties’ consent, the capacity of parties and other formal 
requirements, any other conditions of validity would put arbitration agreements ‘in a 
disadvantageous position compared to other substantive contracts’239 and therefore 
‘the principle of the contractual nature of arbitration agreement would be violated’240. 
Differently, the arbitrability of a dispute concerns more of a public policy rather than 
an inherent contractual requirement. As discussed above, arbitrability concerns 
whether a dispute concerning a specific subject matter would be inappropriate to be 
adjudicated in arbitration from the perspective of a specific jurisdiction – this is an 
extrinsic issue concerning the exclusive jurisdiction rule of a state but not the 
fundamental contractual relationship between the parties. This conceptual distinction 
would therefore understandably lead to that, for example, although an arbitration 
agreement is itself valid, an enforcing court may still refuse to enforce the arbitral 
award based upon that the subject matter of the parties’ dispute as covered by the 
arbitration agreement is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the enforcing state 
(but not because of any inherent deficiency of the agreement itself). 
Secondly, from a more pragmatic perspective, this connection between the validity of 
arbitration agreement and the arbitrability of the subject matter of parties’ dispute 
does not seem to be approved by the NYC, at least one could not confidently 
establish it by perusing the text of the Convention. It could be clearly seen that the 
validity of arbitration agreement (as provided in Article V(1)(a)) and arbitrability (as 
provided in Article V(2)(a)) are placed in two different provisions, and such 
placement was arranged with certain reasons. One of the most potent reasons is that 
the role an enforcing court plays under Article V(1) and Article V(2) are different. 
Under the former, an enforcing court may examine relevant violations only if it is 
raised by the parties whilst under the latter, the court could examine arbitrability 
                                                          
238 J. Lew, L. Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 7-3. Emphasis added.  
239 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-61. 
240 Ibid.  
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issues on its own motion.241 Therefore, since interpreting arbitrability as a component 
of an arbitration agreement being valid would not render the inapplicability of 
Article V(2)(b) of the NYC,  a practical dilemma would hence arise: could an 
enforcing court raise the issue of arbitrability on its own initiative or should an 
enforcing court only raise the issue of arbitrability based upon parties’ claims? 
Moreover, allowing arbitrability issues to be raised under both the law governing 
arbitration agreement or the law of seat (if interpreting inarbitrability as a component 
of invalidity and hence under Article V(1)(a)) and the law of enforcing state (under 
Article V(2)(b)) would in fact expand the scope of scrutiny of arbitral award, i.e. 
subject the enforceability of arbitral award under not only the law of enforcing state 
but also the law governing arbitration agreement or the law of seat, which could 
arguably run counter to the pro-enforcement spirit of the Convention, and would thus 
also make this approach less persuasive. 
Hence, based upon these considerations, the author reckons that it would be more 
tenable to believe that the drafters of the Convention have intentionally distinguished 
the validity of arbitration agreement with the arbitrability of parties’ dispute, and the 
conclusion that the law governing arbitrability issues at enforcement stage should be 
the law of the enforcing state hence still remains defensible. 
D. The permissive wording and its application under Article V(2)(a) 
The previous research on the rationale and law applicable to inarbitrability seems to 
grant an enforcing court with the full discretion on arbitrability issues: once an 
enforcing court deems a specific subject matter inarbitrable under its own law, it 
could certainly refuse to enforce an award concerning a dispute of this subject matter. 
It hence leaves the impression that the permissive wording ‘may’ under Article 
V(2)(a) refers to a rather high level of discretion.   
This, notwithstanding, is not the case in practice. Such seemingly wide discretion is 
in fact largely restricted under the consideration of the enforcement-bias borne by the 
NYC. Since as stated that the Convention was designed to ‘encourage the recognition 
                                                          
241 Article V(2) reads that: ‘Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if 
the competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that …’.  
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and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements’242, such arbitrability defence 
should be understood as an exception rather than an option to be applied freely.243 As 
inspiringly proposed by a leading scholar, the application of arbitrability should be 
restricted from two aspects, namely that a NYC Contracting State may only treat 
specific, rather than broadly-scoped subject matters244 as non-arbitrable in order to 
protect discrete and articulated public policy; 245  and a Contracting State, when 
establishing its own nonarbitrability exceptions, should also examine the necessity of 
such exception by not only considering its own national conditions but also the 
evolving practice of other states.246 Following this restrictive attitude, it could be 
clearly noticed that the scope of arbitrability has experienced a remarkable expansion 
in the last two decades,247 and in general awards are now rather rarely denied on the 
ground of nonarbitrability.248 
                                                          
242 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 1974, footnote 15, at 520. Notably, such enforcement-
friendly attitude is also widely recognised and applied. See Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, 
at p. 129. (‘[O]ver the past 50 years, virtually every major developed country has substantially revised 
or entirely replaced its international arbitration legislation, in every case, to facilitate the arbitral 
process and promote the use of international arbitration.’) 
243 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 1039. (‘The expansive application of judicially-
created ‘non-arbitrability’ rules also contradicted the objectives of the New York Convention and 
most national arbitration legislation.’) 
244 For example, a hypothetic provision which generally provides that ‘disputes concerning tort claims 
shall not be arbitrated’ would clearly violate this principle. 
245 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 614. 
246 Ibid, at p. 616. This viewpoint has been recognised by jurisdictions such as the U.S., see Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 1985, at 639 (‘it will be necessary for 
national courts to subordinate domestic actions of arbitrability to the international policy favouring 
commercial arbitration’) 
247 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-3. See also, for example, Nigel 
Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, 
at para. 2.144; Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 244; Alexis Mourre (2011) op. 
cit., supra note 130, at paras. 1-006 and 1-025. It should also be noticed that some jurisdictions even 
intentionally distinguish domestic arbitrability issues with international arbitrability issues and confine 
themselves from applying domestic standard in enforcing international awards. For example, although 
Article 2060 of the French Code civil provides that ‘one may not enter into arbitration agreements in 
matters of status and capacity of the persons, in those relating to divorce and judicial separation or on 
controversies concerning public bodies and institutions and more generally in all matter in which 
public policy is concerned’ (The original text is ‘On ne peut compromettre sur les questions d'état et 
de capacité des personnes, sur celles relatives au divorce et à la séparation de corps ou sur les 
contestations intéressant les collectivités publiques et les établissements publics et plus généralement 
dans toutes les matières qui intéressent l'ordre public’. The translation was given in Stavros 
Brekoulakis, (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, footnote 11, at para. 2-6.), its application is limited to 
domestic arbitration but not an international one as the latter is governed by French Code de 
procédure civile, in which such limitation cannot be seen. (See Jean-François Poudret and Sebastien 
Besson (2007) op. cit., supra note 177, at pp. 292-293.)  
248 Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 243. See also, for example, J. Lew, L. 
Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 9-2; Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., 
supra note 205, at para. 3-54.  
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Nevertheless, although it has been increasingly rare that arbitrability defence could 
be successfully invoked, it is premature to utterly disregard it since inarbitrability is 
still active in certain areas, especially those concerning strong public interest,249 and 
the scope of arbitrability as applied by different jurisdictions still, to certain extent, 
remains different. 250  Therefore, it is still too early to announce the ‘death’ of 
inarbitrability251, and the issues of arbitrability hence still remain a relevant subject 
matter to be considered. 
E. Remaining questions concerning arbitrability issues 
Through the introduction and analysis above, a basic mechanism of arbitrability is 
hence established by Article V(2)(a) of the NYC: the arbitrability of a specific 
subject matter at enforcement stage is determined pursuant to the enforcing state’s 
understanding of the inappropriateness of arbitrating this subject matter. If the 
dispute would fall within the jurisdiction of the enforcing state’s national courts, the 
law of forum would be applied. If not, inarbitrability should not be invoked as a bar 
to obstruct the enforcement of arbitral awards.  
This basic mechanism, although being seemingly clearly established, is not free of 
uncertainty in legal practice. There is a remaining question concerning whether the 
reasons as listed in Section III(A) of this Chapter would always lead to a subject 
matter concerning public interest being inarbitrable.  
 To begin with, a question mark would hang on those extrinsic reasons as they 
seem to be more empirically assumptive rather than being uniformly 
observed. For example, in the case of the alleged ‘less intensive fact-finding 
process and less rigorous evidential proceedings when compared to national 
courts’, it still remains to be seen whether this phenomenon could be 
observed both horizontally and vertically: as for the former, whether it could 
                                                          
249 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 1040. (‘the demise of the nonarbitrability doctrine 
has occured exclusively in the field of private rights of action, almost always in commercial disputes 
between business entities’)  
250 Jean-François Poudret and Sebastien Besson (2007) op. cit., supra note 177, at p. 314. (‘This 
survey of some restrictions to the arbitrability of disputes … show[s] that limitations do exist and are 
not uniform.’) For example, different from many other jurisdictions, disputes arising from exclusive 
distributorship agreements performed in Belgium are still deemed as inarbitrable. See Alexis Mourre 
(2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-026. 
251 Stavros Brekoulakis (2009) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 2-86. (‘Inarbitrability is not dead; at 
least, not yet.’) 
69 
 
be observed in every jurisdiction? As for the latter, whether it could stand the 
test of time, especially with the development of international commercial 
arbitration as an increasingly widely applied dispute resolution mechanism?  
 Moreover, although the reason concerning the inherent inappropriateness of 
the marriage of international arbitration and disputes concerning public 
interests could be much more persuasive and conclusive, several doubts 
would need to be resolved first before affirming its legitimacy.  
- First, as regards the argument that arbitrating public interests involved 
disputes would violate the contractual essence of international arbitration 
since it would inevitably exert influence on third parties, what are the 
nature of influence as exerted on the contractual parties and the third 
parties? Are these influences the same or should they be distinguished? If 
they are different, would such difference degrade the legitimacy of this 
argument?  
- Secondly, in regard to the argument that the confidentiality of 
international arbitration would possibly cause information asymmetry 
which may hence block subsequent adjudications and lead to the 
insufficient redress for behaviours violating relevant public interests, the 
uncertainty lies in that is confidentiality in international arbitration 
absolute? In other words, would confidentiality always lead to the alleged 
information asymmetry and the blockage of subsequent adjudications?  
These issues will be further examined in Chapter IV, where the question will be 
further concretised and examined by placing the focus upon the arbitrability of EU 
competition law disputes. 
IV. Exploring the interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing 
courts under Article V(1)(e) 
The last ground addressed by this research is provided in Article V(1)(e), which 
reads that: 




(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside 
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the 
law of which, that award was made.’252 
Although textually speaking, the expression ‘the country in which, or under the law 
of which, that award was made’ could be interpreted as a multi-directional provisions 
pointing to several potential jurisdictions, in legal practice, this provision is widely 
understood as referring to the arbitral seat of international arbitration.253 Therefore, 
this ground is usually interpreted as that if an arbitral award has been set aside by the 
court of arbitral seat, the enforcing court may refuse to enforce the vacated award. 
A. The permissive wording and its application under Article V(1)(e) 
An issue immediately following the interpretation of the text of Article V(1)(e) is 
where the permissive wording ‘may’ will lead the decision of an enforcing court to 
when encountering an arbitral award annulled by a seat court.   
Expectedly, the involvement of both seat court and enforcing court would inevitably 
require an allocation of competence, which would theoretically fork three main paths. 
                                                          
252 Notably, for the purpose of this research, the scenario that an award has not yet become binding on 
the parties will not be considered. 
253 It could be noted that there are actually two options mentioned in this provision, namely the 
country in which the award was made and the country under the law of which the award was made. As 
for the former, it is rather uniformly understood to refer to the country of the seat of arbitration. (See, 
for example, Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at pp. 3621-3622; Steel Corporation of the 
Philippines v. International Steel Services, Inc., U.S. District Court, the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, U.S., 31 July 2006, Civil Action No. 06-386.). As for the latter, although theoretically 
speaking the expression ‘under the law of which the award was made’ could be interpreted as 
referring to the law governing the arbitration proceedings; the law governing the parties’ arbitration 
clause and the substantive law governing the parties’ underlying dispute, it is generally understood as 
referring to the country of which the law would govern the procedural aspects of an international 
arbitration. (See, for example, Nadia Darwazeh, ‘Article V(1)(e)’, in Herbert Kronke, Patricia 
Nacimiento, et al. (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards : A Global 
Commentary on the New York Convention, Kluwer Law International, 2010, at p. 321.).  
Notably, although being rather rare that an arbitration agreement would provide that on the one hand 
state X will be the seat of arbitration whilst on the other hand the law of state Y will govern the 
procedural aspects of the arbitration, it did happen occasionally. (See, for example, Union of India v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 48. (HC)). One of the prevailing ways, at least 
as observed in England, is to strike the balance and opine that the internal procedural aspects of the 
arbitration will be governed by the law of state Y whilst the external aspects of the arbitration (e.g. 
those concerning the involvement of seat’s court) will be governed by the law of state X. (See 
Jonathan Hill, Determining the Seat of an International Arbitration: Party Autonomy and the 
Interpretation of Arbitration Agreements, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2014, at 
527-534.) For the purpose of this research, this subtle potential difference between the country in 
which an award was made and the country under the law of which an award was made will not be 
further discussed and they will be understood as both referring to the seat of arbitration in the 
following discussion.  
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The traditional path recognises the legitimacy of both seat court and enforcing court 
in examining the legality of arbitral award and anchors international arbitration in ‘a 
plurality of national legal order’254. It would also make a distinction between a seat 
court and an enforcing court by recognising a ‘primary jurisdiction’ between them, 
which would, quasi-exclusively, determine the legality of an arbitral award. 
Differently, the second path opines that international arbitration is ‘relegated to a 
component of a single national legal order’255. In other words, on this path, the court 
of a jurisdiction would possess the absolute primacy and the viewpoint of the court 
of the other jurisdiction would make no difference. Last but not least, the third path, 
which is the seemingly fairest way, treats arbitral seat and enforcing state equally – 
their legal requirements would essentially weigh the same.  
As for these three paths, the third path may not be practical at all. Pursuing such 
seemingly fairness would almost unfortunately incur unpleasant uncertainty: equal 
importance would also mean equal unimportance. As sharply pointed out:  
‘If no forum enjoyed the nullificatory power … accorded to primary 
jurisdiction … the winner of a defective award could fail in enforcement in 
any forum and still continue to go to others in an effort at enforcement, 
harassing the other party and forcing it either to settle for a nuisance value 
factored by the number of jurisdictions in which it could be pursued or to 
expend great amounts of time and effort to block and block again 
enforcement efforts without ever securing a terminal annulment.’256 
The interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing courts under Article V(1)(e) 
should then follow either the first or the second path. 
1. Two potential paths under the NYC 
There seems to be no doubt that Article V(1)(e) steps on the first path as it impliedly 
grants seat courts a primary status whilst leaves certain space for the discretion of 
enforcing courts. As reflected in legal practice, the majority behavioural pattern is 
that the annulment decision made by a seat court would usually generate a universal 
                                                          
254 Emmanuel Gaillard (2010) op. cit., supra note 158, at p. 24. 
255 Ibid, at p. 15. 
256  W. Michael Reisman, Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration: 
Breakdown and Repair, Duke University Press, 1992, at p. 117. 
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effect which should be generally respected and followed.257 Even if an enforcing 
court decides to enforce the award, it could do so only under rather exceptional 
scenarios258 and such decision would not generate extraterritorial effect.259 Due to the 
wide acceptance of this approach, the first path will hence also be called as the 
‘traditional path’ hereinafter. 
However, such implied primacy of seat court under the Convention may arguably be 
subject to a potential exception pursuant to an interpretation of Article VII of the 
NYC. Article VII, also known as a ‘more-favourable-right’ provision260, reads that 
‘[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not … deprive any interested party 
of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to 
the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is 
sought to be relied upon.’ 261  It has been interpreted by certain jurisdictions as 
allowing an enforcing court, by excluding Article V(1)(e) from its own arbitration 
law262, enforce an arbitral award which has been set aside by a seat court: since 
Article V(1)(e) is a provision of which the effect is to potentially block the 
enforcement, if an enforcing state’s arbitration law does not include this provision, it 
would in fact be qualified as a more lenient legal requirement as the chance of 
                                                          
257 Ibid, at p. 114. See also, for example, Jonathan Hill (2016) op. cit., supra note 86, at 326. (‘The 
majority opinion among commentators seems to accept … if an award has been set aside by the courts 
of the seat of arbitration, the courts of other countries should, as a general rule, refuse to enforce the 
award under the Convention’); PT First Media TBK v. Astro Nusantara International BV [2013] 
S.G.C.A 57, at para. 77. (‘While the wording of Art V(1)(e) of the New York Convention and Art 
36(1)(a)(v) of the Model Law arguably contemplates the possibility that an award which has been set 
aside may still be enforced, in the sense that the refusal to enforce remains subject to the discretion of 
the enforcing court, the contemplated erga omnes effect of a successful application to set aside an 
award would generally lead to the conclusion that there is simply no award to enforce.’). 
258 Which will be further looked at in infra Section IV(A)(3) of this Chapter. 
259 W. Michael Reisman (1992) op. cit., supra note 256, at p. 114. 
260 Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 874. 
261 Emphasis added. 
262 This is the position of France, of which the arbitration law does not include a counterpart provision 
of Article V(1)(e) of the Convention. See Livre IV of Code de procédure civile. See also French Cour 
de cassation decision of October 9, 1984, Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1985, at 341, commentary of B. 
Goldman; France No. 20, Polish Ocean Line v. Jolasry, Cour de cassation, 10 March 1993, Y.B. Com. 
Arb., 1994, at p. 662; France No. 23, Hilmarton Ltd. v. Omnium de traitement et de valorisation – 
OTV, Cour de cassation, 23 March 1994, Y.B. Com. Arb., 1995, at p. 665; France No. 26, The Arab 
Republic of Egypt v. Chromalloy Aeroservices, Inc., Cour d’Appel, Paris, 14 January 1997, Y.B. Com. 
Arb., 1997, at pp. 692-693. Notably, the U.S. also excludes the application of Article V(1)(e) from its 
own arbitration law and once enforced an annulled arbitral award. See Chromalloy Aeroservices v. 
The Arab Republic of Egypt, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, 939 F. Supp. 907, 1996. 
However, different from French case law, it was reported that this decision has not been very 




enforcement of the allegedly flawed award would be greater. Also, it was argued that 
the mandatory feature of this provision (‘shall not’) would determine that it takes 
precedence over Article V(1)(e), which essentially reflects the discretion of enforcing 
court (‘may’).263 As stated by the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia in 
Chromalloy v. The Arab Republic of Egypt: 
‘While Art. V provides a discretionary standard, Art. VII of the Convention 
requires that, [the text of Article VII]. In other words, under the Convention, 
Chromalloy maintains all rights to the enforcement of this Arbitral Award 
that it would have in the absence of the Convention. Accordingly, the Court 
finds that, if the Convention did not exist, the Federal Arbitration Act would 
provide Chromalloy with a legitimate claim to enforcement of this arbitral 
award.’264 
Under this interpretation, if an enforcing state does not include the counterpart of 
Article V(1)(e) of the Convention in its own arbitration law, the enforcing court 
would ultimately determine the legality of arbitral award and a seat court’s 
annulment judgment would in fact become trivial before it. This interpretation hence 
suggests that the Convention may also simultaneously pick the second path, or the 
‘unorthodox path’ from the viewpoint of the author as it essentially runs counter to 
the traditional path the Convention seems to step on: the legitimacy of seat court 
examining the legality of arbitral award could be ignored, and the fate of arbitral 
award would be solely controlled by enforcing court.  
2. Pick a sounder one: examining the reasons for driving on both paths 
under the NYC265 
Although the two paths as shown in the interpretation of Article V(1)(e) and Article 
VII point to two opposite directions, they are both logically coherent and conforms to 
                                                          
263 Kenneth R. Davis, Unconventional Wisdom: A New Look at Article V and VII of the Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 37 Texas International Law Journal 
43, 2002, at 82. 
264 Chromalloy Aeroservices v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, 
939 F. Supp. 907, 1996, at 909. Emphasis added. 
265 Different from the concept of the ‘first’ and ‘second’ paths as proposed in Section IV(A) of this 
Chapter, the ‘first’ and ‘second’ paths as mentioned in this Section refer to the paths as further 
specified in Section IV(a)(1) of this Chapter.  
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the letter of the Convention 266 , and could theoretically cohabit in the way that 
Contracting enforcing states should generally follow seat courts’ annulment 
judgments unless their arbitration laws exclude Article V(1)(e). Nevertheless, this 
reflected incompatibility could not be simply reconciled in this way: it does not make 
any sense that the Convention on the one hand intends that an award being annulled 
would be a legitimate ground for potential refusal of enforcement whilst on the other 
hand allows an enforcing court, by unilaterally excluding Article V(1)(e) from its 
arbitration law, to totally ignore this ground. Accordingly, since the interpretation of 
an international treaty should not stop at the literal level267, besides the perusal of the 
text of these provisions, the practical rationale for driving on these two paths should 
also be considered to see whether a sounder path could be picked out rather than 
living with a self-contradictory theoretical possibility of cohabitation. 
a. Seat designation and party autonomy 
The first and also the most fundamental rationale for choosing the traditional path 
lies in the alleged connection between arbitral seat and parties’ intention of 
subjecting the procedural aspects of their arbitration to the law of the chosen forum. 
As argued, parties’ seat designation should be interpreted as a deliberate 
consideration on the jurisdiction over annulment of their arbitral award268 and the 
extent of control as exercised by the seat court269, rather than a mere reckless choice. 
As stated, 
‘[T]he choice of the seat of the arbitration is not fortuitous, not is it simply a 
matter of convenience. When the parties make a choice in this respect, they 
                                                          
266 Christopher Koch, The Enforcement of Awards Annulled in their Place of Origin, Journal of 
International Arbitration, Vol.26, Issue 2, 2009, at 287. 
267 See Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which reads ‘A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in light of its objects and purpose’. 
268  Hamid G. Gharavi, The International Effectiveness of the Annulment of an Arbitral Award, 
Kluwer Law International, 2002, at p. 129. See also, for example, William W. Park, Duty and 
Discretion in International Arbitration, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 4, 
1999, at 823. 
269 Some laws authorise parties to provide for stricter/less rigorous annulment grounds than those 
contained under the NYC or the UNCITRAL Model Law. See Emmanuel Gaillard (2010) op. cit., 
supra note 158, at pp. 36-43. 
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are in fact expressing their intent to subject themselves to a given national 
legal order.’270 
Therefore, since the vast majority of grounds as listed in the Convention and applied 
in legal practice for setting aside an arbitral award concerns procedural violations, 271 
and parties consensually subject the procedural aspects of their arbitration to the law 
of a designated arbitral seat, placing the court of seat on the position of primary 
jurisdiction with a granted authority of setting aside arbitral awards is hence strongly 
convincing based upon the concern of party autonomy, which is unquestionably 
prioritised by and hence also one of the most notable feature of international 
arbitration.272 
Nevertheless, such interpreted connection between the chosen forum and the law 
governing arbitration does not stand unquestioned; instead, it has actually been 
challenged on several grounds, e.g. the choice of seat may actually be a matter of 
convenience in legal practice; the choice of seat is often determined not by the 
parties but by the arbitration institution they have selected; the choice of seat is often 
governed by the desire for neutrality, etc.273 As queried:  
‘One has to admit that any reasoning which attempts to reconstruct the parties’ 
intention regarding their choice of the seat of their arbitration, as if all 
situations were the same, is a highly speculative exercise, even when the 
                                                          
270 Ibid, at p. 19. Emphasis added. See also, for example, Roy Goode, The Role of the Lex Loci Arbitri 
in International Commercial Arbitration, Arbitration International, Vol.17, Issue 1, 2001, at 32; 
Bruno Leurent, Reflections on the International Effectiveness of Arbitration Awards, Arbitration 
International, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1996, at 272. (‘The seat if typically fixed in a place where neither party 
has a place of business … That location is not selected for its hotel facilities or charming setting, but 
essentially because of the parties’ confidence in the neutrality of the forum, the quality of the 
[arbitration law of the seat], the competence of [the jurists, arbitrators and judges of the arbitral seat]’)  
271 From a practical perspective, see Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & 
Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at para. 10.60. (In general terms … there is seldom room 
for any form of appeal from an arbitral award, on the law or on the facts, or for any judicial review of 
the award on its merits. If the tribunal has jurisdiction, the correct procedures are followed and the 
correct formalities are observed, the award – good, bad, or indifferent – is final and binding on the 
parties.) 
272 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29, at p. 315. (‘Party autonomy is the 
guiding principle in determining the procedure to be followed in an international commercial 
arbitration. It is a principle that has been endorsed not only in national laws, but by international 
arbitral institutions and organisations.’). See also, for example, Report of the Secretary-General: 
possible features of a model law on international commercial arbitration, UN Doc. A/CN.9/207, at 
para. 17. (‘Probably the most important principle on which the model law should be based is the 
freedom of the parties in order to facilitate the proper functioning of international commercial 
arbitration according to their expectations.’) 
273 J. Lew, L. Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 4-48. 
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parties themselves have directly decided on the matter. The only certainty is 
that the parties have decided to have their dispute resolved by way of 
arbitration … The idea that they nonetheless implicitly accepted that the fate 
of their dispute be ultimately subjected to the conceptions of the seat’s legal 
order on arbitration – or, in practice, what the courts of the seat will decide – 
seems questionable to say the least.’274 
Therefore, it was opined by some scholars that an enforcing state which is not 
persuaded by the ‘default’ connection between seat designation and the law 
governing parties’ arbitration may well disregard seat court’s annulment judgment 
and step on the unorthodox path since as far as it is concerned, 
‘Between a State that simply hosts arbitral proceedings in its hotels or its 
conference centers and a State that authorizes the seizure and forced sale of 
assets on its territory, the latter manifestly has the strongest title to determine 
what it regards to be an arbitral award worthy of legal protection and, 
retrospectively, what it considers to be a valid arbitration agreement and 
proper arbitral proceedings.’275 
However, simply relying on a possibility to query the legitimacy of another 
possibility is hardly tenable. Just as the advocates of the traditional path could be 
criticised that they fail to consider the scenario that a seat designation may be made 
based upon reasons other than parties’ intention of subjecting their arbitration to the 
law of the seat, the reverse would also be true: those who picks the unorthodox path 
might also fail to realise the possibility that a seat designation may actually be made 
based upon the parties’ intention to let the seat’s arbitration law govern their 
arbitration. Moreover, and more pertinent, even if the parties designate an arbitral 
seat merely out of the consideration of, say, convenience, they still show their 
consensus on choosing a specific forum. The consequence of such choice would be 
that a connection, no matter how strong or scarce, between the forum and their 
arbitration would be established. But at the stage of agreeing on an arbitration 
agreement, such connection could generally not be seen between enforcing state and 
                                                          
274 Emmanuel Gaillard (2010) op. cit., supra note 158, at p. 20. 
275 Ibid, at p. 32. 
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the parties’ arbitration: since parties may not even know 276  or confirm 277  the 
enforcement state when entering an arbitration agreement, how would they intend to 
subject their arbitration to the arbitration law of an uncertain place? Hence, the 
author reckons that even though the connection between seat designation and the law 
governing parties’ arbitration might be actually scarce, there would be no point for 
an enforcing court to simply disregard the connection and control the fate of an 
arbitral award, and interpreting parties’ seat designation as choosing the law 
governing their arbitration would therefore be more persuasive. 
b. The consideration of maintaining legal certainty 
Nevertheless, merely depending on the analysis of party autonomy may not lead to 
the undisputed conclusion that the traditional path is a sounder one: under a rarer, yet 
still possible, scenario that an enforcing state excludes Article V(1)(e) from its 
arbitration law and the parties to an arbitration agreement fail to designate an arbitral 
seat, since no clear parties’ intention is shown in this case, the unorthodox path 
would then be unobstructed. The question is then turned to that under this 
circumstance whether a presumptive arbitral seat should be proposed and mainly 
control the fate of arbitral award (the traditional path) or whether the enforcing court 
should now be the sole authority in examining the legality of arbitral award (the 
unorthodox path). 
This is where the second rationale for driving on the traditional path, namely the 
concern of the legal certainty of international arbitration, comes into play, which is 
clearly one of the Convention’s major objects.278 As for legal certainty, by choosing 
the traditional path, the legality of arbitral award would generally be controlled by a 
single jurisdiction, i.e. an arbitral seat, no matter being clearly designated or 
speculated, which would to a large extent ensure the certainty of international 
arbitration. Nevertheless, it may not be the case if the unorthodox path is chosen. 
                                                          
276 Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 883. (‘The enforcement forum is by 
definition a haphazard one’)  
277 Especially under the scenario that the counterparty may have assets in multiple jurisdictions.  
278 David W. Rivkin, The Impact of International Arbitration on the Rule of Law – The 2012 Clayton 
Utz/University of Sydney International Arbitration Lecture, Arbitration International, Vol. 29, Issue 3, 
2013, at 340. (‘… the New York Convention … facilitate[s] trade by providing certainty to businesses 




Unlike the seat of arbitration, the number of the recognition and enforcement state of 
an international arbitration may be more than one and the enforcement forum could 
therefore ‘hardly make any claim to extraterritorial effects’279. As one could not 
possibly ensure that the enforcement standard as applied around the world would be 
uniform, anchoring the legality of arbitral award in multiple potential forums may 
well lead to the facilitation of the creation of ‘floating awards’280, and lead to the 
possibility, or at least the theoretical possibility, of ‘forum shopping’281 , i.e. the 
losing party could be pursued by the winning party with enforcement actions from 
country to country until a court is found, if any, which excludes Article V(1)(e) in its 
arbitration law and is willing to grant the enforcement. 282  This would largely 
derogate the legal certainty of international arbitration and is undoubtedly an 
unsatisfactory result deviating from the original intention of the drafters of the NYC.  
Moreover, driving on the unorthodox path may also preach down the legal certainty 
of international arbitration as it would, under certain situations, allow an enforcing 
court to re-examine what a seat court has already examined. It stands theoretically 
true that an enforcing court of a jurisdiction which is a NYC Contracting State could 
exclude Article V(1)(e) from its arbitration law and hence examine the legality of an 
arbitral award freely based upon Article VII, but such exclusion would not avoid that 
the legality of an arbitral award may still be examined by a seat court. Under this 
circumstance, although Article V(1)(e) is dismissed, the rest provisions of Article V 
are not – the enforcing court could still only examine the legality of the award 
pursuant to the rest of provisions as set in Article V283. Since these provisions are 
also mirrored in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law which regulates on the 
                                                          
279 Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 883. 
280 J. Lew, L. Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 4-58. 
281 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 125. 
282  Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: Towards a Uniform Judicial 
Interpretation, Proefschrift: Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam, 1981, at p. 355. See also W. Michael 
Reisman (1992), op. cit., supra note 256, at pp. 116-117. (‘The distinction between primary and 
secondary jurisdiction is, in my view, central to the control system of the New York Convention and 
has been an important reason for the attractiveness of the regime to its various consumers…Without 
primary-secondary jurisdictional distinction, all states-parties to the New York Convention would be 
jurisdictionally equal. If any of the almost eighty fora of the convention enjoyed the power accorded 
to primary jurisdictions, the unscrupulous arbitration loser could quickly abandon the neutral forum 
upon which both parties had agreed and seek a favourably inclined jurisdiction.’) 
283 Article V of the NYC reads that ‘Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused … 
only if the party … proof that …’, which clearly shows that the grounds listed in this provision are 
exclusive but not exemplified. 
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annulment of arbitral award, it thus stands a good chance that what is raised before 
an enforcing court might has been examined by a seat court -- this is hardly what the 
drafters of the Convention expect. As correctly pointed out: 
‘One of the problems with the concept of the stateless award is that it fails to 
respect this well-established principle of estoppel. A party against whom an 
award is made decides to challenge it in the courts of the seat of the 
arbitration. If he is unsuccessful, why should he be allowed a second – or a 
third or fourth – bite at the cherry in proceedings before a court or courts 
elsewhere? Why, having embarked on a challenge under the lex loci arbitri, 
should he not be required to accept the outcome?’284 
c. The concern of local outdated idiosyncrasies 
However, it is argued that such legal certainty should not be blindly revered and the 
advocates of the unorthodox path plausibly raise an issue to challenge the legitimacy 
of picking the traditional path. It was stated that, in practice there was a ‘double, 
contradictory, trend in international arbitration: on the one hand, the modernisation 
of laws and, on the other hand, the judicial exacerbation of idiosyncrasies’ 285 
Therefore, choosing the traditional path and highly praising the primacy of seat 
court’s annulment judgment may possibly lead to an unsatisfactory result, namely 
that an arbitral award may eventually be invalidated because of being annulled either 
on an archaic understanding of the annulment grounds as mirrored in Article V of the 
Convention286 or on the basis of an exorbitant local annulment ground which is not 
recognised by the international arbitration community’287. Following this possibility, 
                                                          
284 Roy Goode (2001) op. cit., supra note 270, at 35. See also, for example, Termorio S.A.E.S.P. & 
Leaseco Group, L.L.C. v. Electranta S.P. et al., 487 F.3d 928, 2007, at 937. (‘The Convention does 
not endorse a regime in which secondary States (in determining whether to enforce an award) 
routinely second-guess the judgment of a court in a primary State, when the court in the primary State 
has lawfully acted pursuant to “competent authority” to “set aside” an arbitration award made in its 
country.’) 
285 Emmanuel Gaillard (2010) op. cit., supra note 158, at p. 23. 
286 For example, although the UNCITRAL Model Law, by adopting an amendment in year 2006, 
provides a lower formal requirement of an arbitration agreement  being valid (especially as for the 
requirement of arbitration agreement being ‘in writing’) than that of in the previous version of the 
Model Law, some jurisdictions may not adopt this amendment and still apply the archaic 
understanding of an arbitration agreement being in writing, and may hence set aside an arbitral award 
pursuant to Article 34(2)(a)(i) of the Model Law, which requires the validity of arbitration agreement. 
287 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 115. Emphasis added. See also Georgios C. 
Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 882. It should be noted that such archaic understanding or 
exorbitant local annulment ground do not include what is recognised by a particular jurisdiction as its 
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driving on the traditional path may unreasonably derogate the finality and 
enforceability of international arbitral award, which is another landmark purpose of 
the Convention288, by applying archaic laws289, and the unorthodox path should then 
be chosen as it would prevent such obnoxious localism.290 
The possibility of the enforceability of international arbitral award being derogated 
by outdated idiosyncrasies should not be overlooked, and it is rather persuasive that 
once an enforcing court encounters an annulment judgment which was made based 
upon an obsolete annulment standard, it should be allowed to overrule it – the 
enforceability of arbitral award should not be unconditionally sacrificed for fulfilling 
legal certainty. As Staughton, L.J. stated in Soleh Boneh v. Uganda Government, 
‘[i]f the award is manifestly valid, there should … be an order for immediate 
enforcement’291. 
Nevertheless, the author opines that simply relying on the possibility that the 
annulment standards as applied by some seat courts may be outdated to allow 
enforcing courts to systematically overlook seat courts’ annulment judgment would 
hardly be legitimised. First, and most obviously, the possibility that there may be 
some courts setting aside arbitral awards based upon their archaic annulment 
standards will not eliminate the possibility that there would also be other courts 
which are not excessively conservative292. Allowing an enforcing court to simply 
ignore a seat court’s annulment judgment based upon the mere possibility that the 
seat court might apply outdated annulment standard would hence be rather 
overgeneralised. Following this argument, secondly, without first judging whether a 
                                                                                                                                                                    
public policy. Since public policy concern the most fundamental values or interests of a jurisdiction, 
although it may be actually parochial or not in line with the common practice, it is still inappropriate 
to label it as archaic and should thus be ignored. 
288 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 
1958), UN Publications, at 1. 
289 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 115. (Which means to eliminate the impact 
of those ‘outdated’ states which still hold a rather strong conservative annulment standard, but not an 
international one, on international arbitration). See also, Jan Paulsson, Delocalisation of International 
Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters, 32 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
53, 1983, at 59. 
290 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at pp. 115-116.  
291 Soleh Boneh v. Uganda Government [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Report 208 (CA), at 212. Emphasis added. 
292 The author opines that the possibility of the latter scenario would be much higher than that of the 
former, especially given the consideration of the existence of other normative instruments, such as the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.  
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seat court’s annulment judgment was actually made based upon an obsolete 
annulment standard and simply disregarding it and enforcing the annulled award by 
command and force is a rather dictatorial method293 -- it has been sharply pointed out 
that such behavioural pattern is somewhat ‘arrogant and condescending’294. Although 
the Convention indeed allows an enforcing state a ‘measure of latitude in evaluating 
whether the setting aside of an award in its place of origin was compatible with the 
overall international preoccupation of enforcing international arbitration awards’295, 
such latitude would by no means be extended to become a general mechanism of 
allowing an enforcing court, by simply taking no account of seat court’s annulment 
judgment, to examine the legality of an arbitral award. Thirdly and ironically, even 
the aforementioned unreasonable mistrust on seat court’s judgment and the 
somewhat dictatorial manner could by any chance be accepted, this approach may 
still not even ensure the effect as it preaches, namely to promote the enforceability of 
arbitral award, as it is entirely possible that a jurisdiction which applies outdated 
annulment standard could be the arbitral seat in one case whilst serve as the 
enforcing state in another case. Therefore, if a jurisdiction chooses to drive on the 
unorthodox path and excludes Article V(1)(e) from its arbitration law, the national 
courts of it may certainly annul an arbitral award based upon its archaic annulment 
standard in one case whilst refuse to enforce another arbitral award based upon the 
same standard in another case. Therefore, even though under certain circumstances 
some seat courts may actually apply their obsolete set-aside standards, allowing the 
enforcing courts to overrule such annulment decisions should nevertheless be 
confined to be exceptional but not conventional, and it is therefore the traditional 
path, but not the unorthodox path, which should still be selected. 
d. The traditional path as a sounder choice 
The rationales as discussed above essentially reveal the competition between arbitral 
seat and enforcing state in ‘fighting’ for more control over the legality of arbitral seat. 
                                                          
293 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 132. See also, for example, Bruno Leurent 
(1996) op. cit., supra note 270, at p. 270, who pointedly opined that French legal system, which 
excludes the general compliance to seat court’s annulment judgment from its arbitration law and 
freely re-examine the legality of arbitral award, ‘does not lack audacity’, and a ‘susceptible foreign 
judge might find it a touch arrogant in that it dispels his belief that he had certain competence over an 
award that seemed to him to result from a process having its foundation in his legal order’. 
294 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 132. 
295 Christopher Koch (2009) op. cit., supra note 266, at 289. 
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Indeed, as stated, the Convention attempted ‘an uneasy cohabitation between 
provisions reflecting different underlying philosophies’296 and eventually failed to 
‘put in place a complete and harmonious system of control of arbitral awards’297. 
However, although both paths tally with the literal interpretation of the Convention, 
it would be hardly legitimised that the Convention actually intends to establish a 
potentially contradictory mechanism and such potential textual contradiction should 
by no means lead to the inconsistent interpretation of the Convention. By delving 
into the rationale of stepping on these two paths, the traditional path, namely that seat 
court is granted by a primary status and its annulment judgment should be generally 
followed by other enforcing courts, turns out to be the sounder one and should thus 
be picked. As correctly opined: 
‘Article V(1)(e), by exhaustively defining the courts whose decisions may 
produce such collateral effect [i.e. the effect of issue estoppel], builds on a 
rule of allocation of international competencies … The only, if any, “primary” 
control of validity which is internationally current is the one effectuated by 
the courts mentioned in subparagraph (e). The enforcement court may only 
refuse or grant enforcement.’298 
In contrast to the traditional path, the unorthodox one, namely that enforcing court is 
allowed to unilaterally exclude Article V(1)(e) from its arbitration law and freely 
ignore seat court’s annulment decision, fails to be in line with the fundamental values 
as prioritised by the Convention, and should therefore be closed. It was hence argued 
that ‘Article VII(1) of the New York Convention was certainly not included with the 
aim of enabling the enforcement of annulled awards’299, and it could actually be 
                                                          
296 Which refers to Article V(1)(e) and VII of the Convention. See Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. 
cit., supra note 78, at 863. 
297 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 124. 
298 Georgios C. Petrochilos (1999) op. cit., supra note 78, at 862. Emphasis added. See also, for 
example, Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara et 
al. & Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 2004, at para. 27. 
299 Hamid G. Gharavi (2002) op. cit., supra note 268, at p. 81. It should also be noted that, the 
‘legislative history of the Convention does not discuss the relationship between Article V(1)(e) and 
VII(1). In particular, there is no record that the State delegates or their governments contemplated 
whether an award that has been set aside or suspended could be enforced through the application of 
Article VII(1)’. See UNCITRAL Secretariat Guide on the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), 2016 Edition, at p. 301. See also, for 
example, Stephen T. Ostrowski & Yuval Shany, Chromalloy: United States Law and International 
Arbitration at the Crossroads, New York University Law Review, Vol. 73, No. 5, 1998, at 1661. 
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observed in legal practice that jurisdictions which actually step on the unorthodox 
path would be ‘rather out on a limb’300, and most countries do not ‘routinely enforce 
awards which have been set aside by the courts of the seat’301. 
3. Three potential exceptions of the primacy of seat court 
However, notably, drawing the conclusion that seat court should be granted by a 
primary status in examining the legality of arbitral award and enforcing court should 
generally follow its decision should not be further exaggerated and leave the false 
impression that in legal practice enforcing court would always follow seat court’s 
annulment judgment. As will be seen, under certain scenarios, enforcing court does 
hold the discretion and may overrule seat court’s set-aside decision.  
a. The procedural justice of annulment judgments 
First of all, enforcing court may decline to follow seat court’s annulment judgment 
once it finds that the set-aside decision was made under certain procedural injustice. 
It should be noted that the general automatic compliance of an enforcement court is 
fulfilled based upon two prerequisites, namely the substantive and procedural justice 
of a set-aside judgment. Although the primary status of seat court in setting aside 
arbitral award would plausibly ensure the former, it could not automatically 
guarantee the latter. As Colman J stated: 
‘In a case where a remedy for an alleged defect is applied for from the 
supervisory court, but is refused, leaving a final award undisturbed, it will 
therefore normally be a very strong policy consideration before the English 
courts that it has been conclusively determined by the courts of the agreed 
supervisory jurisdiction that the award should stand…I use the word 
‘normally’ because there may be exceptional cases where the powers of the 
supervisory court are so limited that they cannot intervene even where there 
has been an obvious and serious disregard for basic principles of justice by 
the arbitrators or where for unjust reasons, such as corruption, they decline to 
do so.’302 
                                                          
300 Jonathan Hill (2012) op. cit., supra note 12, at 173. 
301 Ibid.  
302 Minmetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel Ltd. [1999] C.L.C 647 (HC), at 661. Emphasis added. 
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Hence, once an annulment could be proved to be procedural unjust, it would be a 
solid reason for the enforcement court not to follow the seat court’s decision.303 This 
analysis was adopted in, for example, Yukos Capital v. Rosneft, in which the 
Gerechtshof Amsterdam enforced an arbitral award which has been set aside by the 
Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow based upon the finding that the setting-aside 
judgment was in fact made under corruption.304 By the same token, Burdon, J. held 
in Maximov that: 
‘My own view would be that an English court should not simply accept that a 
foreign court had set aside an arbitration award, particularly one within its 
own jurisdiction, if there were at the least an arguable case that the award had 
been set aside in breach of natural justice.’305 
It should, however, be emphasised that the test of examining the procedural justice of 
annulment judgment should be a stringent one. For an enforcing court to be justified 
in ignoring an annulment decision, the decision must be ‘repugnant to fundamental 
notions of what is decent and just’306. 
b. Outdated or exorbitant annulment standard 
The second potential exception, as discussed above307 , concerns the outdated or 
exorbitant annulment standard. It is fairly straightforward that if a seat court applies 
an obsolete or unreasonable annulment standard which clearly runs contrary to 
prevailing legal practice to annul an arbitral award, such annulment does not need to 
be followed by the enforcing court. As correctly pointed out: 
                                                          
303 Dicey, Morris & Collins (2006) op. cit., supra note 149, at para. 16-144. (‘where it has been set 
aside in the court of the seat, an arbitral award should be enforced only if recognition of the order 
setting aside the award would be impeachable for fraud or as being contrary to natural justice …’) See 
also, for example, Talia Einhorn, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments on 
International Commercial Arbitral Awards, 12 Yearbook of Private International Law 43, 2010, at p. 
63; Michael Kotrly & Barry Mansfield, Recent Developments in International Arbitration in England 
and Ireland, Journal of International Arbitration, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2018, at 489-490. 
304  Gerechtshof te Amsterdam, Yukos Capital SARL v. OAO Rosneft, 28 april, 2009, No. 
200.005.269/01, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2009 - Volume 
XXXIV, Kluwer Law International, at p. 703. See also, for example, in which the Court suggested 
that an award that has been set aside by the courts of the seat may be enforced in the US under the 
NYC if the annulment is contrary to the procedural justice of the forum. 
305 Maximov v. Open Joint Stock Company [2017] 2 C.L.C. 121 (HC), at para. 64. 
306 Termorio S.A.E.S.P. & Leaseco Group, Llc. v. Electranta S.P. et al., 487 F.3d 928, 2007, at 938. 
Emphasis added. See also, for example, Jonathan Hill (2012) op. cit., supra note 12, at 170. 
307 See supra Section IV(A)(2)(c) of this Chapter.  
85 
 
‘The purpose behind the Convention is reflected in the language of the 1996 
Act. Enforcement ‘shall not be refused’ except in the limited circumstances 
listed in section 103(2) [the counterpart of Article V(1) of the NYC] where 
the court is not required to refuse but ‘may’ do so. Under subsection (5) [the 
counterpart of Article VI of the NYC] the court may adjourn but only if it 
considers it ‘proper’ to do so. The enforcing court’s role is not therefore 
entirely passive or mechanistic. The mere fact that a challenge has been made 
to the validity of an award in the home court does not prevent the enforcing 
court from enforcing the award if it considers the award to be manifestly 
valid.’308 
c. Inarbitrability and violation of public policy 
The third potential exception, which is also the most pertinent one to this research, 
lies in the relationship between a seat court’s and an enforcing court’s viewpoints on 
relevant arbitrability or public policy issues reflected in an arbitral award. As has 
been introduced above,309  subject matters being inarbitrable and the violation of 
public policy are two common grounds for both awards annulment (under Article 
34(2)(b) of the Model Law) and refusal of enforcement (under Article V(2) of the 
NYC). Therefore, in legal practice, it is possible that an arbitral award, which has 
been examined on arbitrability/public policy ground, is brought before the enforcing 
court and the enforcing court would thus determine whether to follow the seat court’s 
decision. More specifically, this situation could be further divided into two sub-
scenarios, namely that an arbitral award has passed the arbitrability/public policy 
examination and the enforcing court needs to determine whether to follow the seat 
court’s decisions; and an arbitral award has been annulled by the seat court based 
upon the seat’s inarbitrability rule or the violation of the seat’s public policy under 
Article 34(2)(b) of the Model Law and the enforcing court is called to refuse to 
enforce the award under Article V(1)(e).  
As discussed above, 310  a key prerequisite for an enforcing court to follow the 
                                                          
308 Nigerian National Petroleum Corp. v. IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd. [2008] Civ. 1157, 2 C.L.C 550 (CA), at 
para. 15. See also, for example, Soleh Boneh v. Uganda Government [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 208 (CA), 
at 212.   
309 See supra Section II of Chapter I.  
310 See supra Section IV(A)(2)(a) and IV(A)(2)(b) of this Chapter.  
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annulment decision made by a seat court is that the review of the involved violation 
is conducted under the quasi-exclusive competence of the seat court – since the 
violations as listed in Article 34(2)(a) of the Model Law essentially concerns the 
procedural aspects of international arbitration and the law governing the procedural 
aspects of arbitration is almost always the law of arbitral seat, once relevant 
procedural issues have been examined by the seat court, it would then create the 
effect of issue estoppel and it would hence be inappropriate to re-examine what the 
seat court has ruled upon normally.311  
However, as for subject matters being inarbitrable or the violation of public policy, 
the seat court may not be understood as possessing such primary status on these 
issues, and its decision on the legitimacy of awards would thus not be automatically 
followed by the enforcing court.  
First of all, as drawn above, 312  arbitrability rules and public policy concerns 
essentially reflect the fundamental public interests of a jurisdiction which such a 
jurisdiction would not yield. This solid territorial feature thus determine that when 
the exclusive jurisdiction rule or public policy of the enforcing state is violated, the 
enforcing court would apply its own law and may eventually refuse to enforce the 
award, and this applicable law is also confirmed by Article V(2)(a) and V(2)(b) of 
the Convention. This conclusion on the choice of law, from the author’s opinion, 
would by no means be altered under the Convention by a seat court’s judgment 
which does not reckon that the award violates its own arbitrability rule or public 
policy. Indeed, it would be hard to understand why the viewpoint of an enforcing 
court on its own fundamental public interest would be subordinated to the viewpoint 
of a seat court on the seat’s fundamental public interest. It would also be rather 
confused if on the one hand the Convention confirms the law applicable to public 
interest issues being the law of forum whilst on the other hand tacitly permits the 
possibility of bypassing this choice of law. Therefore, under the first sub-scenario 
                                                          
311 Jonathan Hill (2012) op. cit., supra note 12, at 181-183. (‘If, for example, the courts of the seat 
dismiss a setting aside application and rule that the arbitration agreement was valid or that the arbitral 
procedure was in conformity with the applicable procedural rules, the award-debtor should be 
regarded as estoppel from resisting enforcement of the award in England based on the basis of Article 
V.1.a or Article V.1.d’) See also, for example, Hebei Import & Export Corporation v. Polytek 
Engineering Co Ltd, Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal [1998] 1 HKLRD 287, at 295. 
312 See supra Section II(B) and Section III(C) of this Chapter.   
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that an arbitral award has passed the arbitrability/public policy examination before 
the seat court which refused to vacate the award, this refusal to vacate would not 
generate extraterritorial effect and the enforcing court should still be able to refuse to 
enforce the award if either the enforcing state’s exclusive jurisdiction rule or relevant 
public policy is seriously violated. 
Secondly, it has been concluded above that the refusal of enforcement based upon 
violation of arbitrability rule or public policy are essentially two escape mechanisms 
provided by the Convention which allow an enforcing court to protect its own public 
interests but not two excessively wide pathways allowing an enforcing court to apply 
foreign arbitrability or public policy rule to obstruct the enforcement of arbitral 
awards. Similarly, the author does not reckon that this conclusion would be altered 
by bringing seat court’s annulment decision and Article V(1)(e) into consideration. 
As correctly stated, 
‘Article V(2) of the Convention establishes an exceptional escape device 
from Article V’s generally-uniform rules, which permits a state to refuse to 
recognise an award in rare cases where its own local public policy or 
nonarbitrability rules are violated. What Article V(2) does not contemplate, 
however, is that a Contracting State deny recognition to an award merely 
because another state relied on its own conceptions of public policy, or 
nonarbitrability, to annul that award [i.e. under Article V(1)(e) of the 
Convention]; this would transform local public policy from an exceptional 
escape device into a generally-applicable decision binding in all Contracting 
States. That result would contradict both the nature of public policy doctrine 
and the Convention’s text and purposes, which require recognition of 
agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards.’313 
Therefore, under the second sub-scenario that an arbitral award has been vacated by 
the seat court on arbitrability or public policy ground, Article V(1)(e) should not be 
interpreted as impliedly indicating that the enforcing court should simply follow the 
seat court’s annulment decision. Still, just as discussed above that an enforcing court 
may consider to respect foreign arbitrability rule or public policy if its own public 
                                                          
313 Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 3642. 
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policy requires it to do so, this would also be well applicable to the interrelationship 
between a seat court and an enforcing court: an enforcing court may also consider to 
respect a seat court’s arbitrability rule or public policy if it is its own public policy to 
do so. 
Following these thoughts and given the consideration of previous discussion on 
relevant public policy and arbitrability issues, the behavioural pattern of an enforcing 
court under this second sub-scenario could thus be proposed314: 
 When an annulment decision was made based upon inarbitrability and the 
enforcing state is itself a substantively interested state, it would apply its own 
arbitrability rule no matter how the seat court has ruled on the arbitrability 
issue, since its rule of exclusive jurisdiction is actually influenced of which 
the application should not be subject to other state’s exclusive jurisdiction 
rule. 
 When an annulment decision was made based upon inarbitrability but the 
enforcing state is itself not a substantively interested state: 
- If the seat is not a substantively interested state either, this annulment 
judgment should not be able to influence the enforcing court’s decision on 
enforcement as the arbitrability rule of the seat should not be applied in 
the context. 
- If the seat is, this annulment judgment should also not be able to influence 
the enforcing court’s decision on enforcement in principle. However, if it 
is the enforcing court’s public policy to respect other jurisdiction’s 
exclusive jurisdiction rule, the enforcing court might under this 
circumstance consider whether the public policy defence under Article 
V(2)(b) of the Convention would be triggered by running a balancing test 
between maintaining the general enforceability and the urgency of 
upholding a foreign state’s arbitrability rule. Based upon the solidly 
established pro-enforcement bias of the Convention, the level of such 
                                                          
314  Although previous discussions on arbitrability and public policy were made without the 
consideration of Article V(1)(e) and the interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing courts, 
since bring this Article into consideration would not, as analysed above, alter the conclusions as 
drawn above, they should hence also be applicable here in proposing the behavioural pattern of an 
enforcing court.  
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urgency would be rather high if the latter is expected to outweigh the 
former. The enforcing court should then only refuse to enforce the award 
when the connection between arbitrating the dispute and the seat’s 
relevant public policy being manifestly insufficiently protected could be 
persuasively established.    
- If, under a rather rare scenario, the seat court refused to enforce the award 
based upon the arbitrability rule of a foreign substantively interested state, 
the enforcing court should also follow the suggested behavioural pattern 
in the last sub-point above to examine whether it should apply foreign 
arbitrability rule to refuse the enforcement. 
 When an annulment decision was made based upon violation of public policy: 
- If the seat’s public policy is understood by the enforcing court as covering 
either the enforcing court’s fundamental domestic public interest or a 
generally recognised public value, the enforcing court would then apply 
its own standard of reviewing the seat court’s annulment judgment and 
determine whether to enforce the arbitral award. 
- If the seat’s public policy is not understood by the enforcing court as 
covering either the enforcing state’s fundamental domestic public 
interests or a general public value which is also recognised by the 
enforcing state, the annulment decision would not influence the enforcing 
court’s decision on enforcement in principle. However, if the enforcing 
state does deem respecting foreign public policy as its own public policy, 
the enforcing court may also consider following the seat court’s decision 
if the applicant could persuasively prove that the enforcement of the 
award would manifestly derogate the public policy of the arbitral seat so 
that the derogation would outweigh the finality of arbitral award. 
- If, under a rather rare scenario, the seat court refused to enforce the award 
based upon the violation of a foreign state’s public policy, the enforcing 
court should also follow the suggested behavioural pattern in the last sub-
point above to examine whether it should apply foreign public policy to 
refuse the enforcement.   
B. Remaining questions concerning the interrelationship between seat 
courts and enforcing courts 
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Through the discussion and analysis above the author hence introduced a fairly 
comprehensive behavioural pattern of an enforcing court when encountering an 
arbitral award which has been set aside before a seat court. On the one hand, if the 
award was vacated due to procedural violations which are not deemed to be outdated 
or exorbitant, the enforcing court would generally respect and follow the seat court’s 
decision as long as such annulment judgment was made in accordance with 
procedural justice. On the other hand, if the award was vacated based upon the 
ground of inarbitrability or the violation of public policy, the specific behavioural 
pattern of the enforcing court would depends on the key influence factors, e.g. the 
connection between the dispute and the jurisdiction of the seat court, and the 
connotation of public policy as defined by the seat court when annulling the award, 
which have been listed and analysed above.  
But there is still a notable uncertainty which has not been fully addressed, which 
concerns an enforcing court’s behavioural pattern when deciding whether to enforce 
an arbitral award annulled based upon its violation of the seat’s public policy. As 
concluded above, if the seat’s public policy is understood by the enforcing court as 
covering either the enforcing court’s fundamental domestic public interest or a 
generally recognised public value, the enforcing court would then apply its own 
standard of reviewing the seat court’s annulment judgment and determine whether to 
enforce the arbitral award. This is where the uncertainty would emerge: what specific 
standard should the enforcing court apply? Should the enforcing court re-examine 
what the seat court has examined to ensure that the seat court has performed in the 
way which it would have performed if the public policy issue is directly raised before 
it after the award was rendered? Or should the enforcing court fully trust the seat 
court and simply follow the seat court’s decision? 
Since the answers of these questions may depend on what specific public interest is 
involved, this uncertainty will hence be further examined under a more concretised 
circumstance in Chapter VI, where it will be discussed and analysed in the context of 
enforcing an arbitral award concerning EU competition law dispute of which the 




Chapter IV – Examining the application of Article V(2)(a) of the 
NYC under the scenario of enforcing foreign arbitral awards 
concerning EU competition law disputes 
Having established a basic understanding of the mechanism of reviewing foreign 
arbitral award under the NYC, the next step of this research is further to examine the 
remaining questions of the application of this mechanism under a more specific 
scenario, i.e. the enforcement of foreign arbitral award concerning EU competition 
law disputes.  
The first ground to be looked at is Article V(2)(a) of the Convention. As discussed in 
Section III(E) of Chapter III, although it has now been clearly understood that the 
inarbitrability of a specific subject matter may be set based upon a state’s intention of 
protecting certain public interests and its understanding that arbitration would not 
sufficiently protect them, the rationale of such understanding may be questioned by 
querying the alleged inherent incompatibility between disputes concerning public 
interests and international arbitration and those extrinsic reasons concerning the 
incompetence or impartiality of arbitrators in adjudicating disputes concerning public 
policy.  
This Chapter will hence, through the examination of how the arbitrability of 
competition law 315  was originally determined, subsequently developed and 
eventually remoulded, critically analyse the aforementioned rationales of 
disapproving the arbitrability of subject matters which concerns certain public 
interests. As will be seen in the following analysis, the link between a public interest-
involved dispute and the dispute being inarbitrable would be increasingly scarce, and 
may eventually be disconnected.  
I. The beginning of story: the distrust of arbitration in adjudicating 
competition law disputes 
                                                          
315 It should be noted that, although this research focuses on the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards concerning EU competition law, it would not be necessary to emphasis this ‘regional feature’ 
when examining the arbitrability of competition law disputes since the development of the 
arbitrability of competition law disputes in general essentially reflects the development of the 
arbitrability of EU competition law.  
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In comparison with the arbitrability of some other subject matters which was 
approved ab initio, the development of the arbitrability of competition law disputes 
has had a rather abashed start. As stated, allegations of antitrust law violations used 
to be widely considered as non-arbitrable by national courts.316 The discussion of this 
Chapter will hence start from tracing back to the ‘distrustful era’ and digging into the 
reasons of disapproving the arbitrability of competition law disputes. 
A. The public element of competition law disputes and the private nature of 
arbitration 
The first, and maybe also the most cogent, argument for opposing the arbitrability of 
competition law disputes concerns the conflict between the public element of 
competition law disputes and the private nature of arbitration.  
As for the former, competition law contains norms to protect the wider public 
interest and not just the interests of particular individuals or undertaking.317 As stated 
in American Safety v. McGuire: 
‘[A] claim under the antitrust law is not merely a private matter … Antitrust 
violations can affect hundreds of thousands – perhaps millions – of people 
and inflict staggering economic damage’318. 
As for the latter, arbitration is a private system of adjudication319 which allowed the 
parties to customise the process of their dispute resolution. The whole arbitration 
process aims merely to put an end to disputes between the parties and the arbitral 
award is expected to affect only them. Moreover, such private nature is demonstrated 
not only by rendering arbitral awards binding only upon the parties, but also by the 
confidentiality of arbitral proceedings which is often taken to be one of the important 
                                                          
316 Michael F. Hoellering, Arbitrability of Disputes, The Business Lawyer, Vol.41, No.1 (November 
1985), at 135. 
317 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 93. See also, for example, Ilias Bantekas (2008) 
op. cit., supra note 198, at 212; Jean-François Poudret and Sebastien Besson (2007) op. cit., supra 
note 177, at p. 296. (‘For a long time, the arbitrability of competition law disputes was doubtful 
because of its public policy nature and the fundamental importance of the legislations governing this 
field, both in the United States and in the European Community’). 
318 American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. McGuire, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), at para. 19. 
Emphasis added. 
319 Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 1. 
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features of arbitration.320 As Stephen Bond, a former Secretary-General of the ICC, 
stated: 
‘It became apparent to me very soon after taking up my responsibilities at the 
ICC that the users of international commercial arbitration, i.e. the companies, 
governments and individuals who are parties in such cases, place the highest 
value upon confidentiality as a fundamental characteristic of international 
commercial arbitration.’321 
Here is where the conflict appears. Since the adjudication of competition law 
disputes would inevitably incur influence on public, e.g. on downstream customers 
and other competitors, and thus concerns a strong public interest, the private nature 
of arbitration determines that it is not at an appropriate position to examine the 
subject matter wearing a strong public colour. As being stated: 
‘Because the private right is entangled with the public interest, its 
enforcement has public effects external to the parties … Constrained by the 
privity inherent in the source of his jurisdiction, an arbitrator has authority to 
dictate legal effects inter partes and not vis-à-vis third parties. To the extent it 
would dictate effects with respect to third parties, the arbitrability of 
mixed/public rights would simply conflict with the contractual nature of 
arbitration’.322 
Furthermore, and more importantly, even if a competition law dispute is allowed to 
be arbitrated and the infringement settlement is provided, the settlement would 
merely resolve the dispute between the parties. Since competition law infringement 
would inevitably bring impact upon parties other than the one entering the particular 
contract, it may be argued that the infringement settlement, i.e. the arbitral award, 
could not be an adequate address for the breach of competition law, especially when 
considering that the feature of confidentiality of arbitration would cause information 
                                                          
320 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29, at p. 32. 
321 See Expert Report of Stephen Bond Esq (in Esso/BHP v. Plowman), Arbitration International, Vol. 
11, Issue 3, 1995, 266-268. Emphasis added. 
322 Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at paras. 3-9 and 3-10.  
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asymmetry to other injured parties or influenced public and thus block the way of 
other potential lawsuits or other types of dispute resolution.323  
Therefore, it was opined that competition law which pursues public policy objectives 
is arguably most efficiently safeguarded by organs of the states,324 such as national 
courts or the National Competition Authorities under the context of EU competition 
law, but not arbitral tribunals. As has been clearly pointed out in the American 
context: 
‘We do not believe that Congress intended such claims to be resolved 
elsewhere than in the courts … The pervasive public interest in enforcement 
of the antitrust laws, and the nature of the claims that arise in such cases, 
combine to make … antirust claims … inappropriate for arbitration.’325 
B. The distrust on arbitrators in adjudicating competition law disputes 
Besides the aforementioned theoretical concern on the conflict between the public 
element of competition law disputes and the private nature of arbitration, there is 
another concern on the distrust of arbitration in adjudicating competition law 
disputes which could be much more practical, i.e. the distrust on arbitrators in 
adjudicating competition law disputes.  
The major argument propping up the distrust on arbitrators concerns the expertise 
and impartiality of arbitrators in adjudicating competition law disputes. First, as 
being stated, competition law is not easy to apply: it often involves complicated 
economic determinations not just about one or two undertakings but about broad 
                                                          
323  Notably, in the context of EU law, the Court of Justice has, since Pfleiderer (Case C-30/09 
Pfleiderer v. Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-5161), been trying itself in knots on the countervailing 
pressures of private (judicial) enforcement of the competition rules and encouragement in the use of 
its leniency or ‘whistle blowers’ programme, and the availability of documents submitted under the 
latter to parties seeking their discovery under the former. (See Case C-199/11 Europese Gemeenschap 
v. Otis NV and ors, EU:C:2012:684; Case T-344/08 EnBW Energie Baden-Württemberg AG v. 
Commission, EU:T:2012:242; Case C-536/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde v. Donau Chemie AG and 
ors, EU:C:2013:366; Case T-376/10 Mamoli Robinetteria v. Commission, EU:T:2013:442; Case C-
557/12 Kone AG and ors v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, EU:C:2014:1317. The issues have also, 
necessarily, been taken up by national courts: see AG Bonn, 12. Januar 2012 (Pfleiderer) 51 Gs 53/09; 
Natioanl Grid Electricity Transmission v. ABB Ltd and ors [2012] EWHC 869 (Ch). For recent 
European Commission initiatives see its guidance documents on use of confidentiality rings in 
competition access-to-file proceedings and on confidentiality claims in competition proceedings, both 
published 12 December 2018. 
324 Ilias Bantekas (2008) op. cit., supra note 198, at 196. See also, for example, Alan Redfern & 
Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29, at p. 164. 
325 American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. McGuire, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), at paras. 19 to 23.  
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phenomena in markets.326 Therefore, a hesitant attitude would plausibly be applied 
since it is not unquestionable that arbitrators would all be well-educated as for 
competition law.  
Secondly, arbitrators’ expertise is also questioned based upon the consideration that 
arbitrators, when comparing to national courts or relevant public authorities, have 
limited fact-finding wherewithal. 327  As being considered in American Safety 
Equipment Corp. v. J. P. McGuire: 
‘[T]he issues in antitrust cases are prone to be complicated, and the evidence 
extensive and diverse, far better suited to judicial than to arbitration 
procedures … Since commercial arbitrators are frequently men drawn for 
their business expertise, it hardly seems proper for them to determine these 
issues of great public interest.’328 
Thirdly, it was pointed out that arbitrators, when comparing to national courts’ 
judges, do not have the public interest at heart: 
‘The fear that private arbitrators would under-enforce public laws has very 
widely served as the reason to consider certain matters non-arbitrable. The 
image of arbitrators as “commercial men” biased to business and hostile to 
public regulation of commercial activity, or presumably unable to deal with 
complex public law issues has nourished this classic fear.’329 
Hence, all these considerations lead to the viewpoint that arbitrators may not be fully 
qualified in adjudicating competition law disputes. The consequence of the 
misapplication of competition law may be even serious when considering the 
aforementioned private nature of arbitration, since once the arbitrators misapply 
competition law in adjudicating relevant cases, arbitration may in fact 
                                                          
326 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 93. 
327 Ibid.  
328 American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J. P. McGuire, 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), at para. 20. 
Emphasis added. See also, for example, EC Resolution of the Parliament of 15 July 1994 on 
encouraging recourse to arbitration to settle legal disputes, OJ 1994/C 205/519, in which the 
Parliament stated that the submission of disputes to arbitration could ‘jeopardise the uniformity in the 
interpretation and application of Community law’. 
329 Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at para. 3-9. 
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‘delivers a potent opportunity secretly to enforce contractual provisions 
which may be against competition laws and the private character of 
arbitration minimises and may even eliminate the opportunities for States to 
discover that their competition laws are being circumvented in this way.’330 
II. The turning points: the development of arbitrability of competition 
law disputes 
Although the aforementioned conflict between the public element of competition law 
and the private nature of arbitration as well as the distrust on arbitrators’ expertise 
caused the general non-confidence of numerous jurisdictions331 upon arbitration in 
adjudicating competition law disputes, such situation did not last long. The rapid 
development of international business and trade drives international commercial 
arbitration to be increasingly recognised and used in adjudicating commercial 
disputes, as for both the quantity of arbitration and the categories of dispute which 
are now approved to be arbitrated -- especially the latter, it was stated that there has 
been, in the last three decades, a general trend towards the expansion of the category 
of arbitrable disputes.332 
This development, as could be clearly seen, also affects the arbitrability of 
competition law disputes. As pointed out: 
                                                          
330 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 93. 
331 Besides American Safety v. McGuire and the 1994 European Parliament’ Resolution as quoted 
above, other jurisdictions which have once shown their non-confidence on arbitration including, for 
example, Germany, see § 91 of the original Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, vom 27, Juli 
1957 (BGBl. 1997 I S. 1081) (GWB) which provided that arbitration clauses covering competition 
matters under the Act were void unless they provided each party with the alternative of proceeding in 
respect of these matters before the ordinary courts, see also Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 
36, at p. 95; Belgium, see Brussels, Preflex v. Lipski, JT 1976, 493, in which the Rechtbank van de 
eerste aanleg Brussel held that if an arbitral tribunal could indeed assess whether a contract is valid 
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, a violation of said provision would have deprived it of its 
jurisdiction, as quoted by Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-130; Republic of 
Lithuania, see Article 11.1 of Lietuvos Respublikos komercinio arbitražo įstatymas (The Republic of 
Lithuania Law on Commercial Arbitration): ‘1. Arbitražui negali būti perduoti ginčai, kylantys iš 
konstitucinių, darbo, šeimos, administracinių teisinių santykių, taip pat ginčai, susiję su konkurencija, 
patentais, prekių ir paslaugų ženklais, bankrotu, bei ginčai, kylantys iš vartojimo sutarčių.’ (1. 
Disputes arising from constitutional, employment, family, administrative legal relations, as well as 
disputes connected with competition, patents, trademarks and service marks, bankruptcy and disputes 
arising from consumption agreement may not be submitted to arbitration.). 
332 See J.-B. Racine, L’arbitrage commercial international et l’ordre public (Paris: LGDJ, 1999), 36, as 
quoted by Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-006. 
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‘The arbitrability of competition law issues is a fait accompli. Both in the 
United States and in Europe, the question as to whether competition law 
disputes can be adjudicated by way of arbitration has been answered in the 
affirmative by the local courts.’333 
Therefore, by being clearly aware of the huge change in attitude, there must be 
certain conceptual or practical developments which actually mitigate or even 
eliminate the aforementioned distrust. 
A. The impetus of attitude change: the concern of promoting international 
commerce 
One of, if not the most important, impetus for the attitude change lies in the concern 
of promoting international commerce. As could be clearly seen, since the mid-1980s 
the volume of global trade has steadily increased,334 and based upon the substantial 
benefits of international commercial arbitration, e.g. the neutrality of the forum and 
the likelihood of obtaining enforcement and confidentiality, arbitration has been 
greatly increasingly used in commercial dispute resolution, 335  including in 
adjudicating competition law disputes.336  Therefore, in this context, jurisdictions 
                                                          
333 Gordon Blanke & Renato Nazzini (2008) op. cit., supra note 37, at 48-49. 
334 See the Foreword of Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29. 
335 Ibid. See also, for example, R. Whish & D. Bailey, Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 9th 
ed., 2018, at pp. 341-342.  
336 There would be a concern regarding whether widely-scoped arbitration clauses (such as those 
provide that all disputes arising from the contract shall be referred to arbitration) actually cover 
competition law disputes since such disputes are usually unforeseeable when drafting the clause and it 
is thus arguable that the parties may not intend to refer the specific competition law disputes to 
arbitration. For example, the CJEU once stated in its judgement that ‘A jurisdiction clause can 
concern only disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal 
relationship , which limits the scope of an agreement conferring jurisdiction solely to disputes which 
arise from the legal relationship in connection with which the agreement was entered into … In the 
light of that purpose, the referring court must … regard a clause which abstractly refers to all disputes 
arising from contractual relationships as not extending to a dispute relating to the tortious liability that 
one party allegedly incurred as a result of the other’s participation in an unlawful cartel.’ See Case C-
352/13 CDC Hydrogen Peroxide SA v. Akzo Nobel NV et al, EU :C :2015 :335. However, the author 
holds a different opinion here due to that, first, by stating that all disputes arising from the contract 
shall be referred to arbitration, the text clearly shows the parties’ intention to cover all the 
uncertainties, no matter foreseeable or not, which should naturally include those concerning 
competition law, which, although could not be ‘reasonably foreseen’, still amounts to potential 
disputes. Narrowly construing an arbitration clause would run counter to the well-established principle 
of the broad interpretation of widely-scoped arbitration clause. See, for example, Fiona Trust & 
Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] 2 C.L.C 553 (HL), at para. 27. (‘The purpose of the clause is to 
provide for the determination of disputes of all kinds, whether or not they were foreseen at the time 
when the contract was entered into’). See also Microsoft Mobile v. Sony [2017] 5 C.L.M.R. 5 (HC), at 
para. 81. Secondly, under the context of EU law, precluding competition law disputes from those 
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might be prone to reconsider and even approve the arbitrability of international 
competition disputes as being driven by 
‘[the] basic reflections on the needs of international commerce; and in 
addition to the special reasons which founded arbitrability in the particular 
case, they typically contained arguments of a general nature which supported 
the parties’ freedom to arbitrate per se. The “sensitivity to the need of the 
international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes”337 or to avoid damage to “the fabric of international commerce and 
trade”338 requires … [to] enforce the parties’ agreement’339 
In other words, as for arbitrating competition law disputes, the attention is now no 
longer paid solely on the concern of arbitrating disputes concerning public interest, 
but also on the consideration of promoting international commerce as complying 
with the parties’ intention to refer their disputes to arbitration would first maintain 
the ‘predictability in the resolution of disputes’340 and secondly, to certain extent, 
ensure that such disputes would be heard and judged in due course, and thus prevent 
the disruption of international commercial order. Therefore, under this situation, it 
seems that the arbitrability of competition law disputes is approved – arbitrators are 
now eligible to hear and examine competition law disputes and draw civil 
consequences accordingly.341 
                                                                                                                                                                    
being covered by an arbitration clause would be in contradiction with which has been clearly stated in 
the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States 
and of the European Union. (‘Therefore, infringers and injured parties should be encouraged to agree 
on compensating for the harm caused by a competition law infringement through consensual dispute 
resolution mechanisms, such as … arbitration’). Hence, based upon these concerns, it is opined that 
competition law disputes should be covered by widely-scoped arbitration clause. For further 
discussion on this issue, see, for example, James Segan, Arbitration Clauses and Competition Law, 
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Vol. 9, Issue 7, 2018, 423-430.   
337 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 1985. 
338 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. S Ct 506, 1974. 
339 Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at para. 3-9. 
340 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. S Ct 506, 1974. 
341 It should be noticed that arbitrators could only draw civil consequences such as awarding damages 
or ordering the undertakings to comply by discontinuing certain practices or revising its prices. 
Awarding legal remedies which apply erga omnes, such as issuing fines and withdrawing underlying 
commitment decision, is still within the exclusive power of public enforcers such as national courts 
and national competition authorities. See Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-156. 
See also, for example, Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 323. 
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However, the emphasis on maintaining international commercial order and 
respecting the parties’ autonomy on resolving their disputes do not virtually 
eliminate the distrust of arbitrating competition law disputes. The aforementioned 
conflict between the public element of competition law disputes and the private 
nature of arbitration is still unsolved, and the distrust on arbitrators’ qualification in 
adjudicating competition law disputes is still not dispelled: how could it be ensured 
that competition law would be properly applied by arbitrators and the arbitral award 
would draw relevant consequence adequately? Hence, in order legitimately to 
approve the arbitrability of competition law disputes, several issues need still to be 
examined. 
B. Gaining basic trust on arbitrating competition law disputes: revisiting 
the theoretical conflict between competition law disputes and 
international arbitration 
The starting point of the examination will be the seemingly inextricable theoretical 
conflict between competition law disputes and arbitration. As aforementioned, the 
conflict lies in two main aspects. First, since the adjudication of competition law 
disputes would inevitably influence on the third parties, the inherent private nature of 
arbitration determines that it is not on the appropriate position to render an arbitral 
award affecting not only the contractual but also the non-contractual parties. 
Secondly, the principle of arbitral award merely binding between the contractual 
parties and the confidentiality of arbitration may plausibly lead to the inadequate 
redress of competition law infringements. These two will be discussed respectively 
in this section.  
1. The inevitability of imposing impacts on non-contractual parties 
The rationale of the first argument lies in that the arbitral awards of competition law 
disputes would inevitably ‘dictate effects’ 342  upon non-contractual parties, which 
originates from the principle of privity of contract, i.e. a contract cannot confer rights 
nor impose obligations upon any non-contractual parties. 343  However, before 
legitimising this argument, prudence should be exercised by noticing the difference 
                                                          
342 Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at para. 3-10. 
343 Neil Andrews, Contract Law, Cambridge University Press, 2011, at p. 186. Emphasis added. See 
also, for example, Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights, Oxford University Press, 2007, at p. 173.  
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between dictating effects and conferring rights or imposing obligations upon non-
contractual parties.  
Distinction should be made clearly between an arbitral tribunal acting ultra vires in 
rendering an arbitral award which actually confers rights or imposes obligations upon 
the non-contractual third parties and an arbitral tribunal acting intra vires in 
rendering an arbitral award which solely binds upon the contractual parties but would 
inevitably impose impacts on non-contractual parties. Under the circumstance that an 
arbitral tribunal correctly act intra vires, it was clearly pointed out that: 
‘What an arbitral tribunal can do is to draw the civil consequences of a 
violation of antitrust laws, by enjoining a party to cease violating the other’s 
rights, awarding damages, or invalidating the contract.’344 
Accordingly, it could be clearly seen that, first, the aims of arbitration is putting an 
end to the disputes between the parties. Secondly, the arbitral award also solely 
targets upon the contractual-parties. The plausible interpretation of the effects 
dictated on the third parties should thus not be conferring rights or imposing 
obligations upon non-contractual parties since the arbitral tribunal would never judge 
upon them.345 
The legal effects of relevant arbitral awards on third parties are hence inevitable and 
sometimes even unconscious. For example, in a hypothetical case concerning a 
contract between a raw material supplier who fixed price with other suppliers and a 
material processor, the cease of violating the processor’s right may lead to the 
consequence that the downstream consumers could purchase the products 
manufactured by the processor at a lower price. Clearly, although it may dictate 
                                                          
344 Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-093. 
345 However, uncertainties might exist in circumstances concerning, for example, the extension of an 
arbitral award to the non-signatory parent company of the losing party or when the losing party is a 
state-owned company or entity, the extension to the state of the company. These scenarios essentially 
concern the precise definition and interpretation of the parties to contracts or to the arbitration clauses 
contained therein but not the actual possibility of legitimately rendering an arbitral award binding 
upon a non-signatory third party. Hence, although for the purpose of this paper, these issues would not 
be examined here since fully addressing them would be inevitably lengthy, the author does not opine 
that the result of the examination would provide a new ground for disapproving the arbitrability of 
competition law disputes. For a thorough discussion on these issues, see Bernard Hanotiau, Complex 
Arbitrations: Multiparty, Multicontract, Multi-Issue and Class Actions, Kluwer Law International, 
2006. See also International Chamber of Commerce; International Court of Arbitration, Complex 
arbitrations: Perspectives on their Procedural Implications, Paris: ICC Publishing, 2003. 
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effects upon non-signatory third parties, it neither confers the consumers the right to 
sue the supplier based upon the specific contract nor does it impose obligations on 
them. 
It hence follows the discussion above that it would be inadequately legitimate to 
deny the arbitrability of competition law disputes simply based upon the argument 
that the arbitral award would dictate effects upon non-contractual parties. As long as 
the arbitral award merely dictates inevitable effects which neither confers rights nor 
impose obligations on the third parties, the arbitrability of competition law disputes 
should be upheld at this stage, subject to the following examinations. 
2. Does private enforcement actually block the way of subsequent 
adjudications? 
The second argument focuses on the inadequacy of redress of arbitrating competition 
law disputes. Since competition law infringement would inevitably bring impacts 
upon parties other than the one entering the particular contract, the arbitral award 
may not be an adequate address for the breach of competition law since, first, the 
award would aim merely at the parties’ disputes but not the non-signatory ones. 
Secondly, and more pertinently, the confidentiality of arbitration would prevent 
relevant information from disclosure, which may lead to information asymmetry or 
even blockage to other injured parties or influenced public and thus block the way of 
subsequent potential lawsuits or other types of dispute resolution. 
Notably, different from the privity principle as being consecrated in arbitration, the 
confidentiality of arbitration, which is often regulated in national arbitration laws or 
institutional rules, is painted by a rather uncertain colour. Although it was asserted 
that ‘It is generally considered that the arbitral award, like the existence of the 
arbitral proceedings, is confidential’346, the applicable scope of confidentiality vary 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and also from institution to institution.347 
                                                          
346 E. Gaillard & J. Savage (1999) op. cit., supra note 129, at para. 1412. 
347 George Burn & Alison Pearsall, ‘Exceptions to Confidentiality in International Arbitration’, in 
Confidentiality in Arbitration – Commentaries on Rules, Statutes, Case Law and Practice, ICC 
International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, 2009 Special Supplement. See also Michael Hwang S.C. & 
Katie Chung, Defining the Indefinable: Practical Problems of Confidentiality in Arbitration, Journal 
of International Arbitration Vol. 26, Issue. 5, 2009, at 628-641.  
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As for relevant national laws, for those jurisdictions which do regulate on 
confidentiality in their national laws, Norway and Spain are at both ends of the 
spectrum. According to § 5 of Chapter 1 of the Lov om voldgift348: 
‘Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the arbitration proceedings and the 
decisions reached by the arbitration tribunal are not subject to a duty of 
confidentiality.’349 
Almost utterly conversely, Article 24(2) of Ley 60/2003, de Arbitraje350 provides that: 
‘The arbitrators, the parties and the arbitral institutions, if applicable, are 
obliged to maintain the confidentiality of information coming to their 
knowledge in the course of the arbitral proceedings.’351 
Other jurisdictions lie in the middle, of which the national laws shares a similar 
pattern consisting of a general protective attitude towards confidentiality with a few 
exceptional scenarios, e.g. the parties’ explicit consensus on confidentiality, the 
establishment or protection of a party’s legal rights and the situation that certain 
disclosure is authorised or required by law or a competent regulatory body, under 
which the protection of confidentiality would be unavailable. One of the most 
representative examples would be the New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996, which on 
the one hand states that ‘Every arbitration agreement to which this section applies is 
deemed to provide that the parties and the arbitral tribunal must not disclose 
confidential information’ 352  whilst on the other hand provides several scenarios 
under which the prohibition on disclosure of confidential information would be 
limited353. 
                                                          
348 i.e. Norwegian Arbitration Act. 
349  The original text is ‘Hvis ikke partene har avtalt noe annet for den enkelte sak, er 
voldgiftsbehandlingen og voldgiftsrettens avgjørelser ikke underlagt taushetsplikt’. The translation 
was provided in Antonias Dimolitsa, ‘Institutional Rules and National Regimes Relating to the 
Obligation of Confidentiality on Parties in Arbitration’, in Confidentiality in Arbitration – 
Commentaries on Rules, Statutes, Case Law and Practice, ICC International Court of Arbitration 
Bulletin, 2009 Special Supplement, at p. 14. Emphasis added. 
350 i.e. Spanish Arbitration Law. 
351 The original text is ‘Los árbitros, las partes y las instituciones arbitrales, en su caso, están obligadas 
a guardar la confidencialidad de las informaciones que conozcan a través de las actuaciones arbitrales’. 
The translation was provided in Antonias Dimolitsa (2009) op. cit., supra note 349, at p. 17. Emphasis 
added.  
352 See Article 14B of the Act. 
353 See Article 14C of the Act. 
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This diversity concerning the applicable scope of confidentiality could also be 
observed in institutional rules.354 On the one hand, some institutional rules clearly 
rule on confidentiality issues covering from the existence of arbitration to arbitral 
awards. For example, Article 30.1 of the LCIA Arbitration Rules explicitly provides 
that: 
‘The parties undertake as a general principle to keep confidential all awards 
in the arbitration, together with all materials in the arbitration created for the 
purpose of the arbitration and all other documents produced by another party 
in the proceedings not otherwise in the public domain, save and to the extent 
that disclosure may be required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue 
a legal right, or to enforce or challenge an award in legal proceedings before 
a state court or other legal authority.’355 
On the other hand, some other institutional rules, e.g. the ICC and ICSID arbitration 
rules, remain silent on confidentiality issues.  
Last but not least, for those jurisdictions which remain silent on confidentiality issues 
in their national laws, the examination of national case law also reflect such diversity. 
Some jurisdictions hold the attitude that confidentiality is not an essential feature of 
arbitration. Mason C.J. clearly stated in Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v. The 
Honourable Sidney James Plowman that: 
‘I do not consider that, in Australia … we are justified in concluding that 
confidentiality is an essential attribute of a private arbitration imposing an 
obligation on each party not to disclose the proceedings or documents and 
information provided in and for the purposes of the arbitration … It does not 
recognize that there may be circumstances, in which third parties and the 
                                                          
354  Institutional rules examined in this research include the arbitration rules of London Court of 
International Arbitration (LCIA), International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), American Arbitration Association (AAA), Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for 
Arbitration (KLRCA), World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), China International 
Economics and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), Singapore International Arbitration Centre 
(SIAC) and Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC).  
355 Emphasis added. 
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public have a legitimate interest in knowing what has transpired in an 
arbitration, which would give rise to a “public interest” exception.’356 
Similarly, in Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd. v. A.I. Trade Finance Inc., the 
Högsta domstolen357 refused to recognise the implied obligation of confidentiality in 
arbitration: 
‘One of the advantages of having a dispute considered by arbitration 
proceedings as compared with judicial proceedings, and one which is very 
persuasive for companies to choose arbitration is believed to be the secrecy 
associated with arbitration proceedings … However, this advantage does not 
have to mean that there is a preconceived duty of confidentiality binding the 
parties. The real meaning of this, as compared with judicial proceedings, is 
instead that the proceedings are obviously not public, i.e., that the public does 
not have any right of insight by being present at the hearings or having access 
to documents in the matter … This is not contradicted by the parties at the 
same time being entitled to disclose information to outsiders concerning the 
arbitration proceedings.’358 359 
On the other hand, other jurisdictions, such as the UK and Singapore, embrace the 
implied obligation of confidentiality subject to certain exceptions. For instance, in 
Dolling-Baker v. Merrett and Another, Parker L.J. pointed out that: 
‘As between parties to an arbitration, although the proceedings are consensual 
and may thus be regarded as wholly voluntary, their very nature is such that 
there must, in my judgment, be some implied obligation on both parties not 
to disclose or use for any other purpose any documents prepared for and used 
in the arbitration, or disclosed or produced in the course of the arbitration, or 
transcripts or notes of the evidence in the arbitration or the award, and indeed 
                                                          
356 Esso Australia Resources Ltd. v. The Honourable Sidney James Plowman [1995] 128 A.L.R. 391 
(HC), at paras. 35 to 38. Emphasis added. 
357 i.e. Swedish Supreme Court. 
358 Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd. v. A.I. Trade Finance Inc., Högsta domstolen, T 1881-99, 27 
October 2000, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2001 - Volume 
XXVI, Kluwer Law International, at p. 295.   
359 For jurisdictions holding similar attitude, see also, for example, Contship Containerlines, Ltd. v. 
PPG Industries, Inc., S.D.N.Y, 23 April 2003, 2003 W.L. 1948807, in which the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York rejected the argument that confidentiality is implied in law as a 
part of the agreement to arbitrate. 
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not to disclose in any other way what evidence had been given by any witness 
in the arbitration, save with the consent of the other party, or pursuant to an 
order or leave of the court.’360 
Following this general principle, in Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir, 
Potter L.J. listed the exceptions to the broad rule of confidentiality as recognised by 
English law, namely: 
‘(i) consent, that is, where disclosure is made with the express or implied 
consent of the party who originally produced the material; (ii) order of the 
court, an obvious example of which is an order for disclosure of documents 
generated by an arbitration for the purposes of a later court action; (iii) leave 
of the court. It is the practical scope of this exception, that is, the grounds on 
which such leave will be granted, which gives rise to difficulty. However, on 
the analogy of the implied obligation of secrecy between banker and 
customer, leave will be given in respect of (iv) disclosure when, and to the 
extent to which, it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the legitimate 
interests of an arbitrating party … (v) where the “public interest” requires 
disclosure.’361 362 
Through the examination above, two points could be made. First, it could be clearly 
observed that confidentiality in arbitration is a principle which may be over-
emphasised: the protection of it is not unconditional, even for those jurisdictions 
which apply a rather stringent protection on it.363 Secondly, and interestingly, by 
examining the relevant national laws, case law and institutional rules, it could be 
found that public interest seems to be a widely approved exceptional scenario under 
which confidentiality may not be protected. As being observed, the current trend in 
international arbitration has increasingly shown the distinction between the 
unquestioned privacy of the hearing and the confidentiality of the arbitral 
                                                          
360 Dolling-Baker v. Merrett and Another [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1205 (CA), at 1210. 
361 Ali Shipping Corporation v. Shipyard Trogir [1999] 1 W.L.R. 314 (CA). Emphasis added. 
362 For jurisdictions holding the similar attitude, see also, for example, Myanma Yaung Chi Oo Co Ltd. 
v. Win Win Nu, Singapore High Court [2003] 2 S.L.R. 547, at paras. 9 to 17; Société True North et 
Société FCB International v. Bleustein et autres, Tribunal de commerce de Paris, 22 February 1999, 
2003 Revue de l’ Arbitrage 1, as quoted in Antonias Dimolitsa (2009) op. cit., supra note 349, at p. 20. 
363 For example, see Article 24(2) of Ley 60/2003, de Arbitraje. The wording ‘if applicable’, from the 
author’s viewpoint, seems to imply the possibility that relevant information might still be disclosed in 
certain scenarios.  
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proceedings as a whole, especially concerning arbitrations in which there is a 
genuine public interest. 364  Even under the circumstance that the parties have 
explicitly agreed upon a specific confidentiality agreement, such agreement may still 
be overridden if the relevant court considers it to be in the public interest that it 
should be.365 It is also suggested that in the scenario that the outcome of a dispute 
could affect persons who are not parties to the proceedings, ‘those others, or their 
representatives, should be able to have notice of the proceedings’366 
Since it is unquestionable that competition law disputes concern a great extent of 
public interest, it could hence be plausibly deduced that in an arbitration concerning 
competition law disputes, key information such as the existence of such arbitration as 
well as the content of the arbitral award may be required to be disclosed to public 
due to public interest consideration, and arbitrating competition law disputes would 
thus neither hinder the disputes from being known nor impede subsequent 
adjudications from being raised by affected third parties. This deduction was 
supported in American Central Eastern Texas Gas Co., Limited Partnership, et al v. 
Union Pacific Resources Group, Inc., et al, in which the arbitral tribunal was 
required to judge on a competition law dispute and subsequently the losing party 
requested the court of arbitral seat, i.e. United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Texas, to order that the result of the arbitration be sealed. By emphasising 
that any injunctive relief shall not ‘disserve the public interest’, the Court stated that: 
‘Although the … defendants may be harmed more than the non-movants by 
the public disclosure of the arbitration award, the court finds that the public 
interest in this case would be disserved by granting the requested relief. Even 
given the policies underlying the Federal Arbitration Act, the court believes 
that the public has a strong countervailing interest in knowing the results of 
                                                          
364 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29, at p. 34. 
365 Ibid, at p. 41. See also, for example, Lawrence E. Jaffee Pension Plan v. Household International, 
Inc., D. Colo., 13 August 2004, 2004 W.L. 1821968, in which the U.S. District Court of Colorado 
compelled the production of documents from an arbitration in response to requests made in parallel 
litigation, notwithstanding the existence of an explicit confidentiality agreement covering all 
documents disclosed by the parties in connection with the arbitration.  
366 Janet Walker, Arbitrability: Are there Limits? Symposium paper, LCIA Symposium, The Promise 
of International Commercial Arbitration – Testing the Model: Expanding Arbitration to the Public 
Domain, Montreal, 4 October 2004, at 9. 
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arbitration proceedings that involve allegations of anticompetitive and 
monopolistic conduct.’367 
Although the legitimacy of this deduction is still subject to the definitions of public 
interest as well as the legal practice of jurisdictions other than the U.S., based upon 
the examination above and by bearing the public significance of competition law and 
the development trend of confidentiality in mind, it could be plausibly argued that 
disapproving the arbitrability of competition law disputes based upon the scepticism 
that the confidentiality of arbitration would block the way of subsequent 
adjudications would be increasingly untenable.  
C. Gaining basic trust on arbitrating competition law disputes: re-
examining the distrust on arbitrators 
Based upon the discussion above, the theoretical conflict between the public element 
of competition law disputes and the private nature of arbitration has been, to certain 
extent, mitigated. However, by switching the focus to the practical facet of 
arbitrating competition law disputes, an arguably stronger hindrance impeding the 
acceptance of arbitration in adjudicating competition law disputes may still be found, 
namely the distrust on arbitrator’s expertise in judging on competition law disputes. 
The rationale of the hindrance lies mainly in two aspects, i.e. the complexity of 
competition law disputes and the impression of arbitrators being ‘biased to business 
and hostile to public regulation of commercial activity’368. Although this suspicious 
attitude towards arbitrators in adjudicating competition law disputes may be deemed 
to be reasonable especially during the period when international commercial 
arbitration has not or merely made a tentative step into the traditional forbidden zone 
of public law facet, with the widely increasing emphasis upon national or regional 
competition law and the rapid development of international commercial arbitration in 
resolving private disputes, it would be unsound to assume that such attitude would 
still be prevailing, if not being unreasonably sceptical, which could be resorted to 
disapprove the arbitrability of competition law disputes.  
                                                          
367 American Central Eastern Texas Gas Co., Limited Partnership, et al v. Union Pacific Resources 
Group, Inc., et al, 2000 WL 33176064. 
368 Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at para. 3-9. 
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As for the first concern that the complexity of competition law disputes would be 
way beyond arbitrators’ full grasp, one major feature of international commercial 
arbitration should be reiterated, i.e. the parties to an arbitration are generally free to 
choose their own tribunal, 369  which is almost universally embraced by national 
arbitration laws370 or institutional rules371.372 Therefore, when encountering complex 
competition law disputes, it could be legitimately expected that the parties would 
select arbitrators with specific knowledge and experience in competition law for the 
proper resolution of their disputes. As stated in the cornerstone case Mitsubishi v. 
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth: 
‘International arbitrators frequently are drawn from the legal as well as the 
business community; where the dispute has an important legal component, 
the parties and the arbitral body with whose assistance they have agreed to 
settle their dispute can be expected to select arbitrators accordingly.’373 
This feature itself forms a strong implication of the high expertise of arbitrators since 
they are selected to hear and judge on disputes, rather than acting as a full-time judge 
who may sometimes inevitably need to rule on cases out of his specialty. As has been 
pointed out:  
‘In any event, adaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. 
The anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when 
the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the 
participation of experts either employed by the parties or appointed by the 
tribunal.’374 
                                                          
369 Exceptions may lie in specific rules of some arbitration institutions, for example, see Article 7 of 
the LCIA Arbitration Rules, in which the rules provide that ‘If the parties have agreed howsoever that 
any arbitrator is to be appointed … Such nominee may only be appointed by the LCIA Court as 
arbitrator subject to that nominee’s compliance with Articles 5.3 to 5.5; and the LCIA Court shall 
refuse to appoint any nominee if it determines that the nominee is not so compliant or is otherwise 
unsuitable’. See also Article 24 of the CIETAC Arbitration Rules. 
370 See, for example, Article 11 of the UNCITRAL Model Law; Section 16 of Arbitration Act 1996 
(the UK); Section 5 of the Federal Arbitration Act (U.S.). 
371  See, for example, Article 12 of the ICC Arbitration Rules; Article 7 and 8 of the HKIAC 
Arbitration Rules. 
372 Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2004) op. cit., supra note 29, at p. 216. 
373  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 1985, at note 21. 
Emphasis added. 
374 Ibid, at 633. 
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Moreover, from a more practical perspective, arbitrators with knowledge and 
experience in competition law facet, compared to court judges, might be placed at a 
more practically appropriate position to judge on competition law disputes. As has 
been correctly opined: 
‘Arbitrators are not only as well-equipped as judges to deal with the 
complexities of competition law, but they are probably more suited than 
national courts, due to the considerable time and attention they are able to 
devote to the case and also to their ability to frame the proceedings according 
to the particular features of each dispute, in particular by combining civil law 
and common law procedural experience, such as assistance of tribunal-
appointed experts and discovery or cross-examination of witnesses.’375 
Accordingly, it seems that the impression that courts generally guarantee a more 
correct application of competition law is merely an illusion376, and it would thus be 
more persuasive to crush the suspicious impression shrouding upon arbitrators in 
adjudicating competition law disputes than being an adherent of such sceptical 
attitude insistently questioning the expertise of arbitrators. Without explicit 
evidences showing the general incompetence of arbitrators in arbitrating competition 
law disputes, it would be undoubtedly sounder to show basic trust to arbitrator’s 
expertise. 
Compared to the first concern, the second concern regarding the substantive 
impartiality of arbitrators may seem to be more obsolete and imaginary: the 
argument concerning that the bias possibly held by an arbitrator may to certain extent 
lead to a deflective arbitral award should be verified through ‘facts, evidence, and 
possibly, previous relevant case law’ but not pursuant to ‘abstract principles or to the 
personal beliefs of the decision maker’.377 With international commercial arbitration 
becoming one of the most widely used and reliable dispute resolution mechanisms, it 
would be increasingly harder to build the connection between arbitrators being 
businessmen and arbitrators being ‘hostile to public regulation of commercial 
                                                          
375 Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-089. Emphasis added. 
376 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011) op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-026. 
377 Ibid, at para. 2-29.  
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activity’378. A rather convincing argument supporting this viewpoint would be that, 
as will be seen below,379 competition law is increasingly treated as public policy 
worldwide and the intentional omission or carelessness on relevant competition law 
issues in an international arbitration may hence trigger the public policy defence of a 
jurisdiction, which might eventually lead to awards vacation or refusal of 
enforcement under both the Model Law and the NYC. This would, to certain extent, 
contaminate an arbitrator’s reputation and erode one’s career380 as it has been widely 
recognised that an arbitrator is obliged to make all reasonable effort to render an 
award which would not be set aside before the seat court or be refused for 
enforcement before the enforcing court. 381  Therefore, it would be increasingly 
untenable to argue that an arbitrator would take the risk of sabotaging his own career 
to ignore or apply a rash attitude to relevant competition law issues. 
Accordingly, although one could plausibly argue that the integrity of the arbitration 
system might need to be particularly maintained when international commercial 
arbitration ‘expands into new areas of dispute resolution in the public domain’382, 
such necessity could still hardly legitimise such illusive viewpoint assuming the 
substantive partiality of arbitrators.  Hence, unsurprisingly, in Mitsubishi v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth: 
                                                          
378 Karim Abou Youssef (2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at para. 3-9. 
379 See infra Section I(A) and II of Chapter V. 
380 For example, see Gary Born (2014) op. cit., supra note 21, at p. 2013. (‘Arbitrators are almost 
always selected because of their personal standing and reputation and it is the loss of such reputation, 
through parties’ complaints, removal of the arbitrator, or annulment of an award that is by far the most 
effective deterrent against unsatisfactory performance.’).  
381 As for the obligation to render an award which would not be set aside, see Alexis Mourre (2011) 
op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-033 (‘arbitrators also have a duty to make their best efforts to render 
a valid award, that is, an award that will not be invalidated at the seat of the arbitration.’); as for the 
obligation to render an enforceable award, it should be noted that viewpoints may differ regarding 
whether an arbitrator is simply obliged to render an enforceable award (for example, see Günther J. 
Horvath, The Duty of the Tribunal to Render an Enforceable Award, Journal of International 
Arbitration, Vol. 18, Issue 2, 2001, at 135: ‘When one speaks of an arbitrator’s duties, perhaps none is 
more important than the duty to render an enforceable award’) or to make all reasonable effort to 
render an enforceable award (for example, see Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 
151, which stated ‘the most fundamental obligation is to render an enforceable award, or at least to 
make best efforts to render an enforceable award.’; Article 42 of the ICC Rules of Arbitration: ‘In all 
matters not expressly provided for in the Rules, the Court and the arbitral tribunal shall act in the spirit 
of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at law’). Here the 
author supports the latter view as from the author’s viewpoint the duty of rendering an enforceable 
award should be understood as more of an ethical or a moral obligation but not a duty which has a 
fundamental nature. Following this thought, the author hence applies the wording ‘to make all 
reasonable effort’ here. 
382 Janet Walker (2004) op. cit., supra note 366, at 10. 
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‘We also reject the proposition that an arbitration panel will pose too great a 
danger of innate hostility to the constraints on business conduct that antitrust 
law imposes … We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and 
arbitral body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain … 
impartial arbitrators’383 
D. The opportunity for enforcing courts to review the arbitral award 
concerning competition law disputes 
Besides the reconciliation of the inherent conflict between international arbitration 
and disputes concerning competition law issues and the resumption of the trust on 
arbitrators’ expertise and impartiality, there is another safeguard which may further 
ease the misgiving that competition law disputes may not be effectively resolved 
through international arbitration.  
This third-layer protection is the review conducted by seat courts and enforcing 
courts. As for the review conducted by seat courts, it has been introduced above that 
Article 34(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law allows a seat court to review the legitimacy of 
an arbitral award regarding its compliance to the arbitral seat’s public policy, hence 
leaves certain room for the seat court to check whether the enforcement of the award 
would be in line with its competition law concerns as long as competition law is 
deemed as the public policy of the arbitral seat. 384  Similarly, as for the review 
conducted by enforcing courts, both Article 36(2)(b)(ii) of the Model Law and 
Article V(2)(b) of the NYC do authorise an enforcing court to have a second-look on 
whether the award tallies with the enforcing state’s public policy. Therefore, as long 
as competition law is deemed as part of an enforcing state’s public policy, the 
enforcing court could hence review the arbitral award concerning its competition 
legal order to ensure that the tribunal’s judgment is in line with its competition law. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 
when affirming the arbitrability of disputes concerning antitrust law issues, 
                                                          
383 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 1985, at 634. 
384 This issue will be further examined in details in infra Section I(A) of Chapter V. 
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‘[T]he United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement 
stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust 
laws has been addressed.’385 
Notwithstanding, one might argue that, since the prevailing way of applying public 
policy review would not allow a seat court or an enforcing court to dig into the 
merits of the dispute, this prima facie review may not be adequate to expose potential 
violation of competition law, and hence disputes concerning competition law issues 
should not be allowed to be arbitrated. As queried, 
‘The “second” look doctrine is a problematic safety valve for ensuring that 
public law issues receive proper consideration. If it calls for review on the 
merits, it disrupts the arbitral process. But if it calls only for a mechanical 
examination of the face of the award, it may not provide an effective check 
on an arbitrator who mentions the Sherman Act [i.e. U.S. antitrust law] before 
he proceeds to ignore it.’386 
This argument will be further examined in details in Chapter V where the author will 
propose a new reviewing standard to ease the misgiving regarding the inadequacy of 
a court’s scrutiny, but it ought to be sufficient to point out here that this issue 
concerns primarily the reviewing pattern of an enforcing court instead of questions of 
the inarbitrability of competition law disputes. The author opines that the behavioural 
pattern of national courts in scrutinising arbitral award is an external factor in 
comparison with the inherent flaw of the arbitration mechanism or the quality of 
arbitration. In other words, there is no necessary causation between the inadequacy 
of a court’s scrutiny and the potential of an arbitral award violating relevant 
competition law. Therefore, while the mechanism a court uses in its review may 
support the arbitrability of competition law disputes, a potential flaw of this 
reviewing mechanism would not, reversely, pronounce the inarbitrability of 
competition law disputes.  
E. Some other concerns on approving the arbitrability of competition law 
                                                          
385 Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 1985, at 638. 
386  William W. Park, Private Adjudicators and the Public Interest: The Expanding Scope of 
International Arbitration, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, 1986, at 642. 
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Last but not least, besides the major points discussed above, the approval of referring 
competition law disputes to arbitration may also be motivated by the concern that 
since international arbitration, as discussed above,387  is an important way of the 
private enforcement of competition law, approving competition law issues to be 
arbitrated would hence increase the chance of relevant violations of competition law 
being exposed, and therefore shares the burden of national courts or relevant national 
authorities (such as NCAs) and ultimately helps to promote market competition order. 
For example, when speaking of the private enforcement of (now) EU competition 
law, it was listed that there were seven major advantages of private enforcement, 
namely: 
‘• It would increase deterrence against infringements and increase compliance 
with the law. 
• The victims of illegal anticompetitive behaviour would be compensated for 
loss suffered. 
• Private enforcement is an effective way to deal with certain types of cases, 
especially those involving a commercial dispute between two parties and 
those where the claimant has close access to evidence concerning the 
defendant’s business activities. 
• The Commission and the national competition authorities do not have 
sufficient resources to deal with all cases of anticompetitive behaviour. 
• Actions before the courts can offer speedier interim relief to undertakings 
than public proceedings. 
• Courts can order the unsuccessful party to pay the successful party's legal 
costs. An undertaking’s legal costs are not recoverable in the case of a 
complaint to a public authority. 
                                                          
387 See supra Section I of Chapter II. 
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• Private actions will further develop a culture of competition amongst market 
participants, including consumers, and raise awareness of the competition 
rules’388 
Therefore, although private enforcement is not the primary mean of enforcement and 
are to a large extent a complement to public enforcement of competition law,389 its 
advantages would still be a strong incentive motivating the approval of the 
arbitrability of competition law. 
III. The reflection on the development of the arbitrability of competition 
law disputes 
These reasons as introduced and discussed above hence lead to the aforementioned 
change of attitude towards the arbitrability of competition law disputes. As stated,  
‘From a practical perspective, the answer to [the arbitrability of competition 
law disputes] now seems to be pretty much universally agreed: competition 
law or antitrust issues are arbitrable. There is now a jurisprudence constante 
in all major jurisdictions that makes this clear.’390 
More importantly, the research on the development of the arbitrability of competition 
law issues also clearly shows that the conflict between disputes concerning public 
interests and international arbitration would not be consistently irreconcilable. First 
and most fundamentally, as long as a dispute, although concerning certain public 
interest, arises out of a contractual relationship, it could then be resolved by 
arbitration from a theoretical perspective. The key lies in that the legal effect of 
                                                          
388 Donncadh Woods, Ailsa Sinclair and David Ashton, Directorate-General Competition, unit A-1, 
Private Enforcement of Community Competition Law: Modernisation and the Road Ahead, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2 – Summer 2004. 
389 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 94. 
390 Alexis Mourre, ‘Chapter 3 Arbitrating Competition Law Issues: The Arbitrator’s Perspective’, in 
Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners, 
Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 3-007. See also, for example, Julian D. M. Lew, ‘Chapter 12 
– Competition laws: Limits to Arbitrators’ Authority’, in Loukas A. Mistelis and Stavros L. 
Brekoulakis (eds), Arbitrability: International and Comparative Perspectives, Kluwer Arbitration 
International, 2009, at para. 12-68. (‘Arbitrability of competition law has ceased to be a significant 
issue in international arbitration.’) As for EU competition law, see Gordon Blanke, ‘EC Competition 
Law Claims in International Arbitration’, in Austrian Arbitration Yearbook 2009, Stämpfli Verlag AG, 
2009, at p. 24. (‘[I]t is safe to say that … there is a Europe-wide consensus on the arbitrability of 
competition law, in particular of Article 81 and 82 EC’). For a more detailed discussion on the 
arbitrability of EU competition law, especially Article 101(3) TFEU, see Alexis Mourre (2011) op. 
cit., supra note 130, at paras. 1-143 to 1-158. See also, for example, Gordon Blanke & Renato Nazzini 
(2008) op. cit., supra note 37. 
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examining and applying relevant public policy would be mainly confined to the 
contracting parties. Although the arbitral award would inevitably influence the non-
contractual third parties, as analysed above, 391  the nature of such influence is 
essentially different than that of as exerted on the contracting parties. Therefore, as 
pointed out: 
‘[While a dispute concerning EU competition law issues is based upon a 
contractual relationship], where one party to a commercial agreement wishes 
to contend that the other has engaged in some contravention of Article 101 
and/or 102 TFEU which has impacted upon their commercial relationship and 
thereby given rise to loss and damage, or a right to have the agreement 
declared void, arbitration is both an attractive and efficient means of 
resolving such a claim.’392 
Secondly, although international arbitration itself may not provide sufficient redress 
to violations of public interests since it would merely focus on the contracting parties 
but not on other influenced third parties, such focus and the privacy of international 
arbitration would not be a bar to derogate the sufficiency of protecting public 
interests -- the aforementioned non-absoluteness of confidentiality of arbitration 
proceedings and arbitral awards is one of the most representative examples. Thirdly, 
with the development of international arbitration and the improvement of the quality 
of arbitrators, when public policy issues are raised, it could be legitimately expected 
that the arbitrators are fully competent to examine and rule on them. As stated: 
‘[O]n a pragmatic level, international arbitration and its users have reached a 
level of sophistication and acceptance that arbitrators can and should 
determine all issues regardless of complication or content.’393 
Moreover, it should also be noted that the reviewing mechanism of enforcing court 
would also make certain contribution to boost the confidence of arbitrating public 
interest-involved disputes as it forms another layer of guarantee to ensure the arbitral 
awards’ compliance to the enforcing state’s public policy. Also, arbitrating disputes 
concerning public interests may also be encouraged as international arbitration is, to 
                                                          
391 See Section II(B)(1) of this Chapter.  
392 James Segan (2018) op. cit., supra note 336, at 424.  
393 Julian D. M. Lew (2009) op. cit., supra note 390, at para. 12-68. 
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certain extent, a complementary mechanism for resolving disputes concerning public 
interests -- it essentially establishes another platform for potential violation of public 
policy to be discovered, examined and determined.  
It hence follows these points that international arbitration, from both theoretical and 
pragmatic perspectives, has the potentiality to become a reliable dispute resolution 
mechanism for resolving disputes concerning public interests. This potentiality, 
coupled with the aforementioned consideration of promoting international commerce, 
hence lead to the tendency towards a greater arbitrability. 394 Although one should 
still not forget that the arbitrability of a specific subject matter (other than 
competition law) would essentially rest with a jurisdiction’s own consideration of 
whether international arbitration could sufficiently protect relevant public interest of 
the jurisdiction and a jurisdiction would hence still hold the discretion to shape its 
own standard of arbitrability rule,395 under the steady development of international 
arbitration and the improvement of the competence of arbitrators, those ‘tiny islands 
of non-arbitrability’396 concerning public interests-involved disputes may eventually 
submerge in the ‘vast ocean of arbitrability’397. While it may still be premature to 
officially announce the death of arbitrability, it could be reasonably expected that 
arbitrability would be increasingly rarely invoked successfully in refusing the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral award, and it would eventually become a dust-laden 
ground. Just as a leading scholar once confidently stated: 
‘“Arbitrability: are there limits?” I, for one, cannot see any.’398 
                                                          
394 See, Margaret L. Moses (2017) op. cit., supra note 22, at p. 243; Nigel Blackaby & Constantine 
Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at para. 2.144; J. Lew, L. 
Mistelis & S. Kröll (2003) op. cit., supra note 200, at para. 9-5.  
395 Potential factors which would influence a jurisdiction’s decision on the arbitrability of specific 
subject matters may include but is not limited to, for example, the virtual trade-off between the 
consideration of promoting international commerce and protecting specific public interest of the state, 
and the result of the observation of arbitrators’ competence of rendering arbitral awards which are in 
line with the state’s public policy. 
396 Jean-Baptiste Racine, L'arbitrage commercial international et l'ordre public, Paris: LGDJ, 1999, at 
p. 26, as quoted in Alexis Mourre (2011) op. cit., supra note 130, at para. 1-025. 
397 Ibid.  
398 Janet Walker (2004) op. cit., supra note 366, at 12. See also, for example, Karim Abou Youssef 
(2009) op. cit., supra note 205, at para. 3-54. (‘Arbitrability is a concept whose success has banalized 
and, to a large extent, emptied of significance. The “commerciality” reservation and the defence of 
inarbitrability as ground for non-enforcement under the New York Convention have lost much of their 
role. With the gradual death of arbitrability, they would also fall in desuetude. The liberation of 
arbitrability from all references to local law, to favour the security of international contracts, has 
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Chapter V – Examining the application of Article V(2)(b) of the 
NYC under the scenario of enforcing foreign arbitral awards 
concerning EU competition law disputes 
Having critically examined the rationales of disapproving the arbitrability of subject 
matters concerning public interests, the focus will now be switched to the second 
ground, i.e. Article V(2)(b), and the remaining issues concerning its application in 
legal practice will be examined.  
As queried above, two key questions of the application of Article V(2)(b) lie in that, 
first, under the scenario of relevant public policy issues having already been 
considered by the arbitral tribunal, whether the enforcing court should fully trust the 
tribunal’s decision without even reviewing the reasoning of it; and secondly, under 
the scenario that relevant public policy issues were not examined by the tribunal, 
whether the enforcing court should, under the pro-enforcement principle, merely read 
the information reflected in the award itself to draw the conclusion on the existence 
of serious violation of public policy. This chapter will hence examine these 
uncertainties from the perspective of enforcing foreign arbitral awards concerning 
EU competition law disputes. As will be seen, the simple mode of prima facie review 
may not well strike the balance between the finality and legality of an arbitral award 
concerning EU competition law dispute, and a series of more comprehensive 
enforcing pattern will be proposed. Following the examination of the reviewing 
pattern of enforcing courts examining potential breaches of EU competition law, a 
general reflection on the interrelationship between the finality and legality of an 
arbitral award as well as the specific behavioural pattern of an enforcing court will 
also be made to shed certain light to the enforcement of arbitral awards concerning 
other strong public interests.  
I. Three preliminary issues 
Before delving into the reviewing patterns of enforcing courts reviewing arbitral 
awards concerning EU competition law, three preliminary issues should be examined. 
It has been raised above that besides the potential query on an enforcing court’s 
                                                                                                                                                                    




behavioural pattern on reviewing arbitral awards concerning strong public interests, 
there are two principles which do stand the test of time, namely that only 
fundamental public interests could be able to trigger public policy defence under 
Article V(2)(b), and only serious violation of public policy could be condemned 
under this Article. 399 Therefore, before digging into the behavioural pattern of an 
enforcing court reviewing awards concerning EU competition law issues, one should 
first examine whether EU competition law would be deemed as the public policy of 
enforcing states under Article V(2)(b), and whether any violation of EU competition 
law would be serious enough to trigger public policy defence under Article V(2)(b), 
to lay the foundation for subsequent discussion. More specifically, the latter question 
will be further divided into two, i.e. that what the modalities of an arbitral award 
violating EU competition law in international arbitration are and whether a potential 
breach of EU competition law as reflected in an arbitral award would always trigger 
the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b). 
A. Connecting EU competition law to enforcing states’ public policy 
The first issue to be examined concerns the connection between EU competition law 
and enforcing states’ public policy within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC. 
Notably, since the enforcing state of an arbitral award concerning EU competition 
law dispute would not necessarily be within the EU and EU competition law is 
indeed painted with a clear regional colour, it could hence be reasonably surmised 
that the degree of recognising EU competition law as part of public policy may differ 
between EU Member States and non-EU jurisdictions. This section will therefore 
examine the connection between EU competition law and public policy by 
distinguishing the enforcing courts as the courts of non-EU jurisdictions and the 
courts of EU Member States. 
1. EU competition law, EU’s fundamental public interests, and EU Member 
States’ public policy 
When connecting EU competition law and EU Member States’ public policy, it could 
be found that these two are essentially at two different levels. The former is at EU 
level, which concerns the competition order of the EU’s single market; whilst the 
                                                          
399 See supra Section II(C) of Chapter III. 
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latter is at national level. Therefore, before connecting these two terms, two 
questions should be examined. First, does EU competition law represent a 
fundamental public interest at EU level? If EU competition law could not obtain the 
fundamentally important status at EU level, it would be hardly imagined that its 
importance could be unanimously recognised by EU Member States. Secondly, if EU 
competition law represents an EU’s fundamental public interest, as an EU-level term, 
how would it be assimilated by EU Member States and form part of their public 
policy?  
a. Does EU competition law represent a fundamental public 
interests of the EU? 
The first question to be examined is that whether EU competition law represents an 
EU’s fundamental public interest, and the examination of this question should start 
from making a more precise definition of the term ‘EU’s fundamental public 
interests’.  
i. What are EU’s fundamental public interests? 
To define this term, one of the most direct and efficient ways would be to resort to 
EU primary law which is expected to convey the core value cherished by the EU and 
would hence shed certain light to this question.  
(1) The examination of EU primary law 
The founding treaties 
The starting point of the examination on EU primary law is the Treaty Establishing 
the European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter the ‘ECSC’), which was signed 
on 18 April 1951 and came into force on 25 July 1952. At that time, the whole of 
Europe was recovering from the aftermath of World War II. As enormous amount of 
coal and steel production was needed for reconstruction and given the consideration 
that German coal and steel industry had been dominant in Europe before the war, 
other countries in Europe were aware that without intervention German industry was 
likely to reacquire such dominance again.400  The idea of establishing a common 
                                                          
400 David J. Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus, 1998, 
Oxford University Press, p. 335. 
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market in coal and steel as a meant of squaring the various interests of the founding 
member states (in particular those of Germany and France) was born, resulting in the 
creation of the ECSC.   
The initial emphasis of the rudiment of the new community was hence mainly placed 
upon the recovery of European economic and maintaining the post-war peaceful 
relations among European countries.401 But such short-term object turned to be not 
only a post-war recovery measure but also the start of progress towards a much more 
ambitious long-term goal. It was stated that the founders of the ECSC were also clear 
about their intention for the Treaty, namely that is was merely the first step towards a 
‘European Federation’ 402  – ‘the common coal and steel market was to be an 
experiment which could gradually be extended to other economic spheres, 
culminating in a political Europe’403. 
This preliminary concept of integration of a European Community was further 
enhanced by two treaties which were signed later by the six founding members of the 
Coal and Steel Community, namely the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (hereinafter the ‘TEEC’) and the Treaty Establishing the European 
Atomic Energy (hereinafter the ‘TEAE’). These treaties formed the root of the 
integration of Europe404, in which the concept of integration was further steadily 
revealed. As clearly reflected in the Preamble of the TEEC: 
‘[The Contracting States’ leaders]  
DETERMINED to lay the foundation of an ever-closer union among the 
peoples of Europe’405 
The concept of establishing an ‘ever-closer union’ was further mainly concretised to 
economic integration -- it could be clearly seen that the TEEC listed in total eleven 
economic “activities” which the Community was to pursue, covering the elimination 
                                                          
401 See the Preamble of the ECSC. See also, for example, Monnet Jean, Memoirs – Translated from 
the French by Richard Mayne, Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1978, at pp 292-294. 
402  See Primary legislation of the European Union –The first treaties, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_1.1.1.html (Retrieved: 
2018-09-10) 
403 Ibid.  
404 John McCormick, Understanding the European Union – A Concise Introduction, Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1999, p. 69. 
405 Emphasis added. 
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of customs duties, fiscal barriers, obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, 
services and capital to ensuring that competition in the common market is not 
distorted.406 Moreover, attempts of promoting political integration, although bringing 
rather limited effect, could also be seen. Tracing back to year 1961, according to 
Bonn Summit of that year, the Heads of State or Government of the six founding 
Member States of the European Community asked an intergovernmental committee, 
‘to hold at regular interval meetings whose aim will be to compare their views, to 
concert their policies and to reach common positions in order to further the political 
union of Europe’407. 
The Single European Act 
Following the TEEC and TEAE, the European Community experienced development 
and the first rounds of enlargement from 1973 to 1986408. On 17 February 1986, 
twelve Member States of the European Community signed the Single European Act 
(hereinafter the ‘SEA’), which amended the Treaties establishing the European 
Communities and promoted the integration of Europe in a more systematic way. It 
set a deadline (1992) for establishing the internal market, which reiterated the 
importance of economic integration as a central short-term object of the 
Community.409 Moreover, besides the steady emphasis on the establishment of the 
internal market, the focus have gradually dispersed to cover other areas, e.g. social 
policy410, research and technology411 and environment412. More importantly, it also 
touched upon political integration by providing provisions concerning (limited) 
cooperation in the field of foreign policy413. In its first article, the Act explicitly 
stated that: 
                                                          
406 See Article 3 of the original TEEC.  
407 Statement issued by the heads of State or Government (Meeting in Bonn on 18 July 1961), Bulletin 
of the European Economic Community, No.7/8, August 1961, at page 35. Emphasis added. Notably, 
based upon the consideration of the identity of the Member States, the incumbent French ambassador 
at that time, Christian Fouchet, rejected this federal option. 
408 The first rounds of enlargement took place in 1973, 1981 and 1986, during which community 
membership doubled from 6 to 12. See John McCormick (1999) op. cit., supra note 404, at p. 72.  
409 See Article 13 of EEC Treaties (as amended by the SEA). (‘The Community shall adopt measures 
with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 
1992’) 
410 See Sub-section III – Social Policy of the SEA. 
411 See Sub-section V – Research and technological development of the SEA. 
412 See Sub-section VI – Environment of the SEA. 
413 See Title III of the SEA. 
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‘The European Communities and European Political Co-operation shall 
have as their objective to contribute together to making concrete progress 
towards European unity.’414 
The Treaty on European Union and the newly established constitutional structure 
The SEA clearly showed the transition of the focus from economic integration to 
political integration, which was described as ‘the last stage of the multinational 
integration process’415. Such intention of promoting political integration was later 
further enhanced by the Treaty on Union (hereinafter the ‘Maastricht Treaty’), which 
was signed on 7 February 1992. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Community clearly 
went beyond its original economic objective, i.e. creation of a common market, and 
its political ambitions came to the fore. First, according to Title I, Article A of the 
Treaty, ‘the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union’, 
which for the first time publicly introduced the concept of ‘European Union’. It was 
stated that the creation of the EU symbolised the next stage in the process of 
European integration.416 Secondly, the Union created by Maastricht Treaty was given 
more power, which were classified into three groups and were commonly referred to 
as ‘pillars’. The first pillar, as reflected in Title I to III of the Treaty, concerned 
Community activities which were brought into the Community sphere and conducted 
under the so-called ‘Community way’ or ‘communautairisation’417 , according to 
which the conducts of member states in Community activities was subject to an 
autonomous Community legal order. 418  The rest two pillars, which focused on 
common foreign and security policy419 and justice and home affairs420, although not 
                                                          
414 Emphasis added. 
415 Nicholas Moussis, Access to European Union – Law, Economics, Policies, Rixensart, 2011, at para 
8. 
416 John McCormick (1999) op. cit., supra note 404, at p. 80.  
417  David Edward and Robert Lane, Edward and Lane on European Union Law, Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited, 2013, at pp. 32-33. 
418 Ibid, at p. 32. There was a single Council and a single Commission which were established in 
charge of Community activities and applied democratic method in making decisions or issuing 
legislations, regulations or directives binding to member states (see the Treaty establishing a Single 
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities); there was also a judicial organ, i.e. 
the ECJ, to serve as the supreme judicial body to hear, examine and rule on applications concerning 
EU legal questions. 
419 Which aimed at safeguarding the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the 
Union, strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States, promoting international 
cooperation and developing democracy and the rule of law. 
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being within the Community sphere, presented a ‘’blueprint for, and a promise of, 
future (intergovernmental) cooperation, implementation of which would be a matter 
for the competent institutions of the member states.421 
As could be clearly seen, the Maastricht Treaty marked the further enlargement of 
the power of EU institutions by jumping out of the box of Community activity and 
being actually authorised in several areas previously labelled non-Community issues. 
It showed its ambition in achieving integration in not only the area of Community 
activity (which mainly concerned economic issues) but also that of concerning non-
Community activities (which mainly concerned political issues). 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
The trend towards a political union finally reached its climax when all the 27 
Member States at that time422 signed the Treaty of Lisbon. First of all, issues which 
was originally excluded from the Community sphere has increasingly fused in and 
stepped onto the aforementioned ‘Community way’, or maybe more precisely for 
present context, the ‘Union way’. As stated: 
‘The former intergovernmental structure ceases to exist, as the acts adopted in 
this area are now made subject to the ordinary legislative procedure (qualified 
majority and co-decision), using the legal instruments of the Community 
method (regulations, directives and decisions) unless otherwise specified.’423 
                                                                                                                                                                    
420 The purpose of which was to develop common action to provide citizens within the fields of 
freedom, security and justice, especially concerning the free movement of persons. See Article K.1, 
Title VI of the original Treaty on European Union. 
421 David Edward and Robert Lane (2013) op. cit., supra note 417, at p. 33. Notably, This asymmetry 
of legal effect between the first and the remaining two pillars were subsequently improved by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, whereby certain parts of the third pillar were transferred to the first pillar (some 
components of the justice and home affairs, for example, asylum, immigration and rights of third 
country nationals, were transferred into the first pillar and the remaining part of third pillar was 
renamed ‘Provisions on Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters’). Furthermore, later in 
2004, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was even proposed to fuse both Community 
and non-Community pillars, but was eventually failed when French and Dutch voters rejected the 
Treaty in May and June 2005 and its ratification process thus came to an end. 
422 Except Croatia, which became the member state of EU in 2013. 
423  Primary legislation of the European Union – The Treaty of Lisbon, available at 




One of the most representative examples would be the police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, which was now wholly communautairised424.  
Secondly, based upon the first development, as explicitly provided in Article 47 of 
the post-Lisbon TEU that the Union has now been officially granted full legal 
personality. The Union therefore acquired the ability to sign international treaties in 
the areas of its attributed powers or join an international organisation. Member States 
may only sign international agreements that are compatible with EU law.  
Following these two major developments, the Treaty of Lisbon finally established a 
quasi-constitutional system, which marked unprecedented progress in the political 
integration of the European Union. 
(2) The definition of EU’s fundamental public interests 
The definition of EU’s fundamental public interests could then be further specified 
based upon the examination of the development of EU primary law.  
It could be clearly found in the above examination that ‘integration’ is the key word 
running through the development process of the EU. This concept of integration is 
unchanged and evolving simultaneously. As for the former, the idea of the 
integration of the Europe has not changed since the very beginning of the first 
Treaties: it is worth recalling here that even the humble idea of uniting and 
controlling coal and steel resources had a much more ambitious plan of ‘culminating 
in a political Europe’425. As for the latter, the development of the EU clearly has a 
phased feature, which presented the transition from economic integration (e.g. the 
TEEC) to political integration (e.g. TFEU and post-Lisbon TEU).  
Pursuant to these two points, the definition of EU’s fundamental public interests 
could hence be concluded as a complex of policies focusing on the integration of the 
European Union, with the emphasis now being placed upon the political integration.  
ii. EU competition law as part of EU’s fundamental public 
interests 
                                                          
424 David Edward and Robert Lane (2013) op. cit., supra note 417, at p. 38. 





Having defined EU’s fundamental public interests more specifically, the connection 
between EU competition law and EU’s fundamental public interests should then be 
built to see whether EU competition law serves the purpose of EU integration and 
could hence be part of EU’s fundamental public interests. 
A brief retrospect of the development history of EU competition law seems to 
announce an affirmative answer. This would be particularly true when the emphasis 
of the integration was still placed upon economic integration. Tracing back to the 
ECSC, under the consideration that German coal and steel industry had been 
dominant in Europe before the war and other countries in Europe were aware that 
without intervention German industry was likely to reacquire such dominance, the 
concept of protecting competition was hence greatly valued since it was expected to 
break the prophecy pessimistically made by many observers who ‘saw Europe’s 
future as socialist – a high degree of state control of the economy and a decreasing 
sphere of operation for personal freedom and economic competition’426. It could 
hence be seen that two important competition law provisions were provided in the 
ECSC Treaty, namely Article 65 which focuses on the prohibition of anticompetitive 
agreements and Article 66 which concerns the regulation of concentrations and 
misuses of economic power, with the expectation that they could assist to create a 
‘real solidarity’ and the ‘common bases’ for ‘an economic community’ 427 . EC 
competition law subsequently continued to perform as an indispensable support for 
the economic integration of the Community by constantly adjusting its role to 
comply with the development of the EU. For example, with the misgiving of German 
reacquiring dominance fading away, the attention of the Community hence switched 
from controlling state’s actions to promoting economic growth, EC competition law 
hence also developed to protect the idea of common market and applied a more 
stringent mechanism – Regulation No. 17: First Regulation Implementing Article 85 
and 86 of the Treaty is a representative example, which further centralised the power 
                                                          
426 David J. Gerber (1998) op. cit., supra note 400, at p. 165. 
427 See the Preamble of the ECSC Treaty. Emphasis added. Notwithstanding, it was also stated that the 
actual operations of the ECSC competition law system had a limited impact on the development of 
competition law in Europe. During the period the Commission did not prohibit any concentrations, 
and its enforcement of other provisions was quite limited, concentrating on the German coal sales 
agencies. (See Ibid, at p. 342.) This fact might imply that the competition law as provided in ECSC 
Treaty mainly focus on the prevention of resource monopoly rather than creating and maintaining a 
healthy and competitive common market. See also, for example, Raymond Vernon, The Schuman 
Plan, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 47, No. 2, 1953, at 197. 
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of examination and approval of relevant anti-competitive behaviours to the European 
Commission to guarantee both compliance and uniformity.  
Hence, by acting as a guardian of the economic order of the Community, EC 
Competition law was unquestionably deemed as part of EU’s most fundamental 
public interest. As the ECJ clearly stated in Constern & Grundig: 
‘The [EEC] Treaty, whose preamble and content aim at abolishing the 
barriers between States, and which in several provisions gives evidence of a 
stern attitude with regard to their reappearance, could not allow undertakings 
to reconstruct such barriers. Article 85(1) is designed to pursue this aim, 
even in the case of agreements between undertakings placed at different 
levels in the economic process.’428 
Similarly, in Eco Swiss: 
‘[A]ccording to Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty … Article 85 of the Treaty 
constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, 
for the functioning of the internal market.’429 
But the connection between (now) EU competition law and EU’s fundamental public 
interests seemed to be weaken when the emphasis of integration started to switch 
from economic integration to political integration. After the establishment of the 
internal market of which the deadline was set by the SEA 430 , the economic 
integration of the Europe seemed to gradually walk-off from the stage and the role of 
competition law hence changed from the guardian of economic integration to the 
monitor of a healthy and stable internal market environment among Member States. 
As stated in Regulation 1/2003, the main focus of the development of (now) EU 
competition law should be placed upon meeting the ‘challenges of an integrated 
                                                          
428 Cases 56 & 58/64 Constern & Grundig v EEC Commission [1966] ECR 299, at 340. Emphasis 
added. See also, for example, Case C-306/96 Javico International and anor v. Yves Saint Laurent 
Parfums [1998] ECR I-1983, at paras. 13 and 14. 
429 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, at para 36. 
Emphasis added. 
430 See Article 13 of EEC Treaties (as amended by the SEA). (‘The Community shall adopt measures 




market’ 431 . It may hence be opined that since economic integration has almost 
completed, the importance of it would be allowed a ‘back seat’432. A question mark 
would therefore hang on whether economic integration would still be deemed as one 
of the most fundamental goals of the EU, and it would hence also be queried that 
whether EU competition law, of which the main function is to maintain the economic 
integration of the EU, should still be deemed as part of EU’s fundamental public 
interests. 
Such questioning of the importance of EU competition law continued along with the 
development of EU primary law. As could be found, different from its 
predecessors, 433  the TFEU does not make clear reference to competition in the 
provision concerning the general economic duty of Member States. 434  Rather, it 
could only be found that in Title VII of Part Three of the TFEU, that: 
‘For the purposes set out in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union, the 
activities of the Member States and the Union shall include, as provided in the 
Treaties, the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close 
coordination of Member States' economic policies, on the internal market and 
on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition’435 
and in Protocol (No.27) that: 
‘THE HIGH CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
CONSIDERING that the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty 
on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not 
distorted, 
HAVING AGREED that: 
                                                          
431 Council Regulation No. 1/2003 JC 2003 L1/1 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Article 81 and 82 of the Treaty. Emphasis added. 
432 See Robert Lane, EU Competition Law, Edward Elgar, forthcoming. (‘as the aims of the Treaties 
come to fruition and the internal market approaches completion they may progressively be allowed a 
back seat and emphasis re-directed to economic goals of competition’) 
433 As could be found, in both TEEC (Article 3(f)) and TEC (Article 3(1)(g)), they all clearly state that 
the Community shall ensure that ‘competition in internal market is not distorted’. 
434 See Article 5 of TFEU. 
435 Emphasis added. 
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To this end, the Union shall, if necessary, take action under the provisions of 
the Treaties, including under Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union.’436 
This change then led to the doubt that whether EU competition law should still be 
granted with the high importance it possessed previously. As stated, given the 
‘Treaty style of progression from the general to the specific, and the core to the 
peripheral’ 437 , the change of location of the competition provisions from a 
Community activity to 27th of 37 protocols is ‘by any measure a demotion’438. Based 
upon this consideration, the questioning of the importance of EU competition law 
seem to be further legitimised: the downgrade or the new opacity as shown in the text 
of the Treaty may be read to imply that competition is no longer one of the primary 
objectives of the European Union. 
This seemingly persuasive query may, notwithstanding, be proved to be a mere gloss, 
which could be broken from two ways. First, it should be noted that economic 
integration is a type of status rather than a mere task which would automatically 
terminate once it has been completed. Therefore, even though the completion of 
economic integration could be fulfilled at a certain point, EU competition law would 
still be a safeguard to maintain, if not promote, the economic integration of EU -- 
although the emphasis of EU competition law has now ‘re-directed to the economic 
goals of competition’439 and is no longer placed upon the economic integration of the 
EU, the pursue of a healthy and stable internal market would still be conducted based 
upon the idea of economic integration, and EU competition law would hence still 
strengthen the sense of economic unity among Member States. Secondly, based upon 
the first point, EU competition law would not only consolidate economic integration 
but also promote political integration as the concept of integration as reflected in EU 
competition law would also be applied in political facet. This broader function of EU 
competition law could even be observed in the founding treaties. As stated in the 
Preamble of the ECSC Treaty, competition law served for the creation of an 
‘economic community’ which would be the foundation of a ‘broader and 
                                                          
436 Emphasis added.  
437 Robert Lane, op. cit., supra note 432. 




independent community’, an ‘organised and vital Europe’ and maintain the ‘peaceful 
relations’ 440 among Member States.  
Judgments of the ECJ also to certain extent reassured those who feared that EU 
competition law has been less important. As held in Commission v. Italy, two years 
after Lisbon Treaty entered into force, 
‘As to the seriousness of the infringement, the vital nature of the Treaty rules 
on competition must be recalled … which are the expression of one of the 
essential tasks with which the European Union is entrusted … that vital nature 
is apparent from Article 3(3) TEU, namely the establishment of an internal 
market, and from protocol No.27 on the internal market and competition, 
which forms an integral part of the Treaties in accordance with Article 51 
TEU, and states that the internal market includes a system ensuring that 
competition is not distorted.’441 
It could hence be observed that the aforementioned ‘demotion’ was not recognised 
by the ECJ, and EU competition law still concerns the core interest of the EU and 
greatly contributes to the economic integration of the European Union. With no 
doubt, EU competition law forms part of EU’s fundamental public interests. 
b. Assimilating EU competition law in EU Member States’ public 
policy 
Having linked EU competition law with EU’s fundamental public interests, the last 
missing connection is between EU competition law and EU Member States’ public 
policy: would EU competition law, although being part of EU’s fundamental public 
interests, be the public policy of EU Member States? 
i. The primacy of EU law 
The relationship between EU’s fundamental public interests and EU Member States’ 
public policy essentially concerns the relationship between EU law and Member 
                                                          
440 See also, for example, Nikola LJ. Ilievski, The Concept of Political Integration: The Perspectives 
of Neofunctionalist Theory, Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, Vol.1, No.1, 2015, in which 
the author opined that economic integration is the foundation of the integration in other areas, 
especially in political areas.  
441 Case C-496/09 Commission v. Italy [2011] ECR I-11483, at para 60. Emphasis added. See also 
Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v. Teliasonera Sverige [2011] ECR I-527, at para 20. 
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States’ national law. One of the most long-established and crucial principles 
concerning this relationship is the principle of the primacy of EU law, which could 
be traced back to the period of the founding treaties. 
One of the landmark decisions of the ECJ concerning the primacy of (now) EU law 
over Member States’ national law was Flaminio Costa v ENEL, in which Mr. Costa, 
who was an Italian citizen owning shares of an electricity company and opposed to 
the nationalisation of the electricity sector in Italy. By refusing to pay his electricity 
bill, he was sued for non-payment by ENEL, which was a newly established national 
electricity entity. In his defence, he argued that the nationalisation of the electricity 
industry violated the provisions concerning competition and common market as 
provided in the TEEC as well as the Italian constitution. The Giudice Conciliatore, 
Milan, referred this case to the ECJ for preliminary ruling. 
Before the ECJ, the Italian Government submitted that the request of Giudice 
Conciliatore was ‘absolutely inadmissible’, inasmuch as a national court which was 
obliged to apply a national law cannot avail itself to Article 177 TEEC (now Article 
267 TFEU), which set out the scenarios under which the ECJ could give preliminary 
rulings. In its reply, the ECJ explicitly stated that: 
‘By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty has created 
its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an 
integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their courts 
are bound to apply. 
… 
The integration into the laws of each Member State of provisions which derive 
from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the Treaty, 
make it impossible for the States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a 
unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system accepted by them on 
the basis of reciprocity. Such a measure cannot therefore be inconsistent with 
that legal system. The executive force of Community law cannot vary from 
one State to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without 
jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty set out in Article 
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5(2)[442] and giving rise to the discrimination prohibited by Article 7[443] 
… 
It follows from all these observations that the law stemming from the Treaty, 
an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original 
nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without 
being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis 
of the Community itself being called into question.’444 
Similarly, this attitude was also reflected in Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, a 
competition law case, in which the ECJ stated that: 
‘The EEC Treaty has established its own system of law, integrated into the 
legal system of the Member states, and which must be applied by their court. 
It would be contrary to the nature of such a system to allow Member States to 
introduce or to retain measures capable of prejudicing the practical 
effectiveness of the Treaty… Consequently, conflicts between the rules of the 
Community and national rules in the matter of the law on cartels must be 
resolved by applying the principle that Community law takes precedence.’445 
However, interestingly, during the process of European integration, the only treaty 
which clearly provided for the primacy of EU law, i.e. the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe446, came to its premature end. But it should be noted that 
such failure had nothing to do with the primacy of EU law – it was only the 
consequence of rash decisions and maybe the advocacy formalism.447 As could be 
                                                          
442 ‘[Member States] shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objections of this Treaty.’ 
443 ‘Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any special provisions 
contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.’ 
444 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 585, at 593-594. Emphasis added. See also 
Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council, [2003] Q.B. 151 (HC). This case concerned the European 
Communities Act 1972 which is an Act of Parliament of the UK legislating for the accession of the 
UK to the (now) EU and also the incorporation of (now) EU law into the domestic law of the UK. In 
this case, the High Court clearly stated that [‘The present state of our domestic law is such that 
substantive Community rights prevail over the express terms of any domestic law, including primary 
legislation, made or passed after the coming into force of the 1972 Act, even in the face of plain 
inconsistency between the two.’] 
445 Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1, at 14. 
446 See Article I-6 of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 
447 It could be clearly found that, although the Treaty of Lisbon has eventually been ratified, it actually 
cannibalised much of the substance of the Constitutional Treaty. 
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found, although the Treaty of Lisbon said nothing regarding the primacy of Union 
law, a Declaration No.17 as annexed to the Treaties clearly provided that: 
‘The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union, the Treaties and the law adopted by 
the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of Member 
States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law. 
The Conference has also decided to attach as an Annex to this Final Act the 
Opinion of the Council Legal Service on the primacy of EC law as set out in 
11197/07 (JUR 260): 
“Opinion of the Council Legal Service of 22 June 2007 
It results from the case-law of the Court of Justice that primacy of EC law is a 
cornerstone principle of Community law. According to the Court, this 
principle is inherent to the specific nature of the European Community. At the 
time of the first judgment of this established case law (Costa/ENEL, 15 July 
1964, Case 6/641 [1] there was no mention of primacy in the treaty. It is still 
the case today. The fact that the principle of primacy will not be included in 
the future treaty shall not in any way change the existence of the principle and 
the existing case-law of the Court of Justice. 
[1] “It follows (…) that the law stemming from the treaty, an independent 
source of law, could not, because of its special and original nature, be 
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question.””’448 
Therefore, based upon the examination, it could be undoubtedly concluded that EU 
law possesses the primacy over Member States’ national law -- where there is a 
conflict between EU law and Member States’ national law, the former prevails. 
The confirmation of the primacy of EU law would therefore naturally lead to the 
conclusion that EU’s fundamental public interests, as explicitly enshrined in EU 
primary law which forms an integral part of and possesses the primacy over its 
                                                          
448 Emphasis added.  
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Member States’ national laws and reflected the core interests of EU, should be 
respected and regarded as the public policy of its Member States. As stated, the 
integration of EU is a ‘process by which domestic policy areas become increasingly 
subject to European policy-making’449. It involves the domestic assimilation of EU 
policy and politics450. A conclusion could hence be made to verify the thought as put 
forward above: EU’s fundamental public interests is a series of policy concerning the 
dual-dimensional integration of the Union, which should form a part of each Member 
State’s essential public interests, thus lies within the meaning of public policy under 
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. 
ii. Narrowing down the scope of EU competition law: Article 
101 and 102 TFEU as matters of EU Member States’ 
public policy within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the 
NYC 
Following the discussion above, it would therefore be natural to draw the conclusion 
that, since EU law possesses primacy and takes precedence over conflicting Member 
States’ national laws and EU’s fundamental public interests should be assimilated as 
Member States’ public policy, EU competition law as part of EU’s fundamental 
public interests should also be deemed as EU Member States’ public policy. 
Notwithstanding, it should be borne in mind that in the context of international 
arbitration, the law applicable to public policy issues is the law of the enforcing 
state451 and the term ‘public policy’ should be narrowly interpreted.452 Accordingly, 
if the enforcing state is an EU Member State, the relevant public policy would be the 
EU Member State’s public policy, which should also be narrowly interpreted. 
Following this rationale, although EU’s fundamental public interests should be 
assimilated as EU Member States’ public policy, EU law is essentially not the 
applicable law of public policy issues in international arbitration and EU’s 
fundamental public interests in this research was not defined in a narrow way as the 
                                                          
449 Tanja A. Börzel, Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to Europeanisation in 
Germany and Spain, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 4, 1999, footnote 1, at 574.  
450 Claudio M. Radaelli, ‘The Europeanization of Public Policy’, in Kevin Featherstone & Claudio M. 
Radaelli, The Politics of Europeanization, Oxford University Press, 2003, at p. 31. 
451 See supra Section II(B) of Chapter III. 
452 See supra Section II(C) of Chapter III. 
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term ‘public policy’ should be defined within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the 
NYC. Instead, it was understood as the fundamental interests of EU in general and 
was hence defined in a rather broad way as covering all the relevant legal 
instruments aiming at maintaining and promoting EU integration. EU Member States’ 
public policy should by no means be defined in such a broad fashion; otherwise any 
violation of relevant legal instruments concerning the protection and promotion of 
EU integration would be a potentially legitimate ground for the refusal of relevant 
arbitral awards – this clearly runs counter to the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC.  
Therefore, although EU competition law forms part of EU’s fundamental public 
interests, it may not automatically form part of EU Member States’ public policy 
within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC.  
The question is thus whether EU competition law is narrow enough to be part of EU 
Member States’ public policy in the context of international arbitration. From the 
author’s viewpoint, the key of this question lies in the scope of the term ‘EU 
competition law’. If defining EU competition law as all the relevant legal instruments, 
it would be part of EU’s fundamental public interests as they all serve the purpose of 
maintaining and promoting EU integration, but it should not be categorised as EU 
Member States’ public policy in the context of international arbitration as it would 
lead to an unpleasant result: the violation of almost all the relevant EU competition 
legal instruments would be potentially condemnable under Article V(2)(b) of the 
Convention. This could hardly be acceptable. Just as Advocate General Wathelet 
argued in his opinion in ‘Gazprom’ OAO, 
‘I do not agree that the judgment in Eco Swiss and Mostaza Claro should be 
interpreted in such a way that the mere fact that a particular sphere forms part 
of the exclusive or shared powers of the European Union in accordance with 
Article 3 TFEU and 4 TFEU is sufficient to raise a provision of EU law to the 
rank of public-policy provisions. If that were the case, EU law in its entirety, 
from the Charter of Fundamental Rights to a directive on pressurised 
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equipment, would be a matter of public policy for the purposes of Article 
V(2)(b) of the 1958 New York Convention.’453 
The scope of EU competition law, if to be recognised as part of EU Member States’ 
public policy, should therefore be narrowed down to those competition rules which is 
so fundamental that any breach of which would be unacceptable, hence be in line 
with the requirement of narrow interpretation of public policy under Article V(2)(b) 
of the NYC. Just as AG Wathelet once suggested, for a specific legal instrument or 
value to be understood as a rule of public policy within the meaning of Article 
V(2)(b) of the NYC, the violation of which should be intolerable by the legal order 
of the place in which recognition and enforcement are sought as such a breach would 
be unacceptable from the viewpoint of a free and democratic State governed by the 
rule of law.454  
Following this rationale, the focuses of this research, i.e. Article 101 and 102 TFEU, 
should be recognised as part of EU Member States’ public policy as the breach of 
which would essentially be unacceptable. This is clearly reflected in the text of both 
Articles. For example, Article 101(2) reads that ‘Any agreements or decisions 
prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void’455. Similarly, Article 
102 TFEU clearly provides that ‘[a]ny abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited’456. This well-set mechanism for condemning violation of both Articles 
hence clearly prove that any breach of them would be intolerable, and therefore 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU should be assimilated as EU Member States’ public 
policy. 
This conclusion was essentially approved by the ECJ in Eco Swiss, 
‘… according to Article 3(g) of the EC Treaty…Article 85 of the Treaty 
constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment 
                                                          
453 The Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-536/13 ‘Gazprom’ OAO, EU:C:2014:2414, 
at para. 182. 
454 Ibid, at para. 177. See also The Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-438/14 Nabiel 
Peter Bogendorff von Wolffersdorff v. Standesamt der Karlsruhe, EU:C:2016:11, at para. 100. (‘[I]n 
order for a rule to be one of public policy, it must be a mandatory rule so fundamental to the legal 
order in question that no derogation from it would be possible in the context of the case at issue.’) 
455 Emphasis added. 
456 Emphasis added.  
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of the tasks entrusted to the Community and, in particular, for the functioning 
of the internal market. 
… 
… the provision of Article 85 of the Treaty may be regarded as a matter of 
public policy within the meaning of the New York Convention.’457 
Since this landmark case, there has been no query that Article 101 and 102 TFEU has 
firmly constitutes a matter of EU Member States’ public policy. As for (now) Article 
101 TFEU, in Marketing Displays International Inc. v. VR Van Raalte Reclame BV, 
both the Hague Rechtbank and Gerechtshof confirmed that Article 81 EC is a public 
policy provision within the meaning of the New York Convention.458 Similarly, in 
SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV, the Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles set 
aside the arbitral award due to its violation of Article 101 TFEU which therefore 
essentially violated its own competition public policy.459 As for (now) 102 TFEU, for 
example, in Aéroports de Paris v. Commission which was a case concerning the 
alleged violation of 86 EC, the Court of First Instance explicitly confirmed the public 
policy nature of this Article which was ‘specifically designed to render its provisions 
mandatory and to prohibit traders from circumventing them in their agreements’460 
and therefore should be understood as part of public policy of EU Member States.461 
                                                          
457 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, at paras. 36 
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458 Netherlands No. 29, Marketing Displays International Inc. v. VR Van Raalte Reclame BV., 
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460 Case T-128/98, Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2000] ECR-II-3929, at para. 241. This decision 
was subsequently confirmed by the ECJ in case C-82/01, Aéroports de Paris v. Commission [2002] 
ECR-I-9297. See also, for example, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-298/04, Vincenzo Manfredi v. Lloyd 
Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA (C-295/04), Antonio Cannito v. Fondiaria Sai SpA (C-296/04) and 
Nicolò Tricarico (C-297/04) and Pasqualina Murgolo (C-298/04) v. Assitalia SpA [2006] ECR I-6619, 
at para. 31. (‘it should be recalled that Articles 81 EC and 82 EC are a matter of public policy which 
must be automatically applied by national courts) 
461 Although this research focuses on Article 101 and 102 TFEU, following the rationale 
raised above concerning whether a specific legal instrument could be regarded as a matter of 
public policy within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC, it was opined that other 
relevant EU competition law, such as Article 106 & 107, should also be categorised as 
matters of public policy due to the clear intolerable nature of the behaviours concerned in 
these provisions. For further discussion, see, for example, Damien Geradin, Public Policy and 
Breach of Competition Law in International Arbitration: A Competition Law Practitioner’s Viewpoint, 
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2. EU competition law and non-EU jurisdictions’ public policy 
The examination of the relationship between EU competition law and EU Member 
States’ public policy leads to a somewhat unsurprising conclusion – it is expected 
that since EU competition law is a crucial component of EU legal order and EU law 
possesses the primacy over EU Member States’ national law, certain legal 
instruments of EU competition law which are of fundamental nature, such as Article 
101 and 102 TFEU, would hence be naturally regarded as the public policy of EU 
Member States.  
But the situation would be largely different before non-EU jurisdictions based upon 
two main obstacles. The first which hinders EU competition law issues from 
triggering a non-EU jurisdiction’s public policy concern lies in one of the basic 
mechanisms of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC. It has been discussed above462 that under 
the framework of Article V(2)(b), the enforcement court would generally apply their 
own law in examining public policy issues. As being correctly stated that: 
‘[R]eviewing courts are commissioned to apply domestic mandatory norms. In 
regard to mandatory foreign norms, they are never subject to anything more 
than a discretion to give effect to such foreign norms.’463 
Therefore, since the ‘public policy focus is exclusively upon the values of the state of 
the reviewing court’ 464 , if competition issues are not recognised by a non-EU 
enforcing state as its public policy, challenging an arbitral award based upon the 
violation of its public policy before its national court would be predestined to be a 
failure based upon the strong ‘pro-enforcement bias’ as reflected in the NYC.465 
                                                                                                                                                                    
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2016-029, 2016, at 11-14, in which the author argued that Article 106-
108 TFEU as well as the EU Merger Regulation should fall within public policy within the meaning 
of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC.  
462 See supra Section II(B) of Chapter III. 
463 Phillip Landolt, Limits on Court Review of International Arbitration Awards Assessed in light of 
States’ Interested and in particular in light of EU Law Requirements, Arbitration International, Vol. 
23, No. 1, 2007, at 72. 
464 Ibid, at 71.  
465 Public policy could be regarded as a countervailing force against pro-enforcement bias. Once the 
non-EU enforcing court does not deem competition law as its public policy, it would hence be much 
less persuasive for it to review an arbitral award concerning competition law issue and much more 
legitimate for it to enforce the arbitral award. See Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan 
Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., supra note 1, at para. 11.106; Neil Andrews, Arbitration and 
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Following the first obstacle, the second further concerns that, even under the scenario 
that a non-EU jurisdiction internalises competition law in its definition of public 
policy, it is likely that it would merely focus on its own competition law but not 
others. Therefore, when encountering competition law issues concerning the 
competition law of other jurisdictions, its own competition public policy concern 
may not be triggered.  
One of the must-discussed cases concerning this issue is X SA v. Z SA, which, 
although not directly concerning the review of EU competition law award at 
enforcement stage, could still shed certain light to the discussion. In this case, the 
Swiss Tribunal Fédéral, by disapproving the losing party’s argument at the 
annulment stage that the involved agreement (governed by Swiss law) between two 
EU Member States’ companies violated Article 85 EC, stated that: 
‘In so doing, the arbitrator did not violate public policy, as it is defined by the 
above-mentioned case law. It is doubtful that the provisions of – national or 
EU – competition law are among those fundamental legal or moral principles 
that are recognised in all civilised countries, to the point that their violation 
should be seen as a violation of public policy’466 
It hence follows this judgment that a non-EU jurisdiction may limit the connotation 
of its competition public policy to cover only the competition law issues which 
would actually influence its own competition legal order, and EU competition law 
would hence not be deemed as its public policy. 
These two obstacles may hence exclude EU competition law from being deemed as a 
non-EU jurisdiction’s public policy. But this is not, especially from the perspective 
of the EU, a desirable result. Such exclusion may lead to an asymmetry that, under 
the scenario that an arbitral award concerning EU competition law dispute enters the 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Contract Law – Common Law Perspectives, Springers, 2016, at pp. 151-152; Westacre Investment Inc. 
v. Jugoimport-SPDR Holding Co. Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 288 (CA), at 304-305. 
466 1e Cour Civile, X SA v. Z SA, 13 november 1999, 1999, ASA Bulletin, Vol. 17, Issue 4, at p. 534. 
The original text is [‘Ce faisant, l'arbitre n'a pas violé l'ordre public, tel qu'il a été défini par la 
jurisprudence rappelé plus haut. Il paraît, en effet, douteux que les dispositions du droit – national ou 
européen – de la concurrence fassent partie des principes juridiques ou moraux fondamentaux 
reconnus dans tous les Etats civilisés, au point que leur violation devrait être considérée comme 
contraire à l'ordre public’]. The translation is provided in Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, 
at p. 149. Emphasis added. 
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enforcement stage immediately after being rendered by a tribunal, the legality of the 
arbitral award which the EU Member States would wish to assure would 
automatically drive into the safe harbour since an enforcing court would examine 
public policy issues under its own law, which, notwithstanding, does not reckon EU 
competition law as part of its public policy. This result may be regarded as 
something of a ‘loophole’ of international arbitration, and such asymmetry was 
deemed as ‘one of the unsatisfactory aspects of the intersection between competition 
law and arbitration’467. 
The question which ought then to be asked is whether such dissatisfaction is 
inevitable and whether these two obstacles are unbreakable so that the link between 
EU competition law and non-EU jurisdictions’ public policy can never be built. The 
author opines that it is not the case in legal practice and two main ways out of his 
loophole can be observed. The first has been discussed above,468 namely that a non-
EU state, although not recognising or deeming EU competition law as its own public 
policy, intends to respect the EU competition legal order out of public policy reasons. 
The national courts of the non-EU state would hence have the incentive to ensure 
that relevant EU competition law issues have been duly and reasonably reviewed 
since owing to the respect for EU competition law the non-EU enforcing courts 
would not tolerate an ill-founded or apparently-erroneous judgment on relevant 
competition law issues. If it is persuaded that relevant issues have not been reviewed 
in this manner, EU competition policy, and ultimately the non-EU state’s public 
policy, would be violated and it may therefore activate the non-EU state’s public 
policy defence under Article V(2)(b) of the Convention. 
The second solution, by being different from the first, envisages the aforementioned 
two obstacles. The first would be the easier one to break, of which the core rationale 
                                                          
467 Tim Ward & Kassie Smith (2005) op. cit., supra note 65, at para. 11-058. It should be noted that 
such ‘asymmetry’ may not only be observed in international arbitration but also in international 
litigation. See, for example, Article 45(1) of the Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), which provides that ‘On the 
application of any interested party, the recognition of a judgment shall be refused : (a) if such 
recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member State addressed’, in 
which the term ‘Member State addressed’ clearly refers to the Member State called for enforcing a 
foreign judgment. See Tomaž Keresteš, Public Policy in Brussels Regulation 1: Yesterday, Today and 
Tomorrow, LeXonomica, Vol. 8, No. 2, 2016, at 82.  
468 See supra Section II(B)(3) of Chapter III. 
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merely lies in the possibility that competition law may not be interpreted by non-EU 
jurisdictions as their public policy. It could be easily tackled by considering another 
possibility, namely that non-EU jurisdiction would also incorporate competition law 
in its public policy definition, and it could be actually observed that such possibility 
is not merely theoretical but also practical: as stated, since the time of the 
aforementioned Swiss Tribunal fédéral’s decision, ‘competition law has continued 
its course of establishing itself as crucial to the economic ordering of States’469 and 
‘virtually every developed economy in the world now has competition law’470. It is 
therefore increasingly untenable that competition law cannot be regarded as public 
policy.471  
The second obstacle, notwithstanding, could be harder to crack since its hidden 
rationale is fairly straightforward and plausibly irrebuttable: since a non-EU 
jurisdiction would focus mainly on its own competition public policy and EU 
competition law does not concern its competition legal order, EU competition law 
would therefore not be regarded as the public policy of the non-EU state.  
But one should bear in mind that the connotation of a state’s public policy would 
usually convey a two-layer meaning: besides the fundamental political, social and 
economic public interest of the state, its public policy would also cover those general 
value pertaining to morality, justice and internationally recognised public value. 472 
The rationale of the second obstacle hence omits this second layer of meaning and 
neglects the possibility of EU competition law conveying an internationally 
recognised public value so that the involved EU competition law issues would still 
trigger the public policy concern of a non-EU state. 
A plausible extension of the connotation of EU competition law could hence be made, 
namely that besides addressing EU competition law issues and concerning EU 
competition legal order, it also conveys a general value of competition, i.e. to prevent 
economically and other socially harmful effects of cartels and other restrictions to 
competition and thereby to promote competition in the interest of a liberal market 
                                                          
469 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 150. 
470 Ibid, footnote 81, at p. 151. 
471 Ibid. 
472 See supra Section II(A)(3) of Chapter III.  
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order473. Such general value may potentially extend beyond geographic boundaries 
and permeate non-EU jurisdictions’ own public interest -- when the national court of 
a non-EU jurisdiction encountering an arbitral award concerning disputes relevant to 
EU competition law, the incentive of protecting EU competition legal order may 
resonate with the motivation of protecting general competition value as cherished by 
the non-EU jurisdiction and hence to certain extent also urges the non-EU state’s 
national court to examine the arbitral award based upon its public policy concern and 
ensure relevant competition law issues have been duly and reasonably reviewed. As 
opined, 
‘[I]n the international context, antitrust norms pertain to the public policy of 
the forum and are considered to fall under the category of mandatory 
norms … Mandatory rules usually aim to protect the general political, social, 
economic, or cultural interests of a specific country. Rules protecting free 
competition are generally accepted to constitute such mandatory norms, 
irrespective of their EU or national provenance.’474 
But such plausible connection between EU competition law and a non-EU state’s 
public policy could be established only if the non-EU state regards competition law 
as part of its own public policy and generalises the concept of competition public 
policy from its specific competition legal order to the general competition value, 
which may still not be universally accepted. This uncertainty, notwithstanding, could 
be eliminated to a certain extent from three practical senses. First, with the growing 
recognition of the importance of competition law, the general competition value as 
cherished by EU competition law would be increasingly recognised and it would 
hence be increasingly less likely that EU competition law would be regarded as a 
pure regional public policy which has no connection with non-EU jurisdictions’ own 
public policy. For example, the Zurich Commercial Court has started to recognise the 
‘general goals of competition law’475 as reflected in (now) EU competition law and 
                                                          
473 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, footnote 81, at p. 150. 
474 Assimakis P. Komninos, ‘Chapter 9 – Arbitration and EU Competition Law’, in Jürgen 
Basedow, Stéphanie Francq, and Laurence Idot, International Antitrust Litigation: Conflict of 
Laws and Coordination, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012, at pp. 199-200. 
475 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 151. 
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apply it as mandatory norms.476  Secondly, as competition principles increasingly 
converge and may even be uniform across many jurisdictions477, it may hence be 
increasingly probable that ‘a breach of EU competition law, especially where it is a 
hardcore restriction, may also constitute a breach of other applicable competition 
laws’478 and ‘any award giving effect to such an agreement or such a provision may 
thus constitute a violation of the relevant public policy’ 479 . Thirdly, a non-EU 
jurisdiction examining foreign arbitral awards concerning EU competition law issues 
based upon its own public policy concern of the general competition value may also 
be motivated by a reciprocal consideration: if it wishes that an arbitral award 
concerning its own competition law would be to certain extent examined by an EU 
enforcing state, it should then first hold the same mind when a foreign arbitral award 
concerning EU competition law issues is brought before it and first ‘open up its 
doors’480 for such friendly reciprocal legal environment. Such reciprocal concern 
may hence also encourage a jurisdiction to perform in a more actively way.481 This 
would be wholly in harmony with the international law principle of comity.  
Although it is expected that a certain level of uncertainty and asymmetry may still 
exist since the analysis conducted above still needs to be further verified in legal 
practice to see to what extent a non-EU jurisdiction would generalise EU competition 
law as conveying general competition value and hence examine arbitral awards 
concerning EU competition law under its own public policy concerns, it could 
plausibly be foreseen that, with the aforementioned development of competition law, 
the arbitral awards concerning EU competition law issues may increasingly resonate 
with and trigger other jurisdictions’ public policy concerns, and the aforementioned 
discordant asymmetry would thus be gradually mitigated.  
                                                          
476 See, for example, Commercial Court of Zurich, 21 June 2004, ZR 104 (2005) 97, (No. 27), as 
quoted in Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 151. 
477 Rolf Trittmann & Boris Kasolowsky (2011) op. cit., supra note 37, at para. 6-072. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
480 This is a concept borrowed from Ilias Bantekas (2008) op. cit., supra note 198, at 209. 
481 One might reckon that such reciprocal concern may also lead to a more robust approach which 
encourages a non-EU jurisdiction to treat EU competition law itself as its own public policy. But it 
should be noted that the application of such reciprocal concern is still subject to the non-EU 
jurisdiction’s judge and weigh between the legal expectation (i.e. an arbitral award concerning its own 
competition law would also be duly examined by an EU Member States’ national court), and the fact 
that it is not obliged to consider and examine the public policy of a foreign state as well as the 
consideration of the ‘pro-enforcement’ bias. The author holds the viewpoint that the former would 
generally not be strong enough to exceed the latter.  
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It hence follows the discussion above that EU competition law may be linked with 
non-EU jurisdictions’ public policy in two ways. The first is that a non-EU state, 
although not considering EU competition law as its fundamental public interest, does 
regard respecting other jurisdictions’ public policy as its own public policy and may 
hence trigger its public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) when the violation of 
EU competition law could be established. The second is that a non-EU jurisdiction 
treats EU competition law as focusing not only on the EU competition legal order but 
a general competition value which would also be recognised and cherished also by 
it,482 and hence views EU competition law as its own public policy in this sense.  
B. The modalities of potential breaches of EU competition law in 
international arbitration 
After concluding that EU competition law would/could be treated as the public 
policy of EU Member States and may also, under certain circumstances, trigger the 
public policy concern of non-EU jurisdictions, the next step of the analysis will 
progress to examine the modalities of an arbitral award violating EU competition law 
in international arbitration.  
The examination of public policy issues of an arbitral award at enforcement stage is 
essentially conducted through the review of the manifestation of an arbitral award.483 
Hence, the examination of the modalities of potential breaches of EU competition 
law in international arbitration should be conducted by tracing back to the stage at 
which an arbitral award is rendered, i.e. the arbitration proceeding, to see what 
breaches may potentially occur when arbitrators solve disputes concerning EU 
competition law issues.  
                                                          
482 It should be reiterated that there may be certain jurisdictions which still do not reckon competition 
law as part of their own public policy or, although recognising the fundamental importance of 
competition law, do not treat EU competition law as conveying a general competition value which 
could be recognised by even non-EU jurisdictions and do not regard respecting other jurisdictions’ 
public policy as its own public policy. Under these circumstances, a potential breach of EU 
competition law as reflected in a foreign arbitral award may not trigger the public policy defence 
under Article V(2)(b) NYC before the national courts of these jurisdictions. However, as stated above, 
with the steady development of competition law around the world, these two scenarios would be 
increasingly rarely observed, and for the purpose of this research, these two scenarios will hence not 
be further examined in the following sections and chapters. 
483 The review of the manifestation of an award may not only examine what the arbitrators said in an 
award, but also, under certain circumstances, the correctness of the award, namely whether the 
arbitrator has duly or even correctly examined relevant disputes. See infra Section II of this Chapter. 
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1. Non-application of EU competition law 
One of the most likely manifestations of the potential breach of EU competition law 
during the arbitration proceedings would be that relevant EU competition law issues 
are not examined at all -- when arbitrating a dispute arising from a contract 
containing anticompetitive agreement or provisions, neither the parties nor the 
arbitral tribunal raise EU competition law during the arbitration proceeding. Under 
this circumstance, it is hence possible that a potential violation of relevant EU 
competition law provisions may not be captured, and potential breach of EU 
competition law could therefore happen, especially when the tribunal renders an 
award in favour of the party who is benefitted from the anticompetitive agreement.  
This potential situation could be found, for example, in Thalès484 , in which the 
plaintiff (‘Thalès’) and the defendant (GIE) entered into a framework agreement, 
according to which Thalès would end its production of a particular missile in the 
United States and allow GIE to produce this missile. In exchange, GIE agreed to stop 
producing a competing product and adapt the missile to its missile system. The 
parties also entered into a marketing agreement in which provided that Thalès 
granted GIE the exclusive rights to produce and distribute the missile. However, 
when Thalès approached GIE about the production of the missiles, the two were 
unable to agree a price, and Thalès then filed a request for arbitration seeking 
termination of the agreements, and unilaterally terminated the agreements few 
months later.  This contention was denied by the tribunal and Thalès was ordered to 
pay GIE for its loss based upon its unilateral termination of the agreements. Thalès 
then sought to have this award annulled on the grounds that it blatantly violated 
Article 81 EC since the award was made without the examination of the potential 
violation of EU competition law. 
2. Misapplication of EU competition law 
Besides the non-application of EU competition law, another equally direct scenario 
posits that, although EU competition law arguments were actually put forward, the 
                                                          




arbitral tribunal misapplied relevant provisions and the award may hence violate EU 
competition law. 
One of the most representative cases concerning this situation is SNF v. Cytec485. 
Here, SNF and Cytec entered into a contract, which was unilaterally rescinded by 
SNF. In response, Cytec brought ICC arbitration proceedings in Brussels. SNF 
claimed that the contract violated both Article 81 and 82 EC. The tribunal found the 
contract void owing to the breach of Article 81, for which SFN and Cytec shared 
responsibility, but Cytec’s actions did not constitute abuse of a dominant position 
under Article 82. Based upon these judgments, the tribunal merely ordered damages 
against SNF as it was found not to have suffered loss. SNF then challenged the 
award in Belgium. The Tribunal de première instance annulled the award on the 
basis that the remedy was contrary to EU competition law. 
3. Awards running contrary to European Commission or NCA decisions 
The last situation, which might be less obvious than the first two, concerns an award 
being contrary to a decision of the European Commission or an NCA which concerns 
particular anti-competitive behaviour that is also the subject of the arbitration 
proceeding. 486  An instructive provision concerning the link between an award 
running contrary to a Commission or a NCA decision and the potential violation of 
EU competition law is Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003, which clearly provides 
that:  
‘1. When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or practices under 
Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a 
Commission decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the 
decision adopted by the Commission. They must also avoid giving decisions 
which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in 
proceedings it has initiated. To that effect, the national court may assess 
                                                          
485 SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, 8 Mar. 2007 [2007] 
Rev. Arb. 303. 
486 This is an important prerequisite for an award runs contrary to an authoritative decision.  
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whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. This obligation is without 
prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article 234 of the Treaty.’487 
Although Regulation 1/2003 does not touch upon international commercial 
arbitration, given the consideration of the legal requirement of uniform interpretation 
and application of EU competition law, it is a tenable inference of Article 16(1) of 
the Regulation that once an arbitral award runs counter to what the Commission has 
decided, the award would breach EU competition law, since the message conveyed 
by Article 16(1) is essentially the prohibition of decisions running counter to the 
decision adopted by the Commission, no matter whether such decision is made by a 
national court or an arbitral tribunal. 
Following the same rationale, it could also be deduced that if an arbitral award runs 
contrary to an NCA decision, it would also violate EU competition law. Although the 
Regulation merely provides that NCAs shall not render decisions running counter to 
the Commission’s decision488 and remains silent as to whether national courts should 
not render decisions running counter to NCA decisions, the Regulation does 
effectively delegate the Commission’s power to NCAs. 489  As opined by the 
Commission: 
‘The Commission sees no reason why a final decision on Article 81 or 82 
taken by an NCA in the European Competition Network (ECN), and a final 
judgment by a review court upholding the NCA decision or itself finding an 
infringement, should not be accepted in every Member State as irrebuttable 
proof of the infringement in subsequent civil antitrust damages cases.’490 
Pursuant to this viewpoint, it was then suggested that: 
‘National courts that have to rule in actions for damages on practices under 
Article 81 or 82 on which an NCA in the ECN has already given a final 
                                                          
487 Emphasis added. 
488 See Article 16(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 
489 See Recital (4) of Regulation 1/2003. (‘The present system should therefore be replaced by a 
directly applicable exception system in which the competition authorities and courts of the Member 
States have the power to apply not only Article 81(1) and Article 82 of the Treaty, which have direct 
applicability by virtue of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, but also 
Article 81(3) of the Treaty’) 
490 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules, COM (2008) 165 Final, at 
para. 2.3.  
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decision finding an infringement of those articles, or on which a review court 
has given a final judgment upholding the NCA decision or itself finding an 
infringement, cannot take decisions running counter to any such decision or 
ruling.’491 
C. When would a potential breach trigger the public policy defence under 
Article V(2)(b) of the NYC? 
Following the introduction of the three types of potential breach of EU competition 
law as reflected in arbitral awards, the question which should then be asked is that 
under what circumstance a potential breach of Article 101 or 102 TFEU would 
trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b).  
The simplest and most straightforward behavioural pattern of an enforcing court 
would be that any appearance of the manifestations of violating EU competition law 
would automatically trigger the public policy defence, i.e. when encountering arbitral 
awards which manifest the aforesaid three modalities, an enforcing court would 
automatically refuse to enforce the awards based upon Article V(2)(b). This rather 
simple mode, however, is not evident in legal practice. It was discussed above that 
Article V(2)(b) has been widely interpreted as meaning that only violations which 
are flagrant, concrete and effective could trigger the public policy defence. 492 
Following this widely approved principle, as will be seen, the three modalities of 
potential violation of EU competition law would not always reach the threshold of 
severity and would thus not automatically trigger the public policy defence. 
1. Non-application of EU competition law 
As for the non-application of competition law, the severity of such potential error 
essentially lies in the severity of the relevant anti-competitive behaviour. From the 
EU perspective, such severity concerns the extent by which an agreement, decision 
or concerted practice affects trade or restricts competition within the internal market, 
or the severity of abusive conduct affecting trade between Member States. For 
example, not every agreement, decision, practice or abusive behaviour, even if it 
affects trade between member states and restricts competition, violates EU 
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492 See supra Section II(C) of Chapter III. 
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competition law. In other words, not every non-application of EU competition law 
would be serious enough to trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b).  
Basically, there are two main types of anti-competitive behaviours covered by 
Article 101 and 102, namely the ‘by-object’ and ‘by-effect’ anti-competitive 
behaviours. The ‘by-object’ behaviours under these two Articles refer to agreements, 
decisions or practices of which the object is to prevent, restrict and distort 
competition within the internal market493 or a behaviour with its object of being 
abusive of its dominant position.494 For these ‘by-object’ behaviours, once they are 
deemed as distorting competition by their very nature, it would be irrelevant whether 
such distortions are appreciable, and they would thus be deemed automatically as 
seriously violating EU competition law and trigger the public policy defence under 
Article V(2)(b) of the NYC. As Advocate General Kokott held in its Opinion in 
Expedia Inc., 
‘[R]estrictions of competition ‘by object’ are regarded, by their very nature, 
as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition. 
Agreements with an anti-competitive object are recognised as having harmful 
consequences for society. They can hardly be regarded as de minimis 
infringements. On the contrary, it must be presumed that undertakings which 
enter into an agreement with anti-competitive object always intend an 
appreciable effect on competition, irrespective of the size of their market 
shares and turnover.’495 
Therefore, there should be no question that once a behaviour is classified as ‘by-
object’ anti-competitive behaviours, it violates relevant competition public policy 
                                                          
493 See Article 101(1) TFEU. 
494 Although Article 102 TFEU does not clearly define ‘by-object’ abusive behaviour, it could be 
observed in legal practice. For example, exclusive dealing would be categorised as being abusive by 
its very nature. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Commission [1979] ECR 461, at para 
90. 
495  See the Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc. [2012] 
EU:C:2012:544, at paras. 44 to 57. See also, for example, R. Whish & D. Bailey (2018) op. cit., supra 
note 335, at pp. 149-150; Case 56/65 Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v. Maschinenbau Ulm 
GmbH [1966] ECR 235, at p. 249; Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v. Beef Industry 
Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd. [2008] ECR I-8637, at paras 
15-16; Case C-67/13P Groupement des cartes bancaires v. Commission, EU:C:2014:2204, at para 50; 
Case C-373/14P Toshiba Corp v. Commission, EU:C:2016:26, at para 26. 
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within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC as such violation is undoubtedly 
serious enough. 
Notwithstanding, this would not be the case for ‘by-effect’ behaviours, which refer to 
agreements, decisions or practices of which the effect is to prevent, restrict and 
distort competition within the internal market496, or behaviours with the effect of 
abusing dominant positions.497 For these behaviours, their severity essentially lies in 
the behaviours’ impact: if they do not have an appreciable impact either on 
competition or on inter-state trade, they may nevertheless not be caught498 and would 
hence not be serious enough to trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) 
of the NYC. As the ECJ held in Völk: 
‘If an agreement is to be capable of affecting trade between Member States it 
must be possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis 
of a set of objective factors of law or of fact that the agreement in question 
may have an influence … Consequently an agreement falls outside the 
prohibition in Article 85 when it has only an insignificant effect on the 
markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned 
have on the market of the product in question.’499  
From the perspective of a non-EU jurisdiction, an appreciability threshold is also 
widely recognised and applied. For example, Section 3(1) of India Competition Act 
2002 explicitly provides that: 
                                                          
496 See Article 101(1) TFEU.  
497 Although Article 102 TFEU does not clearly define ‘by-object’ abusive behaviour, it could be 
observed in legal practice. For example, ‘margin squeeze’, which occurs when there is such a narrow 
margin between an integrated provider’s price for selling essential inputs to a rival and its downstream 
price that the rival cannot survive or effectively compete, would be categorised as ‘by effect’ abusive 
behaviour. See Case C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom AG v. Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, at para 
250, in which the ECJ disapproved the argument which claimed that ‘the very existence of a pricing 
practice of a dominant undertaking which leads to the margin squeeze of its equally efficient 
competitors constitutes an abuse within the meaning of Article 82 EC’. See also Case C-52/09 
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-527, at paras 60-77. 
498 R. Whish & D. Bailey (2018) op. cit., supra note 335, at p. 133. See also, for example, European 
Commission’s Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the ‘De 
Minimis Notice’). 
499 Case 5/69 Franz Völk v. Établissements J. Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, at 302. Emphasis added. 
See also, for example, Regulation 330/2010 OJ 2010 L102/1, excluding from the prohibition of 
Article 101(1) all vertical agreements unless they contain hardcore restrictions of competition.  
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‘No enterprise or association of enterprises or person or association of 
persons shall enter into any agreement in respect of production, supply, 
distribution, storage, acquisition or control of goods or provision of services, 
which causes or is likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on 
competition within India.’500 
Similarly, the Competition & Consumer Commission Singapore Guidelines also 
provides that ‘an agreement will fall within the scope of the section 34 prohibition 
[i.e. prohibiting agreements which prevent, restrict or distort competition] if it has its 
object or effect the appreciable prevention, restriction or distortion of competition’501. 
It could therefore be plausibly inferred that when encountering the non-application of 
EU competition law as reflected in a foreign arbitral award, only when an anti-
competitive conduct is examined and confirmed to have sufficient appreciability or a 
clear anti-competitive object would failing to examine such conduct in an 
international arbitration trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b). 
However, it has still been questioned that even if a ‘by effect’ anti-competitive 
behaviour reaches the appreciability threshold, it may still not be serious enough to 
trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC since it was 
stated that even where conduct offends, for example Article 101 TFEU, EU law 
recognises gradients of injury and is more concerned about the so-called hard-core 
violations (which usually concerns ‘by-object’ violations, i.e. those anti-competitive 
agreements, decisions or practices of which the object is to prevent and distort 
competition) than soft-core violations (which usually concerns ‘by-effect’ 
violations).502 Therefore, ‘less outrage would issue from the EU in the case of the 
non-application of EC competition law’ in soft-core violations503 and it may thus be 
plausibly suggested that the non-application of EU competition law in case of soft-
core violation would not meet the threshold of severity as required to trigger the 
public policy defence. 504  For example, it was opined that ‘[a] restriction of 
                                                          
500 Emphasis added. 
501 Emphasis added. 
502 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 215. 
503 Ibid, at p. 216. 
504 Diederik de Groot, ‘Chapter 16 The Ex Officio Application of European Competition Law by 
Arbitrators’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust Arbitration: A Handbook for 
Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 16-053 
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competition in a horizontal agreement is likely to be more detrimental for 
competition than a restriction in a vertical agreement’ 505  and ‘[a] cartel would 
certainly qualify as a repugnant infringement of the competition rules’506. 
The author does not share this viewpoint as that paying main attention on hard-core 
violations does not mean to attenuate the importance of soft-core violation. It is 
merely out of practical reasons to focus more on hard-core violations, such as the fact 
that they generally cause ‘greater harm to competition’ 507  and the practical 
experience that hard-core violations are ‘almost never necessary for the obtaining of 
off-setting Article 81(3) EC-type benefits.’508 It, notwithstanding, never means that 
soft-core violation is not serious enough to be condemned – otherwise Article 101 
would be deemed as ill-drafted since it on the one hand condemn anti-competitive 
conducts in such a non-derogative way509 whilst on the other hand actually give some 
of the wrongdoers a way out. In other words, EU competition law does not 
‘distinguish between serious and minor violations of competition law’510 and the 
severity of violation is inherent in the provisions: as long as an anti-competitive 
behaviour could be caught under EU competition law, it is serious enough. This is 
also the case in the competition law of non-EU jurisdictions.511 Therefore, it could be 
seen that, although whether ‘all parts of the edifice of European competition law 
partake in the paramount public policy rank’ may still be ‘unmapped territory’512, the 
ECJ in Eco Swiss did not consider such potential distinction but confirmedly held 
that, as long as an arbitral award ‘is in fact contrary’ to (now) Article 101 TFEU, it 
would trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC.513 This 
                                                          
505 Assimakis P. Komninos (2012) op. cit., supra note 474, at p. 220. 
506 Ibid.  
507 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 215. 
508 Ibid.  
509  See Article 101 TFEU, which clearly states that anti-competitive agreements, decisions and 
practices shall be prohibited and automatically void without further distinguishing ‘by-object’ and 
‘by-effect’ violations. 
510 Damien Geradin (2016) op. cit., supra note 461, at 15. 
511 See, for example, neither the India Competition Act nor the Competition & Consumer 
Commission Singapore Guidelines provides that ‘by-effect’ violations of competition law 
would be less condemnable than ‘by-object’ violations. 
512 Diederik de Groot (2011) op. cit., supra note 504, at para. 16-053. It should be noted that the 
conclusion drawn above that EU competition law forms part of EU’s fundamental public interests was 
made on the prerequisite that the term ‘EU competition law’ in this research refers to Article 101 and 
102 TFEU.  
513 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, at para 41. 
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viewpoint was subsequently firmly upheld by AG Wathelet in his opinion in 
Genentech v. Hoechst: 
‘Even if there were a scale of infringements of Article 101 TFEU based on 
their obviousness and harmfulness including, in particular, restrictions by 
object and by effect, there is nothing in Article 101 TFEU to support the 
conclusion that these restrictions would be permissible. Indeed, Article 101 
TFEU expressly prohibits agreements between undertakings ‘which have as 
their object or effect’ the restriction of competition. Accordingly, either there 
is an infringement of Article 101 TFEU, in which case the agreement 
between undertakings at issue is automatically void, or there is no 
infringement at all.  
Consequently, it makes no difference whether the infringement of the public 
policy rule was flagrant or not.’514 
Following the discussion above, it is therefore highly reasonably believed that once 
an anti-competitive behaviour is condemnable under EU competition law, it is 
serious enough to trigger public policy defence. As for an enforcing court within the 
EU, it is self-evident that the mechanism of Article V(2)(b) would be activated to 
protect the Member State’s competition public policy since as concluded above that 
EU competition law forms part of EU Member States’ public policy.515 As for a non-
EU enforcing court, it has been opined above that for those non-EU jurisdictions 
which are driven by their own public policy to respect EU competition public policy 
or generalise EU competition law as conveying a general competition value which 
they also cherish as their own public policy, they would also have the incentive to 
ensure that relevant EU competition law issues have been duly reviewed 516 . 
Therefore, once the severity of the non-application of relevant EU competition law 
could be established and recognised by a non-EU enforcing court517 of this kind, 
                                                          
514  The Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-567/14 Genentech v. Hoechst, 
EU:C:2016:177, at paras. 65-66. Emphasis added. 
515 See supra Section I(A)(1) of this Chapter. 
516 See supra Section I(A)(2) of this Chapter.  
517 It should be noted here that the non-EU enforcing court may not actually apply EU competition 
law in examining the severity of the non-application issue as it has no obligation to ensure the 
compliance of the award to EU competition law but merely the incentive to confirm that relevant 
competition law has been duly and reasonably examined. Therefore, the examination of the severity of 
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such non-application could also trigger the public policy defence under Article 
V(2)(b) before it.  
2. Misapplication of EU competition law and awards running contrary to 
authorities’ decisions 
Moreover, as for the misapplication of EU competition law and awards running 
counter to Commission or NCAs decisions, it should be noted that the terms 
‘misapplication’ and ‘running counter’ could be defined in two plausible ways. The 
first interprets them as the application of EU competition law deviates from the 
reasonable understanding of relevant provisions or decisions. As implied by the 
French Cour de Cassation in SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV, under the context of 
international commercial arbitration, the misapplication of EU competition law 
should reach the level of being ‘flagrant, effective and concrete’518. Therefore, the 
misapplication of EU competition law and an award running contrary to a 
Commission or NCA decision should thus be interpreted as a manifest violation of 
EU competition law. On the other hand, the second definition understands them as 
the mere difference of application between an arbitral tribunal and a reviewing court 
or the Commission or a relevant NCA. In other words, as long as the arbitral 
tribunal’s application is not in full accord with the reviewing court or the 
Commission or the relevant NCA decision, no matter how slight the difference is, 
there would be a misapplication of relevant EU competition law. 
The essence of the difference of these two plausible definitions lies in the difference 
of the viewpoints on the extent of the allowed divergence of the application of EU 
competition law. As for the first definition, the application of EU competition law 
allows a certain level of flexibility and discretion – the application could be different 
as long as they are all within a reasonable range. Conversely, as for the second, the 
application of EU competition law is based on the premise that it should be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
the non-application of relevant EU competition law may not be conducted by applying EU 
competition law but the non-EU enforcing state’s competition law, and therefore ‘be recognised’ by 
the non-EU enforcing court. For further discussion, see infra Section II(C)(2)(a) of this Chapter. 
518 French Cour de Cassation (1re Ch. civile), Société SNF v. Société Cytec Industries BV, 4 juin 2008. 
The original text is ‘flagrante, effective et concrète’. The translation is provided in Luca G. Radicati di 
Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-044. 
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conducted under a precise standard – there will always be a ‘correct’ answer to the 
application of EU competition law. 
One might, based upon common sense, reckon that the correctness of an application 
implies such an exclusivity: except a specific correct application, there would be no 
other possibly correct options. The ECJ’s decision in Amministrazione Delle Finanze 
Dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A. seems to support this viewpoint. In this case, the 
ECJ stated that: 
‘[T]he rules of Community law must be fully and uniformly applied in all the 
Member States from the date of their entry into force and for so long as they 
continue in force.’519 
This uniformity as pursued by EU legal order may therefore be plausibly interpreted 
to mean that there should be a specific standard regarding what a correct application 
of EU competition law is, otherwise the EU competition order would not be applied 
uniformly. But this would not be the case in practice. As being pointed out, it would 
be ‘illusory’ to reckon that there would always be a clear distinction between ‘correct’ 
and ‘incorrect’ applications of, not only EU, but also all the non-EU jurisdictions’ 
competition law. It was stated that: 
‘It is naive to believe that, in the presence of a subject matter replete with 
factual and legal complexities, as is the case in most disputes involving 
competition law, there is only one ‘correct’ solution to the issue.’520 
A clear example supporting this viewpoint can be found in Article 3 of Regulation 
1/2003, in which the Council states that, as for Article 82 (now 102 TFEU), ‘Member 
States shall not under this Regulation be precluded from adopting and applying on 
their territory stricter national laws which prohibit or sanction unilateral conduct 
engaged in by undertakings’, which clearly indicates that a stricter application of 
competition law would not be regarded as a wrong application. 
Accordingly, the object of being ‘uniformly applied’ should be interpreted as the 
                                                          
519 Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., [1978] ECR 629, at 
para. 14. Emphasis added. See also, for example, Recital (1) of the Regulation 1/2003. [‘In order to 
establish a system which ensures that competition in the common market is not distorted, Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty must be applied effectively and uniformly in the Community.’] 
520 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-026. 
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competition order in general, but not the specific application of EU competition law. 
As long as the competition order is not distorted or derogated, a certain degree of 
discretion regarding the specific application of EU competition law would be 
approved. Therefore, the first definition should be upheld: the misapplication of EU 
competition law or awards running contrary to relevant decisions should be 
understood as a manifest deviation of understanding from the reasonable application 
of EU competition law. 
Following this definition, again, it could be concluded that only when an arbitral 
tribunal manifestly misapplies relevant EU competition law or renders an arbitral 
award which was clearly contrary to a Commission or NCA decision would public 
policy defence under Article V(2)(b) be activated. Once such clear misapplication or 
contradiction is persuasively established, on the one hand, as for an EU enforcing 
court, such considerable deviation would be intolerable owing to its obligation to 
ensure the full and uniform application of EU competition law,521 and would hence 
trigger the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) of the NYC. On the other 
hand, as for a non-EU enforcing court, as discussed above a non-EU jurisdiction 
which regards competition law as its own public policy and generalises EU 
competition law as conveying a general competition value would also intend to 
ensure that relevant EU competition law issues have been reasonably reviewed.522 
Therefore, the severity of deviation is once established and recognised by a non-EU 
enforcing court of this kind, such misapplication and contradiction could also trigger 
the public policy defence under Article V(2)(b) before it. 
II. Examining the behavioural pattern of enforcing courts reviewing 
potential breaches of EU competition law 
Having established the link between EU competition law and enforcing states’ public 
policy and introduced the basic modalities of potential breaches of EU competition 
law as reflected in arbitral awards as well as whether a violation of EU competition 
                                                          
521 Case 106/77, Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A., [1978] ECR 629, at 
para. 14. 
522 See supra Section I(A)(2) of this Chapter.  
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law would be serious enough to trigger public policy defence under Article V(2)(b), 
the two questions posed above 523can now be examined. 
These two questions, from the author’s viewpoint, essentially concern that how well 
the prima facie reviewing standard, while being fully in line with the pro-
enforcement principle, could satisfy the enforcing court’s obligation under relevant 
public policy concern. Therefore, before reviewing the applicability of the prima 
facie reviewing standard in the context of arbitral awards concerning EU competition 
law, it is critical first to understand what an enforcing court is required to do under 
the concern of protecting competition legal order.  
A. The obligation borne by an enforcing court under the connection 
between EU competition law and its competition public policy concerns 
1. The obligation of EU enforcing court 
As for an EU enforcing court, since EU competition law plays a significant role in 
the legal order of the EU,524 it is naturally expected that an obligation to ensure the 
adequate and reasonable application of EU competition law would be borne by an 
EU enforcing court. As clearly stated in Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European 
Union: 
‘Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member 
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks 
which flow from the Treaties. 
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, 
                                                          
523 i.e. first, when relevant competition law issues have been examined by the tribunal, 
whether the enforcing court should fully trust the tribunal’s decision without reviewing the 
reasoning and merits of dispute; and secondly, when relevant competition law issues were 
not examined by the tribunal, whether the enforcing court should dig into the merits of 
dispute to determine the existence of serious violations of competition law or merely decide 
the fate of the award based upon the information reflected in the award.  
524 See supra Section I(A)(1) of this Chapter. See also, for example, Hans van Houtte, Arbitration and 
Arts.81 and 82 EC Treaty – A State of Affairs, ASA Bulletin, Vol.23, Issue 3, 2005, at p. 432. [‘EC 
competition law aims at maintaining competition in the European market. It furthers social cohesion, 
protection of small and medium firms, promotion of regional and industrial policy and enhancement 
of the international competitiveness of European firms. These goals belong to the ‘public policy’, the 
fundamental principles and core values of the European Union.’] (Original footnote omitted). See also 
Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV [1999] ECR I-3055, at paras. 
36 to 40; Case 102/81, Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei v. Reederei Mond [1982] ECR 1095, at 
para. 14.  
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to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union. 
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and 
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
Union’s objectives.’525 
More specifically, as for Article 101 and 102 TFEU, it was potently opined that: 
‘Article 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU are … fundamental provisions which are 
essential for the functioning of the internal market, without which the 
European Union would not function and the breach of which, whether or not 
flagrant or obvious, would be unacceptable from the standpoint of the EU 
legal order.’526 
Therefore, since it is long-established EU law that the obligations of Article 4(3) are 
borne by all institutions of the state, including its courts527; and EU competition law 
is clearly a fundamental part of EU law, EU Member States shall therefore bear the 
obligation to ensure the adequate and reasonable application of EU competition law. 
Moreover, it should be noted that such obligation may also be legitimised by the 
situation that EU Member States are in fact ‘the first instance to have this 
responsibility’ 528  of ‘policing what arbitration tribunals do’ 529  and ‘ensure their 
compliance with EC competition law’530 since the ECJ has clearly stated in Nordsee 
Deutsche Hochseefischerei that arbitral tribunals are not to be considered as courts or 
tribunals within the meaning of 177 TEC (now 267 TFEU) and they could not 
therefore refer questions to the European Court for preliminary rulings.531 Therefore, 
as Advocate General Wathelet held in his opinion in Genentech v. Hoechst: 
‘[T]he system for reviewing the compatibility of international arbitral awards 
                                                          
525 Emphasis added. 
526  The Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-567/14 Genentech v. Hoechst, 
EU:C:2016:177, at footnote 46.  
527 E.g. the obligation of interprétation conforme. See Case C-106/89 Marleasing v. La Commercial 
International de Alimentacion [1990] ECR I-435.  
528 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 203. 
529 Ibid. 
530 Ibid, at p. 204. 




with substantive EU law through the public policy reservation, whether in the 
context of an action against recognition and enforcement or an action for 
annulment, shifts responsibility for the review downstream, namely to the 
courts of the Member States, rather than upstream, to arbitral tribunals.’532 
It therefore follows these thoughts that an EU enforcing court bears a considerable 
onus in the task of, as the European Council held in the Preamble of the Regulation 
1/2003, ensuring the effective and uniform application of Article 101 and 102.533 
2. The obligation of non-EU enforcing court 
By comparison, and to be expected, the obligation borne by non-EU enforcing courts 
is less heavy as that of an EU enforcing courts, since EU competition law does not 
have the ‘innate’ relationship with their own public policy concern. Therefore, under 
the two scenarios under which EU competition law may trigger the public policy 
concern of a non-EU enforcing court534, as stated above535, a non-EU enforcing court 
would bear only the obligation to ensure that relevant EU competition law issues 
have been duly and reasonably reviewed, but would not to ensure their compliance 
with EU competition law. 
Notably, a distinction could further be made between the obligations borne by a non-
EU enforcing court which merely respects EU competition public policy without 
regarding it as its own public policy and a non-EU enforcing court which generalises 
EU competition law as conveying a general competition value and hence deems EU 
competition law as its own public policy. The respect as shown in the former 
situation would not drive the non-EU enforcing court proactively to examine relevant 
EU competition law issues but rather merely examine relevant issues when raised by 
the parties -- in essence the non-EU enforcing court still not actually building the 
connection between EU competition law and its own public policy. By comparison, 
the respect as shown in the latter situation is an active one which would require the 
                                                          
532  The Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in Case C-567/14 Genentech v. Hoechst, 
EU:C:2016:177, at footnote 60. 
533 Regulation 1/2003, preamble, 1st indent.  
534 i.e. the scenario that a non-EU enforcing court is driven by its own public policy to respect other 
jurisdiction’s public policy so that it would respect EU competition public policy once a manifest 
violation of it is spotted, and the scenario that a non-EU enforcing state generalises EU competition 
law as conveying a general competition value which it also cherishes.  
535 See supra Section I(C) of this Chapter. 
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non-EU enforcing court actively to examine relevant public policy concern as it 
considers that its own public interest is drawn into the fray.  
B. Revisit the prima facie reviewing standard on arbitral awards concerning 
EU competition law disputes: challenge the orthodoxy 
With the obligations of both EU and non-EU enforcing courts being summarised, the 
next step is to examine whether the prima facie reviewing standard could fulfil these 
obligations. 
According to the prima facie reviewing standard, when encountering a query of the 
legality of an arbitral award concerning an EU competition law dispute, an enforcing 
court should, as the Cour d’appel de Paris did in SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV, 
not delve into the merits of dispute but merely conducted prima facie review on the 
award, i.e. ‘only verify whether the tribunal gave consideration to the relevant 
competition law issues at all, without, however, undertaking a review of the merits of 
the tribunal’s analysis’536. Once the enforcing court could affirm that the tribunal has 
examined the competition law issues, it should then approve the enforcement of the 
award without further probing the award’s reasoning. This prima facie approach as 
applied by the Cour d’appel de Paris was subsequently vigorously approved by the 
French Cour de Cassation, which stated that: 
‘The latter [the Cour d’appel de Paris] having reviewed the awards in the 
light of the application of Community competition law within the limits of its 
powers, i.e. without review of the merits, it correctly held that their 
recognition and enforcement did not violate international public policy.’537 
                                                          
536 Gordon Blanke (2007), op. cit., supra note 24, at 52. 
537 French Cour de Cassation (1re Ch. civile), Société SNF v. Société Cytec Industries BV, 4 juin 2008. 
The original text is [‘que celle-ci, qui a procédé — dans les limites de ses pouvoirs, c'est-à-dire sans 
révision au fond de la sentence arbitrale — au contrôle des sentences au regard de l'application des 
règles communautaires de la concurrence, a exactement dit que leur reconnaissance et leur exécution 
n'étaient pas contraire à l'ordre public international’]. The translation is provided in Luca G. Radicati 
di Brozolo (2011) op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-044. Emphasis added. For views supporting this 
approach, see, for example, A. Komninos, Paris Court of Appeal refuses to set aside arbitral award for 
public policy violation, White & Case International Dispute Resolution, Vol.17, No.4, 2004, at 2-3. 
Also, the U.S. Supreme Court’s judgment in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth seems to support 
this viewpoint as the Court stated that ‘[h]aving permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national 
courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the 
legitimate interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed’. Here one could clearly 
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Moreover, following the prima facie review, even when an enforcing court finds that 
the arbitral tribunal actually failed to examine relevant EU competition law issues, it 
should merely run a prima facie review on the basic information as shown in the 
award to judge (or sometimes, speculate) whether there is a serious violation of EU 
competition law or a clear discrepancy to authoritative decisions. This was the 
approach applied by the Cour d'appel de Paris in Thalès538 which concerns the non-
aplication of EU competition law scenario. In this case, the Court followed the prima 
facie approach and refused to examine on the merits of dispute but merely decide 
whether there was a serious violation of (now) Article 101 TFEU by reading the 
award.  
By applying this prima facie approach, the enforcing court does almost nothing but 
merely confirms that relevant issues have already been examined by the tribunal. 
Even under the scenario that the arbitral tribunal failed to examine relevant EU 
competition law issues, the enforcing court would not dig into the merits but solely 
rely upon the information contained in the award to decide (or more likely speculate) 
whether there is a serious violation of EU competition law. This behavioural pattern 
hence invites the query that how fully trusting an arbitral tribunal’s decision or 
merely judging from the manifestation of an arbitral award could fulfil an enforcing 
court’s obligation to, as revealed above, at least ensure that relevant competition law 
issues have been not only duly, but more importantly, reasonably, reviewed.  
1. The  fulfilment of obligation may require an enforcing court to act more 
proactively than fully trusting arbitral tribunal’s decision on competition 
law issues 
The first scenario to be examined concerns that the arbitral tribunal has already 
examined and decided on relevant EU competition law issues, and the query is that 
whether fully trusting arbitral tribunal’s decision would fulfil an enforcing court’s 
obligation under their public policy concern. 
This should not be the case before an EU enforcing court, as the EU enforcing 
                                                                                                                                                                    
see that the emphasis of the Court was placed upon whether relevant competition law issues have been 
addressed but not whether they were reasonably examined.  
538 See, for example, SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE Euromissile, Cour d'appel de Paris (1re Ch. C), 
Not Indicated, 18 November 2004. 
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court’s obligation would be to ensure the effective and uniform application of EU 
competition law, which is, at least from the viewpoint of the author, a rather active 
obligation which would require an EU enforcing court to do more than fully trusting 
an arbitral tribunal’s decision. A careful perusal of the ECJ’s ruling in Eco Swiss 
would reveal that an EU enforcing court should bear a more proactive responsibility 
in reviewing arbitral awards concerning EU competition law. In this case, the ECJ 
did bear in mind that, 
‘it is in the interest of efficient arbitration proceedings that review of 
arbitration awards should be limited in scope and that annulment of or refusal 
to recognise an award should be possible only in exceptional 
circumstances’539 
However, after recognising the limited application of the refusal of enforcement, the 
ECJ emphasised on the fundamental nature of (now) Article 101 TFEU and 
categorised this Article as a matter of public policy within the meaning of Article 
V(2)(b) of the NYC, and further stated that, 
‘Community law requires that questions concerning the interpretation of the 
prohibition laid down in Article 85(1) of the Treaty should be open to 
examination by national courts when asked to determine the validity of an 
arbitration award’540 
Although the ECJ did not in this case go further clearly to make its standpoint on 
what specific behavioural pattern an EU enforcing court should apply when 
reviewing arbitral awards concerning EU competition law, it sent a clear message: 
EU competition law (or more specifically Article 101 TFEU), as part of EU Member 
States’ public policy, requires EU Member States to stay more active to examine but 
not be satisfied by the mere fact that relevant competition law issues have already 
been examined by the arbitral tribunal.  
Notwithstanding, one might argues that requiring a more in-depth review of awards 
concerning EU competition law essentially ‘conflicts with the desire of the parties to 
                                                          
539 Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time v. Benetton International [1999] ECR I-3055, at para. 35.  
540 Ibid, at para. 40. Emphasis added.  
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opt for a one-shot, streamlined dispute settlement mechanism’541. But it should also 
be remembered that the essential purpose of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC is to provide 
an enforcing state the opportunity to protect what constitutes its own fundamental 
public interest. Although based upon the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention 
Article V(2)(b) should be narrowly interpreted and strictly applied, this public policy 
defence should not be understood as a mere superficial ground. Instead, when a 
specific public interest passes the narrow-interpretation test and is deemed as public 
policy within the meaning of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC, its protection would 
essentially prevail and the enforcing court should be able to act as the gatekeeper and 
do what is needed to make sure relevant public policy is not breached. In other words, 
the compliance with the pro-enforcement principle should not be fulfilled at the price 
of sacrificing the protection of public interests.  
Therefore, since relevant EU competition law provisions are firmly and widely 
recognised as EU Member States’ public policy and the protection of EU 
competition legal order inevitably requires an EU enforcing state to ensure the 
effective and uniform application of EU competition law, it should then be allowed 
to ‘ensure’, which clearly refers to a more proactive reviewing behaviour than merely 
following the tribunal’s decision. Hence, as could be seen in Almelo, the ECJ clearly 
held that, 
‘It follows from the principles of the primacy of Community law and of its 
uniform application, in conjunction with Article 5 of the Treaty, that a court 
of a Member State to which an appeal against an arbitration award is made 
pursuance to national law must, even where it gives judgment having regard 
to fairness, observe the rules of Community law, in particular those relating 
to competition.’542 
Following this judgment, Advocate General Saggio, in his opinion in Eco Swiss 
delivered in 1999, also opined that, 
‘[A]s the Court recognized in the course of its judgment in Almelo … the 
need to supervise arbitration awards to ensure that they are compatible with 
                                                          
541 Damien Geradin (2016) op. cit., supra note 461, at 18. 
542 Case C-393/92, Gemeente Almelo and Others v. Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij NV [1994] ECR I-1477, 
at para. 23.  Emphasis added. 
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Community law is particularly great in an area, such as competition, where 
there is a general interest in observance of the rules to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the common market.’543 
In a recent case544, the Danish Højesteret rejected a challenge of an EU competition 
law award on the ground that it violated Article 101 and was hence contrary to public 
policy. In this case, the Højesteret did not comment on the logic of the reasoning and 
concluded that the award is not in violation of the EU competition law rules merely 
based upon its observation that the tribunal has given sufficient consideration to the 
relevant EU competition law issues. It was then questioned whether this approach 
may actually fail to ‘detect a potential manifest violation of the EU competition 
law’545 as well as fail to ‘safeguard the effectiveness of [the] private enforcement [of 
EU competition law] through arbitration’546. 
Notwithstanding, as far as a non-EU enforcing court is concerned, it may be less 
certain that a prima facie reviewing standard would be insufficient since the 
obligation borne by a non-EU enforcing court would be less heavy than that of borne 
by an EU enforcing court – the non-EU enforcing court would merely be obliged to 
ensure that relevant competition law issues have been duly and reasonably reviewed. 
It would, however, be rather difficult to envisage that how an enforcing court could, 
by merely relying upon the fact that relevant competition law issues have been 
examined, reach the conclusion that relevant competition law issues have been duly 
and reasonably reviewed -- the mere confirmation that the arbitral tribunal has 
examined on relevant competition law issues would not per se guarantee the quality 
of the examination.  
2. The fact-intensity of competition law disputes may require an enforcing 
court to dig deeper than merely reading the award 
                                                          
543 The Opinion of Advocate General Saggio in Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton 
International NV [1999] ECR 631, at 661. Emphasis added. 
544 Taewoong Inc. v. AH Industries A/S (142/2014) ruling of the Danish Supreme Court (s. 2) of 28 
January 2016, available online in an unofficial English translation on the official website of the 
Danish Institute of Arbitration at http://voldgiftsinstituttet.dk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/danish-
supreme-court_s-judgment-of-28-january-2016.pdf (Retrieved: 2018-10-08) 
545 Gordon Blanke, Case Comment – Danish Supreme Court rejects challenge of EU competition law 
award on grounds of public policy, Global Competition Litigation Review, Vol.10, Issue 2, 2017, at R-
21. 
546 Ibid.  
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The second scenario to be looked at is that relevant competition law issues have not 
been examined by the arbitral tribunal. Following the conclusion drawn above that an 
enforcing court should be allowed to protect its public interest and both an EU and 
non-EU enforcing courts would at least be obliged to ensure that relevant 
competition law issues have been reasonably and duly examined, there is no question 
that under the scenario of the non-application of EU competition law an enforcing 
court should be able to rule on relevant competition law issues and determine 
whether there would be a serious violation of competition public policy. 
Notwithstanding, it is debatable whether the enforcing court should determine the 
fate of the award by merely reading the information revealed in the award without 
digging into the merits of the dispute.  
The strongest argument made by the proponents of the prima facie reviewing 
standard is that prima facie review would be sufficient to reveal any manifest 
violation of competition law. As opined: 
‘Where the violation is not prima facie apparent from a perusal of the 
award … it is unlikely that the award can be so seriously flawed as to entail 
an actual violation of public policy. Even if such a review were not to weed 
out all awards that could be conceived to endorse an incorrect application of 
competition rules, this would not per se be fatal to competition policy.’547 
Although seemingly persuasive, this may not always be the case as the legitimacy of 
this conclusion would rely largely upon the level of vigilance and sensitivity of an 
enforcing court on the existence of relevant anti-competitive behaviour548 or the clear 
deviation from the reasonable application of competition law549, which, however, 
may not be consistently observed. As may be seen in SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE 
Euromissile, the Cour d’appel de Paris, by showing solid trust in prima facie review, 
refrained from examining the merits of the dispute and decided that the non-
application of EU competition law in arbitrating the dispute which was based upon a 
                                                          
547 Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo (2011), op. cit., supra note 24, at para. 22-032. 
548 As under the circumstance of non-application of competition law. 
549 As under the circumstance of manifest misapplication of competition law and contradiction to 
previous authoritative decisions.  
165 
 
market-sharing agreement did not violate EU’s fundamental public interests.550 This 
conclusion was subsequently sharply criticised.551 
Moreover, and more pertinently, even a decent level of vigilance and sensitivity 
could be generally maintained in legal practice, such prima facie review would 
merely guarantee the capture of hard-core violations of competition law, i.e. 
violations of competition law ‘by object’, whilst to a certain extent leave soft-core 
violations, i.e. violations of competition law ‘by effect’, undetected owing to the 
strong fact-intensity of competition law caused by the economic nature of it.552 From 
the perspective of EU competition law, as held in Commission Staff Working Paper 
accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for breach of the EC antitrust 
rules: 
‘Competition cases are particularly fact-intensive. The finding of an antitrust 
infringement, the determination of damages and the establishment of the 
relevant causal links all require the assessment of a variety of often complex 
factual elements. 
… 
[I]t is important to recall that cases on antitrust damages often require an 
unusually complex assessment of economic interrelations and effects.’553 
                                                          
550 SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE Euromissile, Cour d’appel de Paris (1re Ch. C), Not Indicated, 18 
November 2004. 
551 Therefore, it was opined that ‘it is doubtful whether a limited review of facts is compatible with EC 
law; even more doubt may reign with respect to the prima facie test’: Christoph Liebscher, The 
Healthy Award – Challenge in International Commercial Arbitration, Kluwer Law International, 2003, 
at p. 61. For scholars criticising the Cour d’appel de Paris’s approach, see, for example, Mihail 
Danov, Jurisdiction and Judgments in Relation to EU Competition Law Claims, Hart Publishing, 2011, 
at p. 267. [‘But if a market-sharing agreement is not enough justification for the French court to check 
whether an arbitral award is not based on a contract that is void under Arts 101 and/or 102 TFEU, 
then it is difficult to see what will be.’]; Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at pp. 201-204; 
Emmanuel Gaillard, Extent of Court Review of Public Policy, New York Law Journal, Vol.237, No.65, 
2007.   
552 Diederik de Groot (2011), op. cit., supra note 504, at para. 16-050. See also, for example, C‑453/99, 
Courage v. Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297, at para. 27. (‘Indeed, the existence of such a right strengthens 
the working of the Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices, which are 
frequently covert …’) It was also reckoned that the ‘instances where a breach of EU competition law 
is “obvious” and “flagrant” will not be common’. See Damien Geradin (2016) op. cit., supra note 461, 
at 7. 
553 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper on Damages Actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules, at paras. 65 and 88. Emphasis added. See also, for example, Damien Geradin 
(2016) op. cit., supra note 461, at 7. (‘With limited exceptions, it is rare that a given agreement or 
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Moreover, from a more general observation of competition law around the world,  
‘Antitrust analysis is becoming increasingly complex …. [A]dvances in 
industrial organization (and economics more generally) have rendered 
antitrust a more mathematically rigorous and technically demanding field … 
There is now little doubt that complex economic and econometric analyses 
are standard fare in modern antitrust litigation.’554 
Therefore, as opined, ‘by effect’ anti-competitive conducts may ‘not ordinarily 
become apparent based on a prima facie assessment’555. Where it is not possible to 
confirm that the object of an agreement is to restrict competition, ‘a full analysis of 
the agreement in its market context must be carried out before it is possible to 
determine whether its effect is to restrict competition’556. For both an EU and a non-
EU enforcing court of which the obligation is at least to ensure that relevant 
competition law issues have been duly and reasonably reviewed, the fact-intensity of 
competition law would therefore reasonably require them to rely more than the 
superficial information revealed in an award to determine whether the enforcement 
of the award would violate relevant competition public policy. Notably, the need for 
an in-depth review of the award when necessary for ensuring that it is in line with 
relevant public policy is also recognised by the International Law Association in its 
final report on public policy as a bar to enforcement of international arbitral awards: 
‘When the violation of a public policy rule of the forum alleged by a party 
cannot be established from a mere review of the award and could only 
become apparent upon a scrutiny of the facts of the case, the court should be 
allowed to undertake such reassessment of the facts.’557 
                                                                                                                                                                    
practice can be declared incompatible with EU competition law without an in-depth analysis of the 
factual context of the alleged infringement, as well as its economic effects.’) 
554 Michael R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist 
Judges? The Impact of Economic Complexity & Judicial Training on Appeals, Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 54, No. 1, 2011, at 1-3.  
555 Tobias Zuberbühler & Christian Oetiker (Eds.), Practical Aspects of Arbitrating EC Competition 
Law, Schulthess Verlag, 2007, at p. 26. 
556 R. Whish & D. Bailey (2018) op. cit., supra note 311, at p. 134. See also, for example, Phillip 
Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at p. 216; Case 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin [1967] 
ECR 407, at 415; Case 234/89 Delimitis v. Henninger Bräu AG [1991] ECR I-935, at para. 13.  
557  Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, Arbitration International, Vol. 19, Issue 2, 2003, 
at 262.  
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C. Proposing new reviewing patterns of enforcing courts examining 
potential breaches of EU competition law 
Following the analysis above, it could hence be reasonably concluded that prima 
facie reviewing pattern, although being in line with the pro-enforcement principle, 
may not fulfil the obligation borne by an enforcing court under its public policy 
concern as such reviewing pattern may be ‘excessively liberal or as driven by a pro-
arbitration bias and perhaps even at odds with the thinking of competition law 
enforcers’558.  
A new behavioural pattern of an enforcing court reviewing an arbitral award 
concerning EU competition law issues should hence be proposed, and this is where 
the second uncertainty was raised, namely the specific behavioural pattern an 
enforcing court should apply. Notably, as for the reviewing pattern of an enforcing 
court examining such an arbitral award, three key factors merit particular attention. 
The first concerns whether an enforcing court should raise a potential breach of EU 
competition law ex proprio motu or examine the breach only when it is raised by the 
parties. The second is the extent of an enforcing court examining the merits of 
dispute: could/should an enforcing court re-examine the merits as shown in the case 
freely or under certain restrictions? The third concerns the applicable law, namely the 
law an enforcing court applies when examining a potential breach of EU competition 
law.  
Notably, although it has been discussed above that the prima facie reviewing 
standard may not protect relevant competition public policy well, a proposal on the 
new reviewing patterns should not run in the utterly opposite direction. Instead, the 
proposal should try to strike the optimal balance between the undebatable pro-
enforcement principle and the protection of competition public policy. Therefore, as 
could be seen below, the new reviewing patterns would not allow an enforcing court 
unlimitedly to dig into the merits of disputes but attempt to find the ideal balancing 
point.  
1. The reviewing pattern of an EU enforcing court examining potential 
                                                          
558 Luca G. Radicati Di Brozolo, Antitrust: a paradigm of the relations between mandatory rules and 




breaches of EU competition law 
The first scenario to be considered is an EU enforcing court examining potential 
breaches of EU competition law. 
a. Non-application of EU competition law 
Under the scenario of the non-application of EU competition law, an EU enforcing 
court may notice not only the probability of a failure to apply EU competition law 
based upon parties’ claims, but based also upon its own observation by questioning 
that there may be a conduct as described in Article 101 or 102 TFEU559 but the 
arbitral tribunal has not examined it, or such examination is not reflected in the 
award. This then triggers the examination of the first issue as listed above, namely 
whether the EU enforcing court should, when suspecting or spotting non-application 
of EU competition law, carry on examining the severity of relevant behaviour ex 
proprio motu even when the parties do not raise the issue.  
The obligation borne by the EU enforcing court would suggest it should proactively 
raise and examine relevant competition law issues. The rationale is rather 
straightforward as an EU enforcing court is obliged to ensure the full and uniform 
application of EU competition law, which is essentially a positive obligation 
requiring an EU enforcing court to perform proactively. Therefore, once the EU 
enforcing court suspects a non-application violation which, as analysed above560, has 
the potential of violating EU competition law, it should be able to carry on 
determining the severity of the potentially anti-competitive behaviour and determine 
the fate of the arbitral award.  
Once a non-application violation is on the table, the next issue is the extent to which 
an EU enforcing court should probe the merits of the dispute to examine relevant 
competition law issues. Generally, on a spectrum of which the opposing ends are the 
finality and legality of an arbitral award, the more a tribunal has examined and 
showed it has done so in the award rendered, the less legitimate and necessary an in-
                                                          
559 It should be noted that the behaviour as mentioned here refers merely to the manifestation of those 
behaviours, i.e. the agreement, decision, practice and exploitation of dominant position which may 
trigger relevant competition law concerns. It does not refer to the anti-competitive behaviour which 
actually breaches EU competition law. 
560 See supra Section I(C) of this Chapter.  
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depth review for the enforcement court, and the more the pointer on the spectrum 
would move towards the finality end. In the case as discussed here, non-application 
of EU competition law means that the arbitral tribunal, no matter what the reasons 
are, showed no evidence of examination of relevant competition law issues in the 
arbitral award. Therefore, the pointer on the spectrum would move towards the 
legality end, and it is fully legitimate for the EU enforcing court to probe the merits 
of the dispute to the extent that it could determine adequately the severity of the 
existing potentially anti-competitive behaviour. 
Last but not least, as for the law applicable to the enforcing court’s examination, it is 
unquestionably the case that EU competition law should be applied, since EU 
competition law has been incorporated into EU Member States’ national competition 
law561 and EU enforcing courts are obliged to ensure the full and uniform application 
of EU competition law. 
b. Misapplication of EU competition law 
As for the misapplication of EU competition law, an EU enforcing court may also 
likewise notice the existence of a clear deviation from the reasonable application of 
EU competition law pursuant either to the claims of the parties or through its own 
observation by perusing the arbitral award in which the examination of relevant EU 
competition law is presented. Hence, as discussed above, since an EU enforcing 
court bears the obligation to assure the compliance of an arbitral award with EU 
competition law, it should be able to raise and examine its concern on potential 
misapplication of EU competition law even ex proprio motu.  
It is otherwise in the event of misapplication of EU competition law, following an 
examination of the relevant EU competition law issues by the tribunal. On the 
aforesaid spectrum, the pointer would move towards the finality end, and it would 
thus be inappropriate for the EU enforcing court to dig freely into the merits of the 
dispute. In this case, it is therefore proposed that if the enforcing court suspects the 
potential misapplication of EU competition law, the starting point of its examination 
should be the reasoning evident in the arbitral award but not the examination on the 
merits of dispute. The EU enforcing court should first peruse the reasoning given by 
                                                          
561 See supra Section I(A)(1) of this Chapter.  
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the tribunal and consider the following options: if the reasoning could lead 
sufficiently and logically to the conclusions drawn by the tribunal without a clear 
deviation from the basic facts of the case, the award should be enforced; if the 
reasoning cannot or it greatly deviates from the facts of the case which could 
plausibly lead to the result of the determination, the enforcing court should be able to 
examine the substance of the dispute to the extent that it could reasonably reach a 
conclusion on whether the arbitral award has greatly deviated from a reasonable 
application of EU competition law.  
c. Awards running contrary to authoritative decisions 
Last but not least, as for the scenario of an arbitral award potentially running contrary 
to a Commission or NCA decision on the same anti-competitive behaviour, such 
violation could also either be spotted by an EU enforcing court562 or raised by the 
parties, and following the rationale as discussed above an EU enforcing court should 
be able to raise its concern on potential contradiction even ex proprio motu, and 
examine the level of the discrepancy between the award and relevant previous 
authoritative decision under EU competition law. 
Notably, pursuant to the allegation that an arbitral award runs counter to a previous 
authoritative decision, the conflict does not lie in the deviation between the award 
and the reasonable application of EU competition law, but rests mainly with the 
discrepancy between the award and a previous authoritative decision. It is therefore 
proposed that the EU enforcing court should then merely make a comparison 
between the award and the previous authoritative decision and touch upon the merits 
of dispute to the extent it could reasonably judge on the level of the discrepancy 
between these two. 
Notwithstanding, this conclusion is based upon a key prerequisite, namely the default 
correctness of Commission and NCAs decisions. A much trickier situation may 
occur when such default correctness was challenged by either the parties (e.g. the 
                                                          
562 In legal practice, the author opines that it would be less likely that an EU enforcing court would 
always be aware of a specific Commission or NCA decision, and the latter scenario, i.e. a party raises 
the discrepancy between an arbitral award and relevant authoritative decision, would hence be much 
more commonly observed. However, since it is still practically possible (especially when the involved 
anti-competitive behaviour has been examined and ruled by the NCA of the enforcing state), it would 
still be discussed here.  
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losing party may argue at enforcement stage that the arbitral award runs counter to a 
previous NCA or Commission decision, but the winning party counter that the 
previous NCA or Commission decision was actually erroneous) and the arbitral 
tribunal (e.g. the arbitral tribunal may be aware of the previous NCA or Commission 
decision but still render an award running contrary to it by disagreeing with the 
decision). Under these circumstances, the question is raised: should the EU enforcing 
court then simply ignore such challenge and refuse to enforce the arbitral award? 
The author considers that, as discussed above, since that NCAs and the Commission 
act essentially as the authoritative guardian of EU competition law, 563  decisions 
made by them should attract a very strong presumption that relevant EU competition 
law issues have been reasonably and duly reviewed. Compliance with those 
decisions would hence be legitimate as a default choice, leaving very limited space 
for an EU enforcing court to query the legitimacy of those decisions. Nonetheless, 
meanwhile, it should still be noted that Commission or NCAs decisions may not 
always be beyond reproach. In a recent judgment of the ECJ, a Commission decision 
on the compatibility of a merger with the internal market was overruled.564 Moreover, 
it can also be seen in, for example, the 2008 White Paper on damages565 that in all 
member states, NCA decisions are subject to judicial review, so if unchallenged are 
binding for the addressees of the decision (as res judicata) but are not necessarily 
legally correct. 
Accordingly, since EU enforcing courts are obliged to ensure EU competition law’s 
full and uniform application and should therefore not act merely as the follower of 
Commission or NCAs decisions, once an authoritative decision was challenged by an 
arbitral tribunal, an EU enforcing court should not simply ignore such challenge and 
refuse to enforce the arbitral award.  
The author hence suggests that a more sophisticated solution would be first to 
analyse the parties’ or the arbitral award’s reasoning regarding such challenge. If the 
reasoning is untenable or excessively terse which could not justify the conclusion the 
tribunal drew, a basic trust should be shown to the Commission or the relevant NCA 
                                                          
563 See supra Section I(B)(3) of this Chapter.  
564 Case T-394/15, KPN BV v. European Commission, EU:T:2017:756.  




decision and the arbitral award should be refused enforcement. Only if the reasoning 
is actually plausible and it could reasonably be doubted that the authoritative 
decision is clearly erroneous should the EU enforcing court step forward to examine 
the legitimacy of the arbitral award. 
More specifically, by considering the practical relationship between EU national 
courts and the Commission/NCAs, as for a challenge of a Commission decision, 
although EU Member States’ national courts cannot overrule Commission 
decisions566, it should be noted that Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that 
‘The Court of Justice shall have the unlimited jurisdiction to review decisions 
whereby the Commission has fixed a fine or periodic penalty payment. It may cancel, 
reduce or increase the fine or periodic penalty payment imposed’. Following this 
provision, it could hence be expected that when a national court of an EU Member 
State suspects that the relevant Commission decision might be erroneous, it could 
then activate the jurisdiction it enjoys under Article 267 TFEU and invite the Court 
of Justice to consider the validity of the decision. Unlike the action of annulment 
under Article 263 TFEU, there is no time bar. It should be re-emphasised here that 
since a relevant EU competition law issue has already been examined by the 
Commission and it would be a considerable delay for the enforcement of arbitral 
award by considering the caseload of the ECJ and the inherent complexity of 
competition law case, by bearing the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention in mind, 
an enforcing court deciding to refer the issue to the ECJ ought first to ensure that the 
errors in the Commission decision are so plausible and significant that it may 
actually need to postpone the enforcement and prioritise the legitimacy of the arbitral 
award.  
Moreover, as for a challenge of an NCA decision,  
 if the decision is final, namely that the decision ‘can no longer be reviewed, i.e. 
decision that were not appealed within the applicable time limits and thus 
accepted by their addressees, and those that were confirmed by the competent 
                                                          
566 See Article 16(1) of Regulation 1/2003. (‘When national courts rule on agreements, decisions or 
practices under Article 81 or Article 82 of the Treaty which are already the subject of a Commission 
decision, they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission. They 
must also avoid giving decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the 




- if the relevant NCA is the competition authority of the enforcing state, 
Directive 2014/104/EU requires the enforcing court to treat the NCA 
decision as ‘irrefutably established’568, but the enforcing court could still 
refer the issue to the ECJ for preliminary ruling on the interpretation of 
relevant involved EU competition law issues.569 Again, only when the 
erroneous of the NCA decision is serious and plausibly established should 
the enforcing court refer the relevant issues to the ECJ. 
- If the relevant NCA is the competition authority of another EU Member 
State, the enforcing court can review the legitimacy of the NCA 
decision.570 Notably, this Article requires the enforcing court to treat the 
NCA decision as ‘at least prima facie evidence that an infringement of 
competition law has occurred’. Hence, by also considering the pro-
enforcement bias of the Convention, an error in an NCA decision should 
be serious and be plausibly adduced so that the enforcing court would 
have a strong enough incentive to review the decision. 
 If the decision is not final, the EU enforcing court could then act as the reviewing 
court of such decision. Since relevant EU competition law issues have already 
been examined by the ECJ, the enforcing court should be limited to perusal of the 
NCA decision and the evidence adduced by the parties first but not re-examine 
the merits on its own. If it finds that such erroneous is serious and could actually 
be clearly established, the award should be refused for enforcement, otherwise 
the award should be upheld and enforced. 
2. The reviewing pattern of a non-EU enforcing court examining potential 
breaches of EU competition law 
After examining the reviewing pattern of an EU enforcing court examining potential 
breaches of EU competition law, the focus should then switch to the reviewing 
pattern of a non-EU enforcing court. As said above, the scenario of a non-EU 
                                                          
567 White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2008) 165 final, at 
footnote 9. 
568  Directive 2014/104 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for 
infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ 
2014 L349/1, Article 9(1).  
569 Ibid, Article 9(3). 
570 Ibid, Article 9(3) 
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enforcing court examining potential breaches of EU competition law could be further 
divided into two sub-scenarios based upon the enforcing courts’ obligations: a non-
EU enforcing court may generalise EU competition law as conveying a general 
competition value and hence examine relevant competition law issues in a relatively 
proactive way, for relevant violation of EU competition law would also ultimately 
violate its own public policy; or merely deeming as its own public policy the need to 
respect EU competition public policy and thus examine relevant competition law 
issues in a relatively passive way since its competition order would not actually be 
affected. Owing to this the specific reviewing pattern of a non-EU enforcing court 
would largely depend on its specific obligation as borne in examining relevant EU 
competition law issues, it would hence be reasonably expected that there would be 
differences regarding the reviewing patterns of these two different types of non-EU 
enforcing courts, and these two scenarios should therefore be examined respectively 
in this section.  
a. Non-application of EU competition law 
The potential breach concerning the non-application of EU competition law will be 
examined first, beginning with a consideration of whether a non-EU enforcing court 
should raise the non-application of EU competition law ex proprio motu even when 
the parties do not raise the issue.  
The answer to this question should be in the affirmative for the non-EU enforcing 
court which generalises EU competition law as conveying a general competition 
value and has the incentive proactively to ensure the arbitral tribunal has duly and 
reasonably examined relevant competition law issues. Therefore, once a non-EU 
enforcing court of this kind suspects the existence of a serious violation of 
competition law which was not examined or reflected in the rendered award, the non-
EU enforcing court should be allowed to continue its examination until it reasonably 
reaches its conclusion concerning the severity of the involved anti-competitive 
behaviour.  
However, it is not clear whether such reasoning could also be applicable under the 
scenario that the non-EU enforcing court merely respects EU competition public 
policy. The author takes the view that since under these circumstances the public 
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interest of the non-EU enforcing court is merely to respect EU competition policy 
and the violation of EU competition law would not actually trigger the competition 
policy concern of the non-EU state, it would thus be more plausible to propose that 
the non-EU enforcing court under this scenario would only examine relevant 
competition law issues when they are raised by the parties, even it does suspect the 
existence of a potential violation of competition law from its own perspective.  
Following the examination on the proactivity of two different types of non-EU 
enforcing court, the next issue would be the extent to which a non-EU enforcing 
court should dig into the merits of the dispute to examine relevant competition law 
issues. As for the non-EU enforcing court which considers a potential violation of 
EU competition law would also trigger its own public policy concerns, since the 
award remains silent on relevant potentially anti-competitive conduct, the pointer on 
the aforementioned spectrum would move towards the legality end, and it is hence 
proposed that the enforcing court should be able to dig into the merits of the dispute 
to the extent it considers necessary. As for the non-EU enforcing court which merely 
respects EU competition public policy, since it was concluded above that a non-EU 
enforcing court of this kind would examine only relevant competition law issues if 
put forward by a party, the target of its examination would hence be confined to only 
the merits as contained in the party’s claim. Two potential consequences would 
follow the examination: if the non-EU enforcing court is persuaded by the parties’ 
claim which manages to prove the high severity of the relevant anti-competitive 
conduct, the non-EU enforcing court would reckon that conduct to violate EU 
competition policy and would thus ultimately violate its own public policy to respect 
EU competition policy, and the enforcement of the arbitral award would hence be 
refused. Moreover, if the non-EU enforcing court is not convinced, the arbitral award 
would then be enforced as the non-EU enforcing court would be assured that relevant 
EU competition policy was not violated, and would thus not violate its own public 
policy to respect EU competition policy.  
Based upon the reviewing pattern proposed above, the last issue to be examined 
concerns the law applicable to the review conducted by a non-EU enforcing court. 
An instinctive response is that the competition law of the non-EU enforcing state 
should be applied since relevant competition law issues are brought before the non-
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EU enforcing court and, as discussed above, the law applicable to an enforcing 
court’s examination on relevant public policy issues is the law of the enforcing 
state. 571  But one might still argue that the relevant potentially anti-competitive 
behaviour as reflected in an arbitral award, if actually being recognised, would 
essentially influence the EU, but not the other states’, competition legal order, and 
EU competition law should thus be applied, especially when considering that 
different jurisdictions may interpret and apply their own competition law in different 
ways and therefore the conclusion drawn by a non-EU enforcing court by applying 
the competition law of the non-EU enforcing state may differ from that in applying 
EU competition law.572 However, first, it should be borne in mind that for a non-EU 
enforcing court, it is not obliged to ensure the compliance of the award with EU 
competition law. Instead, its own public interest, under the situation of a non-
application of EU competition law, would merely be that relevant EU competition 
law has been duly and reasonably reviewed, and such adequacy would hence be 
judged under the perspective of the non-EU enforcing court itself. As correctly stated, 
‘Public policy review is in fact often restricted by operation of a sort of 
negative ‘comity’ in accordance with which ‘courts should refrain from 
applying domestic law to foreign cases’ … Positive comity, the actual 
express taking into account of foreign law, is as yet a rarity.’573  
Secondly, even the possibility that the application of the competition law of the non-
EU enforcing state would reach a conclusion different to that if applying EU 
competition law is also unconvincing, especially when finding that, although the 
difference between different jurisdictions’ competition laws ‘will not disappear 
completely, nor should they’574, ‘professionals in different parts of the world are 
                                                          
571 See supra Section II(B) of Chapter III.  
572 See, for example, Phillip Landolt (2007) op. cit., supra note 463, at 72, in which the author, by 
questioning that non-EU national courts may not adequately and correctly examine relevant EU 
competition law issues, opined that a non-EU enforcing court, when being called for determining the 
legality of an arbitral award concerning EU competition law issues, should not examine the legality of 
the arbitral award by itself but refer the issue to the national court of the EU Member States which has 
the connection with the merits of the dispute for determining whether the arbitral award is in 
conformity with EU competition law.   
573 Ibid, at 71. See also Ulrich Haas, Articles on the 1958 New York Convention in Frank-Bernd 
Weigand (ed.), Practitioner’s Handbook on International Arbitration, Verlag C. H. Beck, Munich, 
2002, at p. 521. 
574 David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust 
Rules, Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2009, at 187.  
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converging in their views on the purpose of competition policy and the economic 
principles that underlie it’575, and there is hence ‘far more similarity among countries 
in their approaches to competition policy’ 576 . One of the most representative 
examples is that, as stated, Swiss competition law is increasingly modelled upon EU 
competition law. 577  It can also be seen from the drafting history that EEC 
competition law provisions also adapted American practice and experience for 
reference.578 Hence, instead of distrusting non-EU jurisdictions in a general way, it 
may seem to be more plausible to assume that, at least for the jurisdictions of which 
their competition laws have certain connections with EU competition law, it would 
be highly likely that the conclusion drawn by applying their own competition laws 
would not differ considerably from that of by applying EU competition law. 
b. Misapplication of EU competition law 
The second scenario to be examined concerns a non-EU enforcing court 
encountering a potential misapplication of EU competition law. As is the case in the 
non-application scenario, the misapplication of EU competition law may also be 
suspected or identified by a non-EU enforcing court, and it follows the reasoning as 
raised above that, for a non-EU enforcing court which generalises EU competition 
law as conveying a general competition value, it should be allowed to examine 
whether the arbitral award actually clearly deviates from a reasonable application of 
competition law; for a non-EU enforcing court which merely has the incentive 
passively to respect EU competition public policy, it would examine relevant 
misapplication only when raised by the parties. 
As for the question of the extent of an enforcing court digging into the merits of a 
dispute, it was discussed above that since under the circumstance of a potential 
misapplication of EU competition law the arbitral award has already touched upon 
the relevant anti-competitive behaviour and the tribunal has ruled on it, it would be 
less legitimate and necessary for the EU enforcing court to re-examine what has been 
                                                          
575 Ibid. 
576 Ibid, at 186.  
577 Phillip Landolt (2006) op. cit., supra note 36, at footnote 81, p.151. 
578 See William Diebold, The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959, Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1959, at 352. See also David J. Gerber (1998) op. cit., supra note 400, at pp. 
337-339; George W. Ball, The Past has Another Pattern: Memoirs, New York: Norton, 1982, at p. 89. 
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examined by the tribunal. This rationale is also applicable for the reviewing pattern 
of a non-EU enforcing court, no matter what specific type the non-EU enforcing 
court is.  
Last but not least, the law applicable to a non-EU enforcing court’s examination on a 
potential misapplication of EU competition law should, as concluded above, be the 
competition law of the non-EU enforcing state: although it is the EU competition 
legal order which is potentially influenced, the non-EU enforcing court’s public 
interest under this scenario is merely to ensure that relevant EU competition law has 
been reasonably examined but not the compliance of the arbitral award with EU 
competition law, and the test would thus be examined under the law of the non-EU 
enforcing state.  
c. Awards running contrary to authoritative decisions 
The last scenario concerns a non-EU enforcing court encountering an arbitral award 
which potentially runs contrary to a Commission or NCA decision. Again, at least 
theoretically, awards running contrary to authoritative decision could be spotted by 
either the non-EU enforcing court or the parties’ claims, although the author opines 
that the former situation would be more rarely observed in legal practice as a non-EU 
enforcing court may not always be aware of a specific Commission or NCA 
decision.579 
Once a potential contradiction between an arbitral award and an authoritative 
decision is spotted or raised, as discussed above, the focus of the examination would 
be placed upon the actual discrepancy between these two. Therefore, since relevant 
competition law issues has been reviewed, the non-EU enforcing court should then 
merely compare the award involved and relevant authoritative decision. If the award 
actually runs counter to the decision, the non-EU enforcing court would then refuse 
to enforce the award based upon the enforcement violating its own public policy 
because either it violates the general competition value it recognises, or it would 
violate EU competition policy and hence ultimately violate its public policy to 
                                                          
579 The author considers that a more plausible situation would be that, although a non-EU enforcing 
court would not be sensitive enough to suspect a clear discrepancy between an arbitral award and a 
previous authoritative decision, it may, by perusing the arbitral award, spotting a potential 
misapplication of EU competition law. 
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respect a foreign jurisdiction’s public policy. 
Yet again, the situation may be complicated when a party arguing that the previous 
authoritative decision suffered from concrete errors or the arbitral tribunal stated its 
reason for disagreeing with the previous authoritative decision. Several factors 
should then be considered when proposing the behavioural pattern here of a non-EU 
enforcing court: 
 The first is the fact that relevant EU competition law issues have already been 
reviewed; 
 The second is that relevant EU competition law issues were reviewed by the 
Commission or an NCA, which, as discussed above, is the official guardian of 
EU competition law; 
 The third concerns the public interest of the non-EU enforcing state. As analysed 
above, a potential violation of EU competition law may trigger a non-EU 
enforcing state’s public policy if either the non-EU enforcing state recognises the 
general competition value as reflected in EU competition law as its own public 
policy, or the non-EU enforcing state deems respecting EU competition policy as 
its own public policy. Notably, under both scenarios, the potential violation of 
EU competition law would generally not actually injure the competition order of 
the non-EU enforcing state. 
Given the consideration of these factors, the author thus takes the view that, first, 
since relevant competition law issues have already been reviewed by the authority 
which takes the official responsibility of maintaining the competition order within 
the EU, this creates a strong presumption that relevant competition law issues have 
been duly and reasonably reviewed, and it so leaves limited room for the non-EU 
enforcing court to query the legitimacy of the relevant authoritative decision. 
Secondly, since under both scenarios the competition order of the non-EU enforcing 
state is not actually influenced, the non-EU enforcing court would, by comparison to 
an EU national court, be more reluctant to review the authoritative decision, 
especially for a national courts of a non-EU enforcing state of which the public 
interest is merely to respect EU competition policy. Hence, when encountering the 
situation that the legitimacy of an authoritative decision is challenged, the author 
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suggests that the non-EU enforcing court should generally simply respect the 
decision and refuse to enforce the arbitral award based upon its own public policy 
concerns.  
A trickier situation, nonetheless, is where the non-EU enforcing court is convinced 
that the previous authoritative decision may actually be erroneous pursuant to 
evidence adduced by the parties or the analysis made by the arbitral tribunal in its 
award. Under this situation, it may be argued that since the non-EU enforcing court 
could not ensure that EU competition law has been reasonably reviewed, its public 
interests, no matter whether it is to respect the general competition value or to merely 
respect EU competition policy, could arguably not be satisfied. A key question is 
thus raised: should the non-EU enforcing court then examine the legitimacy of the 
authoritative decision on its own and then determine the fate of the award?  
One may argue that since both the Commission and NCAs decisions have their own 
reviewing channels, the non-EU enforcing court is not in the appropriate position to 
interfere with a decision made by relevant authorities under EU law. As mentioned 
above, the Commission decision could still be subject to the ECJ’s review580 and the 
NCAs decisions could be reviewed by EU national courts581 as well as the ECJ582, 
even when it is final.  
Although fairly persuasive, this argument could still be countered that these 
reviewing channels are designed for EU national courts, but not for non-EU national 
courts. For example, Article 267 TFEU merely provides the possibility of an EU 
national court referring issues to the ECJ for preliminary rulings but not for a non-
EU court to do so; a reference lodged by a national court of a non-member state is 
inadmissible.583 Therefore, since these reviewing mechanisms may not be applicable 
before a non-EU enforcing court, the non-EU enforcing court should then examine 
the legitimacy of relevant EU authoritative decisions by its own.  
However, this counterargument may omit the possibility that a non-EU enforcing 
court may refer the issue back to a national court of an EU Member State which has a 
                                                          
580 See Article 31 of the Regulation 1/2003. 
581 See Article 9(1) and (2) of the Directive 2014/104/EU. 
582 See Article 9(3) of the Directive 2014/104/EU. 
583 For a discussion of the issue see Cases T-377 etc./00 Philip Morris International and ors v. 
Commission [2003] ECR II-1.  
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connection with the case at hand, e.g. an EU national court which would have 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute had the parties not agreed to arbitrate their dispute, 
and the EU national court could hence apply relevant mechanism further to review 
the authoritative decision.584 Following this approach, the non-EU enforcing court 
could on the one hand avoid the inappropriate interference with a foreign judgment 
which would be certainly better reviewed via its own reviewing process, whilst on 
the other ensure that relevant competition law issues could be reasonably reviewed 
so that the non-EU enforcing state’s own public interest could be satisfied. 
It should, notwithstanding, be noted that this approach would to a certain extent run 
counter to the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC as it may prolong considerably the 
process of enforcement, especially when considering the possible heavy caseload an 
EU Member State’s national court may have. This is hence essentially the choice 
between prioritising the pro-enforcement bias of the Convention and respecting the 
internal reviewing process of a jurisdiction. From the author’s viewpoint, although 
the principle of favouring enforcement has been steadily established, it should not be 
able to outweigh a jurisdiction’s judicial procedure. The latter concerns the exclusive 
jurisdiction of a state’s (or a transnational organisation’s) higher judicial authority 
(such as the ECJ) reviewing the judgments or decisions made by a lower judicial 
authority (such as the Commission), which should not yield to the former which 
merely concerns the discretional pro-enforcement bias, but not the mandatory pro-
enforcement obligation, of an international convention. Therefore, when a non-EU 
enforcing court encountering a decision made by an EU authority, it should not 
review the decision on its own but to refer the decision back to relevant reviewing 
process. Yet, it should be noted that this approach should be applied only with 
extreme caution and only when the non-EU national court is convinced that the 
previous authoritative decision may actually be seriously flamed, which in the 
author’s view is unlikely to arise commonly in practice.  
Following the discussion above, it is therefore proposed that non-EU enforcing 
                                                          
584 This idea derives from Phillip Landolt’s suggestion in Phillip Landolt (2007) op. cit., supra note 
463, at 72, in which he suggested that when a non-EU enforcing court encountering a potential 
violation of EU competition law, the enforcing court should not examine the issue by its own but refer 
it to a connected EU national court, and the enforcing court would determine whether to enforce the 
arbitral award based upon the result of the EU national court’s examination.  
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courts should generally respect and follow the authoritative decisions made by the 
Commission or NCAs but not examine the legitimacy of such decision on its own. 
When serious errors in an authoritative decision could plausibly be adduced by the 
parties, the author suggests that the non-EU enforcing court could refer the issue 
back to an EU national court which is connected to the case involved so that the EU 
national court could then apply the reviewing mechanism as provided in relevant EU 
law to review the authoritative decision. Notably, this approach should be cautiously 
applied as it would to a certain extent prolong the enforcement process, and therefore 
only when the non-EU enforcing court considers it necessary should the approach be 
applied.  
III. The reflection on the behavioural pattern of enforcing courts 
reviewing potential breaches of EU competition law 
It is undeniable that the vitality of a dispute resolution mechanism lies in the 
enforceability of the judicial decisions made through it, and this is also the case for 
international arbitration. With the principle of pro-enforcement being steadily upheld 
and standing the test of time, it could be naturally expected that the legality of 
arbitral award should rarely be doubted, and the merits of dispute rarely touched 
upon.   
But, equally, the vitality of a dispute resolution mechanism lies also in the general 
reliability of its judicial decisions. While the so-called prima facie review prevails in 
shaping the behavioural pattern of enforcing courts reviewing international arbitral 
awards, the legality of an arbitral award is still not necessarily settled and the inertia 
of applying prima facie review should not subliminally drive an enforcing court to 
treat that legality as a mere superficial pillar of international arbitration of no 
substantial importance: the awkward situation in SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE 
Euromissile as discussed above should hence be avoided.  
It is therefore still necessary to remain vigilant on how well the balance is struck 
between the finality and legality of an arbitral award, especially when the traditional 
weight ratio between these two parameters oscillates when international arbitration 
steps into unfamiliar public law territory. The starting point would hence be to 
examine whether the orthodox prima facie review can always ensure the 
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maintenance of a reasonable level of legality, or more specifically, whether prima 
facie review can always enable an enforcing court to spot the manifest violation of 
relevant public policy since it is a widely-recognised rule of thumb that only flagrant 
and concrete violations of public policy trigger public policy defence under the NYC. 
The research conducted in this section challenged the orthodoxy and raised a 
counter-example: when encountering an arbitral award concerning EU competition 
law, the traditional and prevailing prima facie review may not always spot the 
manifest violation of EU competition law under certain circumstances owing to the 
strong fact-intensity of competition law issues. This finding then triggers the thought 
that prima facie review should not be a steady default choice, of which the 
application should be subject to the extent that an enforcing court could reasonably 
reach the conclusion on the severity of an involved behaviour which may trigger the 
public policy defence before the enforcing court: if prima facie review could 
adequately reveal a manifest violation, then it should be applied; if not, a further step 
digging into the merits of dispute should take place.  
Once the default application of prima facie review is reasonably challenged, the 
following question is how the balance between the finality and legality of an arbitral 
award concerning a specific public interest should be resolved. Through the research 
on the reviewing pattern of enforcing courts examining arbitral awards concerning 
EU competition law, two key parameters should be particularly focused. The first 
concerns the manifestation of the violation of relevant public policy as reflected in an 
arbitral award, which may essentially influence the balance point between finality 
and legality. For example, as shown in the analysis above, an EU enforcing court 
would be prone to focus more on the legality of an arbitral award concerning EU 
competition law issues if relevant issues have not been examined by the arbitral 
tribunal or not reflected in the arbitral award, whilst this EU enforcing court would 
tend to prioritise the finality of arbitral award if relevant issues have already been 
examined and reflected in the arbitral award. The second concerns the specific 
obligation as borne by an enforcing court when encountering a potential violation of 
a specific public policy. For example, as analysed above, an EU enforcing court 
would on its own motion examine the non-application of EU competition law since it 
is obliged to ensure the full and uniform application of EU competition law and 
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hence the compliance of an arbitral award to EU competition law, whilst a non-EU 
enforcing court which is merely motivated to respect EU competition public policy 
would only examine relevant competition law issue under its own competition law 
when the issue is raised by the parties.  
It hence follows the research of this Chapter that the interrelationship between the 
finality and legality of arbitral award should not be a single-ended model which over-
emphasises the importance of the finality of arbitral award and to a large extent 
underestimates the importance of legality. Although it was once opined that public 
policy is ‘a very unruly horse’585 and ‘once you get astride it you never know where 
it will carry you’586, such misgivings based upon the strong respect of the finality of 
arbitral award should not be an excuse to marginalise the public policy defence as 
clearly listed in the NYC, and hence the legality of arbitral award. With the thought 
that the balance between finality and legality should be struck being borne in mind, a 
more reasonable way is thus to explore a more comprehensive behavioural pattern 
based upon the examination of relevant parameters to carefully ride on this ‘unruly 
horse’, rather than taming it by unconditionally limiting the examination of public 
policy issues and then keep it in the stable. Although public policy has been opined 
to be a ‘rather obtrusive, not to say blundering, steed in the law reports’587 and ‘at 
times the horse has looked like even less accommodating animals’588, it would be 
more effective if it could be applied in a more comprehensive and systematic way, 
and hopefully it would eventually become a Pegasus that could shake off the 
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Chapter VI – Examining the application of Article V(1)(e) of the 
NYC under the scenario of enforcing foreign arbitral awards 
concerning EU competition law disputes 
After examining the application of Article V(2)(b) of the NYC under the scenario of 
enforcing foreign arbitral awards concerning EU competition law disputes, the last 
ground to be examined is Article V(1)(e) of the Convention. As discussed above,590 a 
remaining uncertainty of the interrelationship between a seat court and an enforcing 
court lies in that, when the public policy of the arbitral seat is understood by the 
enforcing court as covering either the enforcing court’s fundamental domestic public 
interest or a generally recognised public value, what specific standard the enforcing 
court should apply to decide whether to follow the seat court’s annulment decision 
which was made based upon the violation of the seat’s public policy. Should the 
enforcing court re-examine what the seat court has examined to ensure that the seat 
court has performed in the way which it would have performed if the public policy 
issue is directly raised before it after the award was rendered? Or should the 
enforcing court fully trust the seat court and simply follow the seat court’s decision?  
I. Exploring the interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing 
courts when examining EU competition law issues: three potential 
scenarios 
This uncertainty will be examined in this Chapter under the scenario that an arbitral 
award concerning EU competition law dispute has been reviewed by a seat court and 
is then brought before an enforcing court for enforcement. As discussed above,591 EU 
competition law would trigger the public policy concern of both EU, and under 
certain circumstances, non-EU States. Since it is entirely possible that an EU or a 
non-EU national court could act as the court of seat or the court of enforcement in an 
international arbitration, the question as raised above should hence be examined 
under a higher-resolution microscope, and three main scenarios will be delved into, 
namely that both the seat and the enforcing state are EU Member States, either the 
seat or the enforcing state is an EU Member State, and neither the seat nor the 
                                                          
590 See supra Section IV(B) of Chapter III.  
591 See supra Section I(A) of Chapter V.  
186 
 
enforcing state is an EU Member State.  
A. Both the seat and the enforcing state are EU Member States 
The first scenario to be examined is that both the seat and the enforcing states are EU 
Member States.  
When considering the interrelationship between two national courts on relevant 
public policy issues in an international arbitration, since different courts might bear 
different obligations under their own public policy, the key of this interrelationship 
would therefore lie in whether fulfilling the obligation of one could simultaneously 
fulfil the obligation as borne by another. If the answer is always in the affirmative, 
then the enforcing court should automatically follow the seat court’s decision on the 
potential violation of EU competition law. If the answer is not always affirmative, a 
more comprehensive interrelationship should accordingly be proposed. 
Following this formula, the interrelationship between two EU national courts could 
easily be shaped: since both courts bear the same obligation to ensure the uniform 
application of EU competition law and hence the compliance of an arbitral award to 
EU competition law, it could be reasonably inferred that once relevant potential anti-
competitive behaviour has been reviewed by an EU seat court, an EU enforcing 
court’s obligation would be automatically fulfilled, and it should hence simply 
follow the decision made by the EU seat court. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that the actual application of this interrelationship 
may be hindered by two potential obstacles. The first lies in a plausible interpretation 
of Article XI(1) of the European Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration (hereinafter the ‘European Convention’). This Article, by taking a step 
further than the UNCITRAL Model Law, intentionally provides that the enforcement 
of an arbitral award could not be refused based upon the fact that the award has been 
set aside by the seat court due to substantive public policy concern. It seems that the 
European Convention lifts the pro-enforcement principle to another level, and it is 
strongly implied that it is the enforcement state’s public policy which matters most. 
As being rather bluntly pointed out: 
‘[I]t would have been completely illogical to have provided for public policy 
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as a ground for the setting aside of an award with international effect. 
Otherwise the situation might well arise in which an award made in State A, 
between nations of State B and State C, which was to be enforced in either 
State B or C, could not be because it had been set aside in State A as violating 
public policy, and notwithstanding the fact that the award was not contrary to 
the public policy of either State B or C.’592 
Moreover, as stated,  
‘It is submitted that it would not be in conformity with the spirit of Art. IX to 
refuse enforcement of an award when suspension has been ordered on the 
basis of a ground for setting aside having no international effect within the 
meaning of Art. IX(1).’593 
Therefore, under the scenario that both the seat and the enforcing state is an EU 
Member State and both of them are Contracting States of the European 
Convention,594 the enforcing court would hence simply not need follow what the seat 
court has examined and review the potential violation of EU competition law by its 
own and under its own reviewing standard. 
This interpretation of Article IX of the European Convention, notwithstanding, 
involves a non sequitur and would hardly be tenable therefore. Removing ‘public 
policy’ from the grounds presents the resolution of the European Convention’s 
drafters of further facilitating the uniform enforcement formula within its 
Contracting States -- domestic public policy which is not recognised by all the 
Member States should not be treated as a legitimate ground for disturbing the 
enforcement of an arbitral award before the enforcing court of a Contracting State. In 
this respect, the European Convention ‘goes further than the New York Convention 
                                                          
592 P. I. Benjamin, Notes: The European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 37 
British Year Book of International Law, 1961, at 494. Emphasis added. 
593 Dominique T. Hascher, European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961 – 
Commentary, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2011 - Volume 
XXXVI, Kluwer Law International, at p. 540. Emphasis added. 
594 The contracting parties of the European Convention are: Albania, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
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and so avoids the problem of local annulments’595. However, the drafters may have 
neglected the possibility that certain value, such as EU competition legal order, 
would gradually evolve to become part of the public policy concern of both a seat 
and an enforcing state which are also the Member States of the European 
Convention. Therefore, a possible unsatisfactory situation would be that, for 
example, an EU enforcing court, by applying Article IX(1) of the European 
Convention, ignores the annulment judgment on an arbitral award concerning EU 
competition law as made by an EU seat court on the ground that the enforcement 
would violate EU competition policy. However, since ensuing the uniform 
application of EU competition law is also the EU enforcing court’s public policy, it 
would hence re-examine relevant EU competition law issues, even though relevant 
EU competition law issues have already been examined by another EU Member 
States’ national court. Such repetition would likely to be meaningless and may thus 
unnecessarily prolong the process of enforcement.  
Therefore, the author’s view is that only pure domestic public policy should be 
filtered by the European Convention, and the Convention should leave a certain 
breathing space for public policy, such as EU competition law, which has the 
observable potentiality of generating regional or even international effect. Hence, 
Article IX(1) of the European Convention should not be interpreted as allowing such 
exclusion of annulment judgment which is made based upon the violation of a public 
policy which has a regional or quasi-international effect, such as EU competition 
law, and it should therefore not be able to hinder an EU enforcing court from trusting 
and following an EU seat court’s decision on whether an arbitral award violates EU 
competition law.   
The second obstacle, and the more cogent one, concerns the potential disparity 
between the attitudes of an EU seat court and an EU enforcing court on relevant 
potential anti-competitive behaviour. More specifically, a disparity may appear in 
two situations. The first, and also the more likely, concerns that the seat court and the 
enforcing court apply two different reviewing patterns. This was the case in SNF v. 
                                                          
595 Nigel Blackaby & Constantine Partasides with Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter (2009) op. cit., 
supra note 1, at para. 11.126. 
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Cytec,596 in which the seat court, i.e. the Brussels Tribunal de première instance, 
annulled the arbitral award based upon its in-depth review whilst the enforcing court, 
i.e. the Cour d’appel de Paris, granted the enforcement based upon its prima facie 
review. The second situation concerns a much rarer situation that the seat court and 
the enforcing court, although applying the same reviewing pattern, reach different 
conclusions on the potential anti-competitive behaviour and hence on whether to 
enforce the arbitral award.  
Once such disparity occurs, the EU enforcing court would then have a final say on 
the fate of the arbitral award since it does not need to follow the EU seat court’s 
decision, and the aforementioned general compliance of an EU enforcing court to an 
EU seat court’s decision may therefore not be observed. Under this situation, since 
the correctness of the EU enforcing court’s decision could not be guaranteed, it is 
possible that the uniform application of EU competition law may not be maintained. 
A plausible way to eliminate this potentiality would be to suggest the EU enforcing 
court, when encountering an EU seat court’s decision with which it does not agree, to 
invoke Article 267 TFEU and ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling on the core legal 
issues concerning the interpretation of relevant EU competition law as reflected in 
the disparity, as the existence of such disparity between two EU Member States 
should be sufficient to trigger the alert that EU competition law may not be 
uniformly applied. Notwithstanding, the feasibility of this suggestion would 
essentially rely upon the willingness of the EU enforcing court, since the mere 
existence of a disparity would not necessarily lead to the incorrectness of the EU 
enforcing court’s decision, and it may thus not doubt the legitimacy of its own 
judgment and reckon that it is not necessarily to ask the ECJ for the preliminary 
ruling.  
Another proposal would be to invite the ECJ to rule on what reviewing pattern (the 
in-depth one, the prima facie one, or a specific pattern lies in the middle) an EU 
national court should apply when examining potential anti-competitive behaviours. 
Although this would still not completely eliminate the possibility that EU 
competition law be not uniformly applied since as stated above that it is still, at least 
                                                          
596 SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, 8 Mar. 2007 [2007] 
Rev. Arb. 303. 
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theoretically, possible that an EU seat court and an EU enforcing court would apply 
the same reviewing pattern but reach different conclusions, it could be reasonably 
expected that the scenario that a disparity caused by different courts applying the 
same reviewing pattern would be much rarer than a disparity caused by different 
courts applying different reviewing patterns, and this proposal would thus be an ideal 
first-step towards the uniform application of EU competition law. As stated, it is 
‘regrettable and astonishing that none of the domestic courts found it worthwhile to 
ask the ECJ for guidance concerning the scope of court review required under 
community law’597 and hopefully ‘on the next occasion, the question will be put to 
the ECJ’598. Nevertheless, before the ECJ actually rules on this issue, it could be 
expected that the specific interrelationship between an EU seat court and an EU 
enforcing court would still be subject to a certain randomness. 
B. Either the seat or the enforcing state is an EU Member State 
The next scenario to be looked at is that either the seat or the enforcing state is an EU 
Member State, which could then be further subdivided into two sub-situations, 
namely when the seat is an EU Member State whilst the enforcing state is a non-EU 
state, and when the seat is outside the EU whilst the enforcing state is in the EU.  
Following the formula as raised above that the interrelationship between a seat court 
and an enforcing court in an international arbitration would essentially depend on 
whether the fulfilment of one’s obligation would also fulfil the obligation of 
another’s, the starting point of shaping the interrelationship between an EU (or a 
non-EU) seat court and a non-EU (or an EU) enforcing court is thus to understand 
the obligations as borne by each court, which essentially depends on their attitudes 
towards the importance of EU competition law.599 
As for the former, the unquestionable supremacy of EU competition law as well as 
its exigent legal requirement of uniform application would cause the direct 
internalisation of EU competition law in EU Member States’ public policy. 
Conversely, as for the latter, although under certain circumstance EU competition 
                                                          
597 Christoph Liebscher, ‘Chapter 23 EU Member State Court Application of Eco Swiss: Review of the 
Case Law and Future Prospects’, in Gordon Blanke & Phillip Landolt, EU and US Antitrust 
Arbitration: A Handbook for Practitioners, Kluwer Law International, 2011, at para. 23-111. 
598 Ibid. 
599 See supra Section I(A) of Chapter V.  
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law may trigger the public policy concern of a non-EU national court, it would only 
trigger the concern in an indirect way.600 Such essential difference would then lead to 
different obligations as borne when encountering an arbitral award concerning EU 
competition law issue. As examined and proposed in Chapter V above, a non-EU 
national court, if connecting EU competition law with its own public policy concerns, 
may either actively or passively ensure that relevant competition law issues have 
been duly and reasonably reviewed,601 whilst an EU national court would be obliged 
to guarantee the compliance of the arbitral award to EU competition law. 
1. The arbitral seat is an EU Member State whilst the enforcing state is a 
non-EU state 
In the situation in which the seat is an EU Member State whilst the enforcing state is 
a non-EU state and the EU seat court has examined relevant potential violation of EU 
competition law, it is reasonable for the non-EU enforcing court to expect that, 
because an EU Member State’s national court, which bears the obligation to ensure 
the effective and uniform application of EU competition law, has already examined 
the potential violation of EU competition law and made its own decision, the 
question as whether relevant competition law issues have been duly and reasonably 
reviewed, which is what the non-EU enforcing court would concern pursuant to their 
own public interests, would have also been examined by the EU seat court, and its 
obligation would have hence also be fulfilled. Therefore, under the scenario that the 
seat is an EU Member State whilst the enforcing state is outside the EU, it seems to 
be logical to propose that the non-EU enforcing court should automatically follow 
the decision made by the EU seat court. 
This proposal, however, omits the subtle distinction between a non-EU enforcing 
court which merely has the incentive to respect EU competition public policy and a 
non-EU enforcing court which generalises EU competition law as a general 
competition value.  
                                                          
600 i.e. either because the non-EU national court have the incentive to respect EU competition legal 
order or because the non-EU national court understands EU competition law as conveying a general 
competition value which is also understood by the non-EU state as its public interest. 
601 Although this conclusion was drawn under the situation that the non-EU national court is the 
enforcing court of an international arbitration, the author opines that it would not be changed if the 
non-EU national court is now the seat court of an international arbitration.  
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As for a non-EU enforcing court of which the public interest is merely to respect EU 
competition policy, since relevant competition law issues have been examined by an 
EU Member State’s national court, its public interest to respect EU competition 
policy would not require it to go further and would lead to automatic compliance 
with the EU seat court’s decision. Under this scenario, such respect would be more 
of a political gesture than an actual action.602 
But the situation would be different for a non-EU enforcing court of which the public 
interest compels to respect general competition value it cherishes. A non-EU 
enforcing court of this type would essentially apply its own standards in assessing 
whether the enforcement of an arbitral award concerning EU competition law 
satisfies its own public interest. A potential disparity may hence arise when the 
reviewing standards applied by the EU seat court and the non-EU enforcing court 
does not match. For example, if the enforcing court in Thalès603 were a non-EU 
national court which applies a relatively in-depth reviewing pattern as proposed 
above604. It might query the legitimacy of the decision made by the seat court, i.e. the 
Cour d’appel de Paris, based upon a prima facie review that a market partitioning 
agreement did not violate EU competition law, and doubt that its public policy to 
respect general competition value is not fulfilled by the examination of the EU seat 
court. Another example would be that although an EU seat court, such as the 
Brussels Tribunal de première instance in SNF605, by applying a rather stringent 
reviewing standard on an arbitral award concerning EU competition law, vacated the 
award, the non-EU enforcing court, if not reckoning such stringency necessary and 
holding that its own public interest has already been satisfied, may eventually 
                                                          
602 Although one might argue that under Article IX(1) of the European Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration, if both the EU seat and the non-EU enforcing state are the Contracting States 
of the European Convention, the non-EU enforcing court could then not simply follow the EU seat 
court’s annulment decision based upon relevant violation of EU competition policy since this Article 
provides that setting-aside an arbitral award due to the violation of public policy should not be a 
legitimate ground for non-enforcement, and therefore the non-EU enforcing court could then not 
simply follow the annulment decision. Nonetheless, as analysed above, this Article should not be 
interpreted as allowing such exclusion of annulment judgment which is made based upon the violation 
of a public policy which has a regional or quasi-international effect, such as EU competition law, and 
it should therefore not be able to hinder a non-EU enforcing court following an EU seat court’s 
annulment decision based upon the violation of competition policy. 
603 SA Thalès Air Défense v. GIE Euromissile, Cour d’appel de Paris (1re Ch. C), Not Indicated, 18 
November 2004. 
604 See supra Section II(B)(2)(b) of Chapter V.  
605 SNF SAS v. Cytec Industries BV, Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, 8 Mar. 2007 [2007] 
Rev. Arb. 303. 
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approves the enforcement of the award. Besides, another potential disparity may 
appear when the EU seat court and the non-EU enforcing court, although applying 
the same reviewing pattern, reach different conclusions on the potential anti-
competitive behaviour and hence on whether to enforce the arbitral award.  
Based upon this consideration, the author therefore takes the view that it would be 
more practical to propose at this point that, by being aware of the potential disparity 
of the reviewing patterns as applied by an EU seat court and a non-EU enforcing 
court or the examination results drawn by both the seat court and enforcing court, a 
non-EU enforcing court which bears an active obligation should be allowed first to 
consider the reasoning of the decision made by an EU seat court and then decide 
whether it would follow the decision under its own reviewing standards.  
2. The arbitral seat is a non-EU state whilst the enforcing state is an EU 
Member State 
Furthermore, under the situation that the seat court is a non-EU national court whilst 
the enforcing court is an EU national court, as analysed above,606 a non-EU seat 
court would examine relevant competition law issues based upon its own public 
interest which merely drives it either to respect EU competition policy or respect the 
general competition value but not actually ensure the compliance of the award with 
EU competition law. Even when the non-EU seat court does reckon that its public 
interest is not satisfied and decides to examine relevant violation of competition law, 
it would do so by applying its own law, but not EU competition law. 607 Therefore, it 
could be plausibly argued that the examination on relevant competition law issues 
made by a non-EU seat court would not automatically fulfil the obligation borne by 
an EU enforcing court which is to ensure the compliance of the award with EU 
competition law, and hence the EU enforcing court need not follow the seat court’s 
decision and decide whether to enforce the award on its own.  
This proposal, however, should not be taken to mean that the non-EU seat court’s 
                                                          
606 See supra Section II(B)(2)(b) of Chapter V.  
607 It has been discussed and proposed above in supra Section II(B)(2)(b) of Chapter V that a non-EU 
enforcing court may examine relevant competition law issues under its own competition law. The 
author reckons that this behavioural pattern concerning a non-EU enforcing court examining an 
arbitral award without any previous decision made by other national court could also be applicable 
under current scenario that a non-EU seat court examining an arbitral award since under this scenario 
the non-EU seat court would also be the first judicial authority examining the arbitral award.   
194 
 
decision would be trivial, and the EU enforcing court would always re-examine 
relevant EU competition law issues. Here is where the consideration of the 
convergence of competition law comes into play. As stated, the convergence of 
competition law has been a ‘lurking possibility in discussions of transnational 
competition law development’ 608  which could ‘narrow differences among some 
states in some areas of competition law’609 and ‘facilitate the transmission of ideas 
and information’610, and the phenomenon that competition principles are increasingly 
converging and may even be the same across many jurisdictions611 can therefore be 
observed. Following from this observation, it would be increasingly untenable for an 
EU enforcing court to presume to distrust that the decision on a potential violation of 
EU competition law as made by a non-EU seat court, although under the non-EU seat 
court’s law, would not be consonant with EU competition law as a default. A more 
reasonable way, from the author’s viewpoint, would therefore be that the EU 
enforcing court first consider the reasoning of the non-EU seat court’s decision and 
examine its adequacy (namely whether the reasoning given by the non-EU seat court 
in its decision could adequately lead to the conclusion it drew), and applicability 
(namely whether the decision made by the non-EU seat court under its own 
competition law could also be applicable when the decision being reviewed under the 
context of EU competition law). If the answer is in the affirmative, no further 
examination would be required and the non-EU seat court’s decision should be 
followed; if the answer is in the negative, the EU enforcing court should then be 
allowed to examine relevant competition law issues under the reviewing standard as 
proposed in Chapter V, and make its own decision on the fate of the arbitral award.  
C. Neither the seat nor the enforcing state is an EU Member State  
The last scenario to be looked at arises where neither the seat nor the enforcing state 
is an EU Member State. Again, the key of examination is to figure out whether the 
fulfilment of a non-EU seat court’s obligation would automatically fulfil the 
obligation as borne by a non-EU enforcing court.  
                                                          
608 David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization, Oxford University Press, 
2010, at p. 292.  
609 Ibid. 
610 Ibid. 
611 See supra Section I(A)(2) of Chapter V.   
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As stated above, there are two types of non-EU court of which the public policy 
concerns could be triggered by potential violations of EU competition law. The first 
is non-EU national courts which merely have the incentive to respect EU competition 
public policy, of which the obligation as borne when encountering an arbitral award 
concerning EU competition law is passively to ensure that relevant competition law 
issues have been duly and reasonably reviewed. The second is non-EU national 
courts which interpret EU competition law as conveying a general competition value, 
of which the obligation is actively to ensure that relevant competition law issues have 
been duly and reasonably reviewed. Based upon these two different obligations, the 
following interrelationship between a non-EU seat court and a non-EU enforcing 
court could hence be proposed. First, since a non-EU court which merely respects 
EU competition public policy plays essentially a passive role, it would simply follow 
the non-EU seat court’s decision (no matter which type of non-EU court) when it 
acts as an enforcing court since its attention would be placed upon the fact that 
relevant competition law issues have been examined by the seat court but not upon 
the correctness of the seat court’s decision. Secondly, as for a non-EU court which 
interprets EU competition law as a general competition value, since it essentially 
plays an active role, it would be motivated to examine relevant competition law 
issues under its own competition law by applying its own reviewing standard when 
acting as an enforcing court. Under this circumstance, since relevant competition law 
issues have already been examined by a non-EU seat court, by considering the legal 
certainty of international arbitration, it is hence proposed that the non-EU enforcing 
court should first peruse the reasoning as shown in the non-EU seat court’s decision: 
if it is satisfied by the decision under its own reviewing pattern, the decision should 
be followed; if it is not, it should then examine relevant competition law issues under 
its own law and reviewing standard, and determine whether to enforce the arbitral 
award.  
II. The reflection on the interrelationship between seat courts and 
enforcing courts when examining EU competition law issues 
The existing framework as laid down in the NYC leaves certain uncertainty in the 
interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing courts. Whilst a clearly-defined 
relationship is called for, the Convention merely provides a suggestive option that 
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once an arbitral award has been vacated by a seat court, the enforcing court has 
discretion whether to refuse enforcement or not. Such uncertainty, as discussed 
above,612 would even increase under the scenario that an arbitral award has been 
vacated based upon its violation of the seat’s public policy but still be brought before 
an enforcing court for enforcement – since the enforcing court is not obliged to 
follow the seat court’s decision on relevant public policy issue, the interrelationship 
between a seat court and an enforcing court when encountering a potential violation 
of public policy would to certain extent be subject to randomness.  
Within all the potential situations concerning such interrelationships, the most 
intractable one arises where a seat court and an enforcing court of an international 
arbitration both recognise a specific public interest. As revealed in this Chapter, 
although a specific public interest may trigger the public policy defence of both a 
seat court and an enforcing court, the importance as attached to the public policy by 
these two courts may differ, which would then lead to the difference of their actual 
reviewing behaviour between the two courts and thus influence the interrelationship 
between them. Therefore, when both courts have the chance to examine an arbitral 
award concerning this specific public policy, a practical conundrum would emerge: 
which court should have a final say on the fate of the award? 
The research in this Chapter hence intends to contribute to answer this question by 
exploring a plausible formula of shaping the interrelationship between a seat court 
and an enforcing court when examining public policy issues. Based upon the concept 
raised in Chapter V that the reviewing pattern of a national court examining relevant 
public policy issues depends essentially upon the specific obligation it bears under 
the specific public policy, the research in this Chapter carries on to propose that the 
interrelationship between a seat court and an enforcing court under a specific public 
policy would essentially depend upon whether the fulfilment of the seat court’s 
obligation could automatically fulfil the obligation as borne by the enforcing court. 
This then leads to a three-step examination, which would start with specifying the 
obligation as borne by a seat court and an enforcing court under a specific public 
policy. For instance, in the example of reviewing arbitral awards concerning EU 
                                                          
612 See supra Section IV(A)(3)(c) of Chapter III, that an enforcing court under Article V(1)(e) of the 
NYC would not be impliedly expected to follow an seat court’s annulment decision made based upon 
the violation of the seat’s public policy. 
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competition law issues, the obligation as borne by an EU Member State’s national 
court would be to ensure the compliance of the arbitral award with EU competition 
law, whilst the obligation as borne by a non-EU national court may be merely 
passively to ensure that relevant competition law issues have been duly and 
reasonably examined. After specifying the obligations, the examination would then 
take its second step to determine what the seat court and the enforcing court would 
do to fulfil their obligations. For example, an EU Member State’s national court 
would proactively examine the reasoning of an arbitral award under EU competition 
law whilst a non-EU national court would examine the reasoning of an arbitral award 
under its own competition law. Also, as could be seen in the research of this Chapter, 
certain parameters, such as the specific reviewing patterns as applied by a seat court 
and an enforcing court, may also come into play.613 Following the first two steps, the 
final step is then to make a comparison between the required actions of both the seat 
court and the enforcing court to shape the specific interrelationship between these 
two courts. 
Although this three-step examination is a mere proposal and remains still to be 
examined and recognised in legal practice, it essentially conveys the idea that the 
interrelationship between a seat court and an enforcing court when encountering an 
arbitral award concerning a specific public interest should be further refined for the 
purpose of increasing the legal certainty of international arbitration. Indeed, such 
interrelationship would usually be an uneasy one since as revealed in the research of 
this Chapter that the establishment of a systematic interrelationship would almost 
inevitably require the involvement of multiple influence factors. But this does not 
mean it should remain untackled and unresolved, and a revisiting of it under the 
scenarios of reviewing arbitral awards concerning not only EU competition law but 
also other public interest is hence strongly encour 
 
 
                                                          
613 This, notwithstanding, does not necessarily mean that when examining public policy concerning 
other public interest, the difference in reviewing patterns as applied by a seat court and an enforcing 
court should also be brought into consideration. The key lies in whether different reviewing patterns 
are likely to lead to different results of review.  
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Chapter VII – A potential rivalry between the protection of public 
interests and the respect of procedural autonomy 
Following the analysis and discussion in the previous chapters, a comprehensive 
behavioural pattern concerning an enforcing court examining an arbitral award 
concerning strong public interest has thus been proposed. Notwithstanding, the 
research does not end here, as there is still a missing piece of jigsaw which should be 
taken into consideration, namely the procedural autonomy of the enforcing state.  
It is not uncommon that in legal practice an enforcing court would require to follow 
certain procedural rules, usually contained in its national arbitration rules, civil 
procedural laws or case law to prevent a relevant public interest issue614 as reflected 
in an arbitral award from being re-raised before it. One of the most representative 
examples would be that certain courts have endorsed the proposition that a 
substantive complaint will not be entertained as a public policy complaint at the 
enforcing stage if it existed at the time of the tribunal proceedings and it could have 
been raised before the arbitral tribunal.615 Such procedural rules, although intends to 
maintain the ‘justice, reliance and practicality’616 of international arbitration, may 
lead to certain inapplicability of the behavioural patterns as proposed above. For 
instance, in a hypothetic case that the losing party failed to raise relevant public 
policy concern before the tribunal and the annulment court but raise it only at the 
enforcement stage, based upon the consideration of procedural autonomy, an 
enforcing court which forbids a public policy complaint being raised if it could have 
been raised in earlier stages would dismiss the losing party’s argument. However, 
this may potentially lead to the violation of relevant public policy if such public 
policy concern is indeed plausible and following the rationale of the concern the 
involved behaviour as reflected in the arbitral award would actually effectively 
violate the public policy of the enforcing state. Therefore, in such a potential rival 
between the protection of public interests and the respect of procedural autonomy, a 
question is raised: which should prevail, the former or the latter? 
                                                          
614 Which concerns both the arbitrability and public policy issues.  
615 See, for example, Soinco SACI & Anor v. Novokuznetsk Aluminium Plant & Ors [1998] C.L.C 730 
(CA). 
616 Epis S.A. v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, District Court of Jerusalem, Israel, 23 November 2004, in 
Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2006 - Volume XXXI, Kluwer Law 
International, at p. 786.   
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This issue was examined by the ECJ in Van Schijndel & Van Veen 617  which 
concerned the application of EC competition law, although not in the context of 
international commercial arbitration. In this case, both applicants were 
physiotherapists and challenged the requirement of compulsory membership of the 
Physiotherapists’ Pension Fund in the Netherlands. One succeeded and one failed 
before the Kantonrechter at Breda and Tilburg respectively, but on appeal to the 
Breda Rechtbank, both applications were dismissed and the Fund succeeded. Both 
applicants then brought their pleas before the Hoge Raad, arguing for the first time 
that the appeal court should have considered, if necessarily of its own motion, the 
question of the compatibility of compulsory fund membership with Community 
competition law. However, in Dutch law a plea in cassation of this kind involving a 
new argument could be made only if it required no examination of facts, and the 
pleas of both applicants did raise new issues of facts. Hence, the Hoge Raad made a 
preliminary reference to the ECJ, asking whether under such circumstances it was 
required to apply EC competition law even where its own national procedural law is 
clearly against such application.  
The ECJ stated in its preliminary ruling that, first, in the absence of Community rules 
governing such issue, it was for the Member States’ legal systems to lay down the 
detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding the direct effect of 
Community law.618 Secondly, and more importantly, such detailed procedural rules 
must not be ‘less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions nor 
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by 
Community law’619.  
                                                          
617 Case C-430-431/93 Van Schijndel & Van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, 
[1995] ECR I-4728. 
618 Ibid, at para. 17.  
619 Ibid. Emphasis added. It should be noted that the approach as taken by the ECJ in examining 
whether a national procedural rule actually renders virtually impossible or excessively difficult the 
exercise of rights conferred by Community law has been heavily criticised. For example, it was 
argued that it is difficult to reconcile Van Schijndel and Peterbroek. See Diederik de Groot (2011), op. 
cit., supra note 504, at para. 16-072. See also G. De Búrca, National Procedural Rules and Remedies: 
The Changing Approach of the Court of Justice and F. G. Jacobs, Enforcing Community Rights and 
obligations in National Courts: Striking the Balance, both in Julian Lonbay & Andrea Biondi, 
Remedies for Breach of EC Law, John Wiley & Sons, 1997, at pp. 43-45 and pp. 31-32; Michael 
Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice: Issues of Harmonisation and Differentiation, 
Hart Publishing, 2004, at p. 48. Notwithstanding, such criticisms would make no difference to the 
conclusion that the balance between the effectiveness of EU law and the autonomy of Member States 
needs to be struck, at least at current stage.  
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This preliminary ruling importantly conveys an implication that ‘the need for 
effectiveness and proper judicial protection can normally be satisfied by national 
remedies enforced through the national courts in accordance with national procedural 
rules’620 as long as the procedural autonomy exercised by the national courts would 
not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the protection of relevant 
public interests. Notably, one of the most important features of a reasonable 
procedural rule which does not incur such virtual impossibility or excessive difficulty 
is that it is based upon the legitimate expectation that relevant violation of public 
interests could have been reviewed before proceeding to final enforcement stage, and 
hence treat the enforcing court as the last hurdle of an international arbitration. 
Therefore, as long as the expectation still stands reasonable, which should be the case 
in legal practice, from the perspective of an enforcing court, it would be less 
legitimate and necessary for it to reconsider relevant public interests issues, and the 
probability that the respect of a reasonable procedural rule would prevent the 
potential derogation of relevant public interests from being discovered is low. A 
plausible conclusion could thus be drawn that the respect of procedural autonomy 
would prevail as long as it stays necessarily reasonable.  
Nevertheless, one might argue that this conclusion which is based essentially upon 
the examination of probability can still not provide a fully convincing answer to the 
hypothetic case raised above, under which although the procedural rule would not 
render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the protection of relevant public 
policy, the final result would be that the relevant public interest is still violated. This 
then leads to the next question concerning necessity and proportionality, namely that 
under the consideration of the low probability that the respect of procedural 
autonomy would lead to the potential violation of public policy being undiscovered 
as well as the solid effect of reasonable procedural rules which maintains the legal 
certainty and fairness of international arbitration, how necessary and proportionate it 
would be for an enforcing court to dismiss its procedural rule for protecting relevant 
public interests.  
                                                          
620 Ton Heukels, Case note on Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Van Schijndel & Van Veen v. 
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten; and Case C-312/93, Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & 
Cie SCS v. Belgian State, Common Market Law Review, Vol. 33, 1996, at 352.  
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The answer to this question lies essentially in the nature of the applicable public 
policy. For example, in the above-mentioned Van Schijndel & Van Veen, EC 
competition law was understood as not a full sense of Member States’ legal 
concept.621 As pointed out: 
‘[T]he assumption made by the authors of the EC Treaty was that national 
legal systems based on the rule of law could be relied upon to provide an 
adequate level of judicial protection; it was therefore sufficient to allow 
Community law to be enforced by  national remedies through national courts 
in accordance with national procedural rules. The reality is that the authors of 
the Treaty had little choice but to rely on national legal systems short of 
undertaking immediate and extensive harmonisation of rules governing the 
organisation of courts, remedies, procedures and time-limits.’622 
Therefore, since ‘large sections of the judiciaries throughout the European Union are 
not yet fully equipped’623 to embrace the primacy of EC law over national procedural 
rules,624 a compromise would thus be made to allow a violation of EC competition 
law potentially to ‘escape’ below the radar in rather rare occasions, 625  and the 
protection of EC competition law may thus not be able to trump the respect of 
national procedural autonomy. 
On the other hand, certain public policy may be deemed as a full sense of legal 
concepts of which the protection would be prioritised both substantively and 
procedurally. For instance, in a Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht case626 , the 
parties concluded a supply contract providing for the arbitration of disputes. 
                                                          
621 If EU competition law were deemed as provisions of public policy in the full sense, it would 
always override not only national substantive but also procedural rules. 
622 F. G. Jacobs (1997), op. cit., supra note 619, at pp. 25-26. 
623 Diederik de Groot (2011), op. cit., supra note 504, at para. 16-073. 
624 It could be found in cases such as Case C-31/90 Johnson v. Chief Adjudication Officer [1994] ECR 
I-5483 and Case C-213/93 Peterbroek, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgian State [1996] ECR I-
4615 that the ECJ steered somewhere between the strong principle of supremacy and effectiveness of 
EU law and the ready deference to national procedural rules. See also G. De Búrca (1997), op. cit., 
supra note 619, at p. 45. 
625 It should still be noted that procedural autonomy may not prohibit a national court to raise relevant 
public interest issues ex proprio motu, which would further lower the risk that relevant public interests 
would actually be violated by conceding to the procedural autonomy of the enforcing state.  
626  Germany No. 71, Seller v. Buyer, Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht, 4 Z Sch 17/03, 20 
November 2003, in Albert Jan van den berg (ed), Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 2004 - Volume 
XXIX, Kluwer Law International, at pp. 771-775. 
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Subsequently, a dispute arose and the claimant thus commenced arbitration. The 
parties then entered into settlement negotiations at the tribunal’s suggestion and 
agreed that the claimant would withdraw arbitral proceedings if the defendant paid 
the amounts in dispute. The defendant then duly paid the amounts, but the claimant 
did not terminate the arbitral proceedings by concealing the parties’ settlement and 
obtained a favourable award. The claimant then sought enforcement in Germany. 
The enforcing court, the Oberstes Landesgericht, denied enforcement pursuant to 
Article V(2)(b) of the NYC, holding that the concealment of a settlement agreement 
constitutes a gross violation of the basic principles of German law, and the 
procedural rule that a party be estopped from raising objections against an arbitral 
award that should be timely raised would be inapplicable in this case. As clearly 
shown here, contractual good faith would hence be understood as a full sense of legal 
concept in German legal system the derogation of which would not be tolerated in 
any case, even under the consideration that such violation would be rather rare under 
the procedural rules.  
It hence follows the discussion and analysis above that the question of whether the 
protection of public interests or the respect of procedural autonomy should prevail is 
not a question of ‘black-or-white’. In other words, the interrelationship between these 
two potentially competing values should not be one simply preceding over another 
but one may be prioritised under certain scenarios. A two-step examination is hence 
proposed when examining the interrelationship between a specific procedural rule 
and a specific public policy, which starts from checking the reasonability of the 
procedural rule. As inspiringly held by the ECJ, a plausible test standard would be to 
see whether the procedural rule would render virtually impossible or excessively 
difficult for the protection of relevant public interests, or more specifically, whether 
the procedural rule would unreasonably prevent or restrict the possibility of a 
potential violation of relevant public interests from being reviewed.  
Following the first step, the nature of public policy should then be examined. If a 
compromise to sacrifice the public interest to a reasonable extent could be accepted 
by the enforcing state, the procedural autonomy should then prevail. If such potential 
derogation, no matter how unlikely, could not be accepted by the enforcing state, the 
protection of the public policy would then be prioritised. It should be noted that the 
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judgment of the nature of public policy may change through time. For example, 
although the ECJ held in Van Schijndel & Van Veen that EC competition law was not 
a full sense of Member States’ legal concept and would hence not take precedence 
over national procedural autonomy, the situation might gradually change through the 
process of political integration, especially bearing in mind Advocate General 
Wathelet’s observation in Genentech v. Hoechst that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are 
fundamental provisions which are essential for the functioning of the internal market, 
without which the European Union could not function and the breach of which, 
whether or not flagrant or obvious, would be unacceptable from the standpoint of the 
EU legal order.627 Therefore, it is suggested that enforcing courts in international 
arbitration should not apply a fixed priority between the protection of a specific 
public interest and the respect of procedural autonomy, and stay alert for any 













                                                          
627  The Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet on Case C-567/14 Genentech v. Hoechst, 
EU:C:2016:177, at footnote 46. 
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Chapter VIII – Conclusion 
International commercial arbitration is understood to be an effective dispute 
resolution mechanism for resolving private dispute between parties of which the 
result, i.e. the arbitral award, would normally trigger little concern for public 
interests, and the existing mechanism of enforcing foreign arbitral award founded 
upon the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC has remained generally effective and 
efficient. However the situation may change when international arbitration begins to 
venture into areas attended by important public interests. A potential conflict 
between the pro-enforcement bias and important public policy concerns may then 
emerge to question the applicability of the existing reviewing mechanism. 
This thesis argues that the existing reviewing mechanism of enforcing foreign 
arbitral awards cannot provide clear and ideal guidance on how an enforcing court 
should act when reviewing an arbitral award concerning important public interests, 
and proposes a new comprehensive behavioural pattern of enforcing courts 
reviewing relevant foreign arbitral awards.  
EU competition law, and more specifically Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, one of the 
most representative examples of a subject matter dealing with an important public 
interest, was therefore chosen as the focus of research. Chapter II of the thesis then 
considered the possibility of international commercial arbitration as a private means 
of enforcing EU competition law to connect EU competition law with international 
arbitration. Through the research, it was found that both Articles 101 and 102 are 
directly effective and applicable before international arbitral tribunals, which led 
therefore to the conclusion that, from a theoretical perspective, disputes concerning 
EU competition law issues could be resolved by arbitration, and thus crucially paved 
the way for the research which followed. Furthermore, that Chapter also revealed 
two major modalities of raising competition law issues in international arbitration, 
namely that competition law issues could be raised either defensively or proactively. 
The link between EU competition law and international arbitration having been 
established, the research then progressed to Chapter III, in which the current 
prevailing understanding of the mechanism of reviewing foreign arbitral award at 
enforcement stage under the NYC was critically examined and the uncertainties 
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regarding the enforcement of arbitral awards concerning important public interests 
raised. The spotlight was placed upon three grounds provided in the NYC, namely 
Article V(2)(a) according to which the enforcement of an arbitral award may be 
refused if the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable; Article V(2)(b) which 
focuses on the potential refusal of enforcement caused by the violation of relevant 
public policy; and Article V(1)(e) which provides the possibility that the enforcement 
of an arbitral award may be refused if the award has already been vacated by a 
competent seat court.  
As for Article V(2)(b), the research of this section set out by providing a plausible 
definition of public policy, i.e. the fundamental and basic principles or values of a 
state, followed by examining its applicable law at the enforcement stage. By 
comparing and analysing the lex fori, the ‘truly international’ public value and the 
law of foreign states, the research concluded that the lex fori should generally be 
applied when examining public policy issues at enforcement stage, unless a 
jurisdiction regards respecting other jurisdictions’ public policy as an international 
comity and essentially incorporates this comity in its own public policy. After the 
examination of the first two issues, the focus then switched to the permissive 
wording and its application under this Article, which further revealed three key 
principles of the application of the public policy defence, i.e. public policy touches 
only upon the most fundamental principles or values of a jurisdiction; only clear and 
effective violation of public policy could activate the public policy defence under 
Article V(2)(b); and the review of public policy issues at enforcement stage could not 
delve into the merits of disputes but merely conduct a prima facie review. 
This third point regarding the reviewing pattern of public policy issue then triggers 
the first key query of this research, namely the applicability of the prima facie 
reviewing standard. More specifically, first, when relevant competition law issues 
have been examined by the tribunal, whether the enforcing court should fully trust 
the tribunal’s decision without reviewing the reasoning and merits of dispute; and 
secondly, when relevant competition law issues were not examined by the tribunal, 
whether the enforcing court should dig into the merits of dispute to determine the 
existence of serious violations of competition law or merely decide the fate of the 
award based upon the information reflected in the award. 
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Moreover, as for Article V(2)(a), the most fundamental question which concerns the 
rationale of inarbitrability was first examined. There are two major reasons which 
cause certain subject matters which concern important public interests to be 
inarbitrable. The first is the inappropriateness which lies inherently in the mechanism 
of international arbitration, i.e. international arbitration is a dispute resolution 
mechanism of contractual origins, which would be inappropriate to solve disputes 
concerning important public interests since the result of arbitration inevitably 
influences third non-contractual parties. The second lies in other extrinsic reasons 
concerning, for example, the distrust of arbitrators’ qualifications and the view that 
international arbitration is, or at least in the past was, equipped with less fact-finding 
powers and less rigorous evidential proceedings. This basic rationale of 
inarbitrability, although seemingly persuasive, is not free of uncertainty in legal 
practice. As for the inherent inappropriateness, uncertainties may arise when 
considering what the nature of influence as exerted on the contractual parties and the 
third parties are. Are these influences the same or should they be distinguished? If 
different, would such difference degrade the legitimacy of the argument? 
Furthermore, as for the extrinsic reasons, a question mark hangs over those extrinsic 
reasons as they seem to be more empirically assumptive than uniformly observed. 
Therefore, a query was raised, whether these reasons would lead always to a subject 
matter concerning public interest being inarbitrable. Followed this examination, the 
applicable law of arbitrability at enforcement stage was then examined. Through the 
research, contrary to the prevailing viewpoint that the lex fori should govern 
arbitrability issue at enforcement stage, an understanding that arbitrability should be 
interpreted as a jurisdictional rule was raised, and it was hence proposed in this 
research that in an international arbitration, if the dispute falls outwith the 
jurisdiction of the enforcing court, the enforcing court’s own law on arbitrability 
should not be applied; if the dispute is indeed within the jurisdiction of the enforcing 
court, the lex fori would then be applied.  
Having gained a basic understanding of the operation mechanism of the arbitrability 
ground under the NYC, the second key query of this research was then raised, 
focusing on the rationale of a subject matter concerning important public interest 
being inarbitrable. It was queried that whether the rationale as introduced in this 
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section, namely both the inherent and extrinsic reasons for denying the arbitrability 
of subject matter concerning important public interests, remains still true in legal 
practice. 
Last but not least, as for Article V(1)(e), a key issue lies in the practical application 
of the permissive wording of this Article – since as it provides that the enforcing 
court may refuse to enforce an arbitral award which has already been vacated by the 
seat court, how should this discretion of the enforcing court be applied? By 
examining two potential interrelationships between a seat court and an enforcing 
court, the research in this Section reached the conclusion that the annulment 
judgment made by the seat court should be generally followed by the enforcing court, 
subject to three exceptions, namely the procedural injustice of the annulment 
judgment, the outdated or exorbitant annulment standard as applied when making the 
annulment judgment, and, most pertinent to this research, the annulment judgment 
being made based upon the inarbitrability of the dispute at hand or the violation of 
relevant public policy.  
With respect to the third exception, the author further proposed a comprehensive 
behavioural pattern of an enforcing court encountering an annulment judgment based 
upon these two grounds. With regard to an annulment judgment made based upon 
inarbitrability, if the enforcing state is itself a substantively interested state to which 
the dispute would fall within the jurisdiction of the state if the arbitration agreement 
were absent, it would apply its own arbitrability rule no matter how the seat court has 
ruled on the arbitrability issue. If the enforcing state is not a substantively interested 
state, two possible scenarios may arise: if the seat court refused to set aside the award 
based upon its own arbitrability rule but the involved dispute did not fall within the 
jurisdiction of the seat court if the arbitration agreement were absent, this annulment 
judgment should not be able to influence the enforcing court’s decision on 
enforcement; if the seat court refused to set aside the award based upon its own 
arbitrability rule and the involved dispute does fall within the jurisdiction of the seat 
court, the enforcing court should then conduct a two-step examination starting from 
considering whether it would, under its own public policy, respect and protect other 
states’ rule of exclusive jurisdiction. If the answer is in the affirmative, it would then 
run a balancing test between its unwritten obligation of enforcing an arbitral award 
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under the NYC and the urgency of upholding a foreign state’s arbitrability rule; if the 
seat court refused to set aside the award based upon the arbitrability rule of a foreign 
substantively interested state, the enforcing court should also follow the suggested 
behavioural pattern in the second scenario as discussed above.  
In regard to an annulment judgment made based upon a violation of relevant public 
policy, if the seat’s public policy is not understood by the enforcing court as covering 
either the enforcing state’s fundamental domestic public interest or a general public 
value which is recognised by the enforcing state, such annulment decision would 
generally not influence the enforcing court’s decision on whether to enforce the 
arbitral award. Although the enforcing court may, if permitted by its own law, 
consider to respect and protect the public policy of the seat, the application of such 
discretion would be restricted under the pro-enforcement bias of the NYC; if the 
seat’s public policy is understood by the enforcing court as covering either the 
enforcing court’s fundamental domestic public interest or a generally recognised 
public value, the enforcing court would then apply its own standard of reviewing the 
seat court’s annulment judgment and determine whether to enforce the arbitral award; 
if the seat court annulled the award based not upon its own public policy but the 
public policy of a foreign jurisdiction, unless it could be convincingly proved that the 
enforcement of the award would manifestly derogate from the public policy of the 
foreign jurisdiction and the law of enforcing state permits the enforcing court to 
respect the public policy of a foreign jurisdiction under certain prerequisites, the 
enforcing court is not obliged to follow the seat court’s annulment decision. 
The third key query of this research is then raised by re-considering the proposal on 
an enforcing court’s behavioural patterns of reviewing arbitral awards on public 
policy ground, namely that if the seat’s public policy is understood by the enforcing 
court as covering either the enforcing court’s fundamental domestic public interest or 
a generally recognised public value, the enforcing court would then apply its own 
standard of reviewing the seat court’s annulment judgment and determine whether to 
enforce the arbitral award. An uncertainty hence emerges: which specific standard 
should the enforcing court apply? Should the enforcing court re-examine what the 
seat court has examined to ensure that the seat court has performed in the way which 
it would have performed if the public policy issue is directly raised before it after the 
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award was rendered? Or should the enforcing court fully trust the seat court and 
simply follow the seat court’s decision? 
With these three key queries raised in examining the three grounds as provided by 
the NYC, the following Chapters IV to VI then set out to provide answers to them 
respectively by concretising the scenario to the enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards concerning EU competition law disputes.  
To begin, Chapter IV addressed the first key query and drew the following key points. 
First, expanding arbitrability on subject matters concerning public interest tallies 
with the tendency of the development of international commerce. Under this 
prerequisite, secondly, as for the inherent inappropriateness of arbitrating disputes 
concerning important public interests, there exists an inevitability of imposing impact 
on non-contractual parties, which merely dictate inevitable effects which neither 
confers rights nor imposes obligation. Such impact should not trigger the concern 
that arbitrating disputes concerning public interests would undermine the nature of 
international arbitration as a private dispute resolution mechanism. Moreover, 
although international arbitration itself may not provide sufficient redress to 
violations of public interests since it would focus merely on the contracting parties 
and not on other affected third parties, such focus and the privacy of international 
arbitration would not constitute a bar to derogation from the sufficiency of protecting 
public interests, especially under the consideration of the non-absoluteness of 
confidentiality of arbitration proceedings and arbitral awards. Thirdly, as for the 
relevant extrinsic reasons, with the development of international arbitration and an 
improvement in the quality of arbitrators, when public policy issues are raised, it 
could legitimately be expected that the arbitrators are fully competent to examine and 
rule on them. Therefore, following these points of view, the author takes the view 
that international arbitration, from both theoretical and practical perspectives, has the 
potential to become a reliable dispute resolution mechanism for resolving disputes 
concerning important public interests. 
Following the discussion on the application of Article V(2)(a) of NYC, Chapter V 
then turned to address the second key query concerning the reviewing pattern of an 
enforcing court examining public policy issues as reflected in an arbitral award. 
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Through this research, it found that the applicability of the prima facie reviewing 
standard essentially depends upon the obligation of an enforcing state under its 
public policy concern as well as the ability of the prima facie reviewing standard in 
revealing potential serious violation. Under the scenario that the prevailing prima 
facie reviewing standard may not reliably reveal potential clear and effective 
violations of relevant public policy, a further step of deeper examination of the 
merits of dispute should be allowed. Based upon this viewpoint, this Section carried 
on to propose a comprehensive behavioural pattern of an enforcing court reviewing 
arbitral awards concerning EU competition law by examining two key parameters, i.e. 
the manifestation of the violation of relevant public policy, and the specific 
obligation as borne by an enforcing court under such public policy, with the 
expectation of shedding light on the behavioural pattern of an enforcing court 
reviewing arbitral awards concerning other public interests.  
The last key query concerning the interrelationship between seat courts and enforcing 
courts was then examined in Chapter VI. Following the concept that the reviewing 
pattern of a national court examining relevant public policy issues depends 
essentially upon the specific obligation it bears under the specific public policy, the 
author carried on to propose that the interrelationship between a seat court and an 
enforcing court under a specific public policy would depend essentially upon 
whether the fulfilment of the seat court’s obligation could automatically fulfil the 
obligation as borne by the enforcing court, which then calls for a three-step 
examination. First, the specific obligation as borne by a seat court and an enforcing 
court under a specific public policy should be specified; secondly, what the seat court 
and the enforcing court would do to fulfil their obligations; and thirdly, a comparison 
between the required actions of both the seat court and the enforcing court should 
then be made to shape the specific interrelationship between the two.  
Last but not least, Chapter VII wound up the research by examining the potential 
rivalry between the protection of public interests and the respect of procedural 
autonomy which may potentially influence the applicability of the behavioural 
patterns raised above, proposing that the interrelationship between these two 
potentially competing values should not be one simply taking precedence over 
another. Following the bottom line that the procedural autonomy of an enforcing 
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state should not inflict unnecessary and excessive difficulty on its national courts 
reviewing public policy issues as reflected in arbitral awards and based upon the 
legitimate expectation that relevant public policy issues, if conditions permit, could 
have been raised before the enforcement stage, the specific interrelationship between 
the protection of a specific public interest and the respect of relevant procedural 
autonomy would also rest with the nature of the public interest, i.e. whether such 
public policy is a full sense of legal concept of which the protection would be 
unconditional whatsoever, or a compromise to sacrifice the public interest to a 
limited, reasonable extent could be acceptable.  
Based upon the research results as concluded above, the contribution of this thesis 
thus lies in three major aspects. The first is that, by revisiting the existing reviewing 
mechanism of foreign arbitral award under Article V(2)(a), V(2)(b) and V(1)(e) of 
the NYC, some new understanding of their application in legal practice, e.g. the 
applicable law of public policy and arbitrability issues and the interrelationship 
between a seat court and an enforcing court, is proposed by the author with the 
expectation of increasing the legal certainty of international arbitration. Secondly, by 
narrowing the research scope to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards 
concerning EU competition law issues, a specific behavioural pattern of an enforcing 
court under this scenario is proposed, which was expected to promote the 
development and increase legal certainty of the private enforcement of EU 
competition law. Thirdly, based upon the examination of enforcing awards 
concerning EU competition law issues, the general principles and specific ideas are 
extracted and generalised to shed light upon the behavioural pattern of an enforcing 
court examining foreign arbitral awards concerning other public interests.  
Notwithstanding, it should be noted that since the New York Convention essentially 
leaves certain room for an enforcing court to exercise its own discretion under the 
grounds as examined in this research, the research results are reached based largely 
upon the examination of relevant theoretical foundations and should hence still be 
subject to the test of legal practice.  However, from the viewpoint of the author, it 
remains true that the existing mechanism of enforcing foreign arbitral awards is not 
flawless and without uncertainty, especially when considering the collision between 
international commercial arbitration and disputes concerning an important public 
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interest. Considering that international commercial arbitration is applied increasingly 
in dispute resolution, the discussion and research on the connection between 
international commercial arbitration and the enforcement of public laws are thus 
encouraged, and a comprehensive enforcement standard of arbitral awards 
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